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Summary 
 
Episodic Cognition (or “Mental Time Travel”) is the ability to mentally re-experience 
events from our personal past and imagine potential events from our personal future. 
This capacity is fundamental to our lives and has been argued to be uniquely human. 
The aim of this thesis is to use behavioural tasks developed in comparative cognition 
to integrate both the literature on different research subjects (animals, children, adults, 
patients) but also from different theoretical perspectives, with the hope of facilitating 
communication and comparison between these fields. 
 
The backbone of the thesis is the behavioural tasks themselves, along with their 
origins in theory. Specifically, the “What-Where-When”, “Unexpected Question” and 
“Free Recall” episodic memory tasks and the “Bischof-Köhler” test of episodic 
foresight. Each of these tasks stems from different theoretical approaches to defining 
episodic cognition. Whilst extensively studied, these four tasks have never been 
undertaken by the same subjects and have never been directly compared. It is thus 
unclear whether these different theoretical perspectives converge on a single “episodic 
cognition” system, or a variety of overlapping processes. This thesis explores these 
issues by presenting these tasks to previously untested animal (the Eurasian Jay), 
developing children (aged 3-6), and a sample of human adults (Cambridge 
Undergraduates). Finally, these findings are applied in the assessment of episodic 
cognition in a population that is thought to have mild hippocampal damage – the 
overweight and obese.  
 
It was predicted that if all these putative tests of episodic cognition were tapping into 
the same underlying ability, then they should be passed by the same animal species, 
develop at the same time in children, correlate in human adults and be impaired in 
those with damage to the relevant brain areas. These predictions were, to some 
degree, confirmed. While the novel animal model could not be tested on all 
paradigms, the jays performed well on Bischof-Köhler future planning test. However, 
the results of the What-Where-When memory test were equivocal. There was a 
relatively low degree of correlation between performance on all the tasks in human 
children, along with a suggestion that each had a distinct developmental trajectory. 
The study of human adults revealed that while performance on all the tasks were 
related to one another, this relationship was often nonlinear, suggesting the 
contribution of several different psychological processes. Finally, it was found that 
both memory and performance on the Bischof-Köhler future planning task were 
altered in individuals who are overweight. A potentially surprising theme throughout 
the results is that performance on the Bischof-Köhler tasks is in fact negatively related 
to performance on memory tests, and improves in patients thought to have mild 
hippocampal damage. 
 
It is concluded that there may be a significant degree of overlap in the processes 
tapped by different putative tests of episodic memory, but that they can not be 
considered to be equivalent. Furthermore, it is suggested that episodic cognition is a 
fundamentally ineffective system with which to predict future motivational states, 
because it is biased by current feelings.  
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Chapter 1  
 
On the Difficulties in Introducing Episodic Cognition 
 
Articles about a particular subject, by tradition, begin with a sentence defining that 
subject and why it is important. In the case of episodic cognition such a sentence is not 
easy to produce; episodic cognition and its component elements have many different 
names (e.g. mental time travel, episodic memory, source memory, autobiographical 
memory, episodic foresight, episodic prospection, episodic future thinking, future-
planning…) and an equally diverse array of definitions. To compound issues, various 
literatures may use the same name for two potentially different processes, or different 
names for what may be a single process. On top of this, psychological tests are 
sometimes labelled for the way they assess memory (e.g. free recall, cued recall) and 
sometimes for the memory that they putatively test (episodic memory test, semantic 
memory test), though different researchers disagree on which of the former correspond to 
which of the latter. Furthermore, different literatures are interested in establishing 
different things about episodic cognition - whether it exists in animals, when it develops 
in children, what brain regions it is dependant upon, which disorders in which it is 
impaired - with only partial consensus as to what it is. All these fractionations make the 
body of research pertaining to episodic cognition tricky to traverse and almost impossible 
to distil down into a single coherent literature. 
 
The various “working definitions” of episodic memory overlap on a central core 
feature, namely that episodic memory refers to the memory for events from the 
personal past. Most theorists now agree that episodic memory forms part of a broader 
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process (variously labelled Mental Time Travel [Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997] or 
Episodic cognition [Clayton et al., 2009]) that allows mental “re-experience” of 
events from the personal past and “pre-experience” of events from the personal future.  
However they differ on many other key features. Box 1 demonstrates the variety of 
different “facts” that have been stated about episodic cognition by various researchers, 
many of which are contradictory. Part of the confusion is historical. As with any new 
field, definitions have been adapted over time to the evidence that has been 
accumulated. Tulving first suggested, forty years ago, the distinction between 
episodic memory for spatiotemporal events in the personal past and semantic memory 
for timeless facts (Tulving et al., 1972). However he has since included the concept of 
“autonoetic” (self-knowing) consciousness (e.g. 1985b) which accompanies episodic 
memory and gives the rememberer the knowledge that what it being experienced is a 
re-experience of an event from one’s own past. Finally, Tulving added 
“chronesthesia” (2002); the sense of autobiographical subjective time that allows 
“mental time travel” into the personal past and future. Thus research that was thought 
to investigate episodic cognition in 1975 was not assessing episodic cognition as it 
was defined in 1985, and research from 1985 has only partial relevance to episodic 
cognition as it was defined in 2005. Evolution of the goal posts of the definition over 
time is not the only factor, however. Part of the confusion lies in the juxtaposition of 
“official” definitions and working definitions – that is, different people’s 
interpretations of those definitions, and people’s own intuitive ideas about what  
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episodic cognition is to them – that create significant discrepancies in the literature. 
On top of this, there are a number of fields that exist parallel to the episodic cognition 
literature that have their own terminology that partially, but not completely, overlaps 
with those in the episodic memory literature (e.g. long-term memory, 
autobiographical memory, declarative memory, source memory, source monitoring, 
reality monitoring, delayed imitation, delayed matching to sample, childhood 
amnesia, prospective memory, planning, delay of gratification, temporal discounting). 
 
 
Is that a Needle, or is it Hay? 
“Mental time travel allows one, as an “owner” of episodic memory 
(“self”), through the medium of autonoetic awareness, to remember one’s 
own previous “thought-about” experiences, as well as to “think about” 
one’s possible future experiences. The operations of episodic memory 
require, but go beyond, the semantic memory system. Retrieving 
information from episodic memory (“remembering”) requires the 
establishment and maintenance of a special mental set, dubbed episodic 
“retrieval mode”. The neural components of episodic memory comprise a 
widely distributed network of cortical and subcortical brain regions that 
overlap with and extend beyond the network subserving other memory 
systems. The essence of episodic memory lies in the conjunction of three 
concepts – self, autonoetic consciousness, and subjective time.” (Tulving, 
2005, p.9) 
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From this example it is possible to see how Tulving’s theory of episodic memory is 
built into his definition(s) of episodic memory, creating a problem of circularity in the 
literature. For example, Tulving states that “the operations of episodic memory 
require, but go beyond, the semantic memory system” (Tulving, 2005, p.9). However, 
it has been recently demonstrated that patients suffering with semantic dementia (who 
have severe semantic memory impairments) are able to remember episodically (e.g. 
Graham et al., 1997, Graham et al., 2000, Simons et al., 2001, Graham and Hodges, 
1997, Hodges et al., 1992, Snowden et al., 1996, Simons et al., 1999). While some 
might argue that this proves this aspect of Tulving’s theory of episodic cognition 
wrong, Tulving might argue that because the memory tests used by these researchers 
were performed successfully by patients with semantic dementia, they cannot, by 
definition, have been testing episodic memory (since episodic memory is defined by 
the fact that it requires but goes beyond semantic memory). The situation is similar 
when it comes to the demonstration of episodic cognition in animals. Immediately 
before the definition quoted above, Tulving stresses that “before we can undertake the 
task of evaluating the presence of episodic memory in nonhuman animals, the concept 
needs to be sharpened…We need to be clear about the kind of memory that I am 
denying to our feathered and furry friends” (Tulving, 2005, p.9). Yet the definition of 
episodic memory that immediately follows from this statement declares that episodic 
memory is “recently evolved…and probably unique to humans” (p.9).  Given this, it 
is by definition impossible for episodic cognition, as it is defined by Tulving, to exist 
in animals.   
 
Thus a discrepancy has been created between what has been empirically demonstrated 
about the nature of cognition in humans and animals, and how these are related to 
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Tulving’s definition of episodic cognition. Because episodic cognition is defined as 
“late developing” (e.g. Tulving, 2002, 2005), it cannot, by definition, be present at 
birth. Therefore any empirical demonstration of memory in newborns cannot be 
evidence for episodic memory. However, the concept of episodic memory is an 
intuitive one that we all recognise from our own mental lives: “we know what mental 
time travel is because we can introspectively observe ourselves doing it and because 
people spend so much time talking about their recollections and anticipations” 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, p.301). Thus individuals’ ideas of what episodic 
cognition is exist independently of Tulving’s definition(s) of it. Because of this, if 
there is evidence of a given memory ability in an infant or an animal that meets an 
individual’s personal conceptualisation of episodic cognition, it is declared as such, 
regardless of what limitations Tulving has built into his definitions. A situation 
therefore currently exists in which evidence for episodic cognition exists for a number 
of nonhuman species (e.g. Zentall, 2005) or no nonhuman animals at all (e.g. 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), in 16-month old babies (e.g. Bauer and Dow, 1994) 
or in no children younger than 4 (e.g. Suddendorf et al., 2011) depending on which 
papers you read.  
 
One might say that the field of episodic cognition is looking for a needle in a 
haystack, but that no-one can agree on what constitutes a needle and what constitutes 
hay. Given the difficulty in establishing what episodic cognition is, how then, is 
episodic cognition actually assessed? 
 
 
 
14 
Interviews 
 
Adult humans are able to verbally report both the content of their memory and their 
subjective experience of remembering. As such, many researchers have investigated 
episodic cognition using interview. These interviews have taken many forms. 
Autobiographical memories can investigated using cue-words (such as “river”) to 
elicit related memories that must be described, located and dated (The Crovitz 
Technique: e.g. Crovitz and Schiffma.H, 1974). Periods of the lifetime (e.g. 
“childhood”) can also be used as cues for recall (The Autobiographical Interview: 
Kopelman et al., 1989). More controlled testing conditions can be created by eliciting 
recall of naturalistic events originating in the laboratory (e.g. Hashtroudi et al., 1990). 
Furthermore, individuals can be asked to imagine themselves in a future scenario 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007), or mentally construct a novel/future scene or event 
(Schacter and Addis, 2007a, Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). While there is little 
controversy that measurement of accuracy and vividness of mental experience 
through interview can effectively tap episodic processes, (Addis and Schacter, 2008, 
Maguire and Mummery, 1999, Hokkanen et al., 1995, Barr et al., 1990, Kapur et al., 
1997, Tanaka et al., 1999, Buckner and Carroll, 2007, Hassabis et al., 2007) these 
tests are heavily reliant on verbal competence and therefore not always appropriate for 
patient groups (for example, where language may be impaired) or young children 
(where it is difficult to disentangle elements of verbal and cognitive development; see 
Chapter 3). Thus there is a need to develop and validate tests of episodic cognition 
that are less reliant on verbal capabilities.  
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“Laboratory” tests of a cognitive process essentially define a behavioural criterion1: if 
a subject demonstrates behaviour X, then they can be said to be using mental process 
Y. However, consensus on a true behavioural criterion for episodic cognition has 
proved difficult. In the first instance, the different definitions of episodic cognition 
highlight different “defining features”. As such, the behavioural criteria born out of 
these definitions emphasize different features. A related problem is that there is little 
agreement (yet little explicit debate) over which behavioural criteria can be said to 
test episodic cognition, and which test related, yet distinct, processes such as semantic 
memory, rule-learning or familiarity. Even within an individual publication opinions 
on such matters are riddled with what seem like inconsistencies. For example, Tulving 
(1984), in describing the work of McKoon & Ratcliff (1979), refers to word-stem 
completion as a semantic memory test and recognition as an episodic memory test. 
Yet only a few lines later, describing the work of Schacter and colleagues (1982), he 
suggests that while episodic amnesics have great difficulty remembering events from 
their lives, they have no difficulty in recognising faces, suggesting that their semantic 
memory is intact. Similarly, Wheeler and colleagues (1997) describe Tulving’s 
(1985a) finding that while free recall is correlated with a report of “remembering” 
rather than “knowing”, cued recall and recognition paradigms are supported to a 
larger extent by semantic memory processes. However, a little later in the same article 
they discuss evidence for frontal lobe involvement in episodic memory that consists 
entirely of studies that used cued recall as their episodic memory test (Buckner et al., 
1995, Squire et al., 1992, Shallice et al., 1994). Such apparent lack of consistency 
even within an individual argument (let alone between them) suggests that an explicit 
debate is needed within the field as to what empirical tests can be considered to assess 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this thesis, the term “Behavioural” refers to a subject’s behaviour (verbal or 
nonverbal) rather than any other indices (such as activation of a particular brain area). The term 
“nonverbal” will be used when referring to tasks which do not require language. 
16 
episodic cognition. The following section explores different behavioural criteria that 
have been argued as necessary for the demonstration of episodic cognition.  
 
Episodic Memory Must … Represent Spatiotemporal Relations  
 
Clayton and Dickinson (1998) argue that if episodic cognition is to be investigated in 
nonverbal subjects, then the assessment cannot require demonstration of subjective 
phenomenology. These authors suggest that a behavioural criterion for episodic 
memory could be derived from Tulving’s original definition of episodic memory as a 
system that “receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or 
events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events” (Tulving et al., 1972, 
p.385): In other words, as memory for what happened, where and when (Clayton and 
Dickinson, 1998). In later writings, Clayton and colleagues emphasize that for a what-
where-when paradigm to be considered to be testing something resembling episodic 
memory, the memory demonstrated must be integrated (i.e. the what, where and when 
elements must form a single representation) and should be able to be used flexibly to 
guide behaviour (i.e. the subject should represent the event, not a fixed response rule 
or intention based on the event; Clayton et al., 2003).  
 
Clayton and Dickinson (1998) label memory demonstrated using the what-where-
when paradigm as episodic-like because nonverbal paradigms cannot demonstrate any 
of the subjective phenomenology associated with later definitions of episodic memory 
(such as the feeling of “re-experiencing” and Tulving’s concepts of “autonoetic 
consciousness” and “chronesthesia”). Suddendorf and Busby (2003a) admit that to 
insist that evidence of episodic memory in animals must include a demonstration of 
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autonoetic consciousness renders the hypothesis that episodic cognition is limited to 
humans unfalsifiable. They argue, however, that this does not make it parsimonious to 
accept that animals possess episodic memory, but rather that they form what-where-
when (WWW) memories which may be episodic, but that a more parsimonious 
account would be that they involve cognitive processes that make no reference to the 
past at all, but instead involve rule-learning or response algorithm. Suddendorf and 
Busby (2003a) furthermore argue that it is possible to create a double dissociation 
between being able to remember the what, where and when of an event and 
involvement of episodic memory: 
 
 “One can know what happened where and when without being able to 
remember the event (e.g. your birth) and, conversely, one can travel 
back in time without access to accurate when and where information. I 
(TS) can vividly re-experience meeting a fascinating character once in 
the Philippines (or was that Indonesia?) sometime in the early nineties 
(or was that the late eighties?)” (Suddendorf and Busby, 2003a, p.6).  
 
However such examples are flawed because they emphasize semantic knowledge 
about location and time that has been received verbally (no one remembers, 
semantically or otherwise, the time and place of their birth from experiencing it) and 
inappropriately impersonal and specific definitions of time and place to emphasize the 
inaccuracy of spatiotemporal information in episodic memory (both “Indonesia” and 
the “Philippines” are “far away” [or even more specifically, “far away south-east from 
here”] and both “the early nineties” and “the late eighties” are “long ago” [or even 
more specifically, “about 20 years ago” or “when I was about 5 years old”]). Note that 
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while “the Philippines” and “the late eighties” are impersonal features of an event, 
“south-east of here” and “when I was 5” are personal features of an event. Because 
this quote was written by Thomas Suddendorf in New Zealand in 2003, and I am 
discussing it in England in 2012, all of the impersonal features (“Philippines”, “late 
eighties”) are identical, but the personal features (“south-east of here”, “when I was 
5”) are changed. Given that episodic memory is memory for personal events, it is 
surely more likely that the what, where and when elements would be recorded from a 
personal perspective. No one argues that episodic memory allows an individual to 
locate precisely on a man-made map or calendar when an event occurred. It is widely 
argued, however, that episodic memory differs from semantic memory in that it 
involves the representation of spatial and temporal information about an event as well 
as what the focal event itself was. 
 
The inclusion of the temporal element in the “what-where-when” criterion has been 
controversial. Researchers have disagreed as to the type of encoded “when” 
information (i.e. distance based [how long ago]; location based [when exactly] or 
order based [before/after judgments]) that constitutes evidence for episodic (-like) 
memory (see Friedman, 1993). Roberts (2008) argues that only location-based 
temporal judgements are episodic while distance based temporal judgements do not 
require memory (but merely “keeping track of how much time has elapsed”: p.113). 
However, Friedman (1993) reviews evidence suggesting that location-based temporal 
judgements are reliant on logical inference of time based on contextual details and 
knowledge about time-courses: e.g. “it must have been in 2001 because I was doing 
my GCSEs, which means I was 16, which means it was 16 years after 1985 which is 
when I was born”. Thus Friedman argues that location-based temporal judgements are 
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largely dependant on semantic knowledge about the contextual details contained in 
episodic memory. Furthermore, Friedman’s model of memory for time (1993) 
includes the judgement of temporal distance as the first process in the series of 
temporal judgments in human memory. As such, it is not clear on what basis Roberts 
(2008) and others argue that memory for “when exactly” something occurred is 
somehow more episodic than memory for “how long ago” it occurred. 
 
Eacott and colleagues (2005) argue that the “when” component of episodic-like 
memory serves only as an “occasion setter” with which to distinguish multiple similar 
experiences (Eacott and Norman, 2004), and consequently that a “what-where-which” 
criterion – where the “which” demarcates the experience as a unique episode - could 
equally be used to define this kind of memory (Eacott and Norman, 2004, Eacott and 
Gaffan, 2005). Cheke & Clayton (2010) agree that replacing “when” with “which” 
brings the what-where-when criteria more into line with other memory tests that 
emphasis memory for context (discussed below). However, they argue that the reason 
that the “what”, “where” and “when” elements are all important is that they can be 
varied independently: In terms of a behavioural criterion “which” cannot avoid being 
confounded by elements of “what” and “where” unless it is temporally defined – i.e. 
unless it is when. Consider the following example: two games of tennis (what) at the 
park (where) could be differentiated by which partner you played, which top you were 
wearing, which court you played on, which tennis racquet you used... but each of 
these could be confounded with “what” (tennis-with-John vs. tennis-with-Jane) or 
where (court in school vs. court in the park). Thus while it is certainly arguable that 
episodic-like memory of an event need not entail recollection of “when” it occurred, 
this element is necessary to behaviourally confirm that the memory is for a specific 
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episode rather than for timeless facts about the spaces or objects involved in that 
episode.  
 
While the What-Where-When behavioural criterion stipulates the content, integration 
and flexibility of demonstrated memory, other behavioural criteria emphasize aspects 
of the encoding or retrieval situation. 
 
Episodic Memory Must … Be Internally Cued 
 
“All retrieval is cued: Retrieval does not occur in situations in which 
appropriate retrieval cues are absent….An important research problem 
lies in the identification of the nature of “invisible” cues… in situations 
in which no cues appear to be present.” (Tulving, 1984, p.229) 
 
Memory retrieval can occur in response to external cues that trigger the retrieval of a 
memory (cued recall) or uncued/in response to an internally generated cue (free 
recall). Tulving (1985b) argued that the contribution of episodic cognition (or rather, 
the self-knowing “autonoetic” consciousness that he argues accompanies episodic 
cognition) to memory for items on a list can be assessed by asking subjects if they 
remembered an item’s occurrence on the list, or whether they simply knew “on some 
other basis” (p.8) that the item was on the list. He found that subjects were more 
likely to report “remembering” items from a word-list during a free recall task than 
during a cued recall task (although this difference was small: 88% compared with 
75%). Thus he concluded that if the memory was internally cued by some cognitive 
process then it was more likely to be remembered episodically then if it was 
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externally cued by some information in the environment (such as the first letter of the 
to-be-remembered word).  
 
The remember/know procedure has been mostly adopted by researchers studying 
recognition memory to differentiate between recollection and familiarity, and has 
been shown to successfully identify the involvement of the hippocampus in memory 
retrieval (e.g. Eldridge et al., 2000). However this literature has thus far failed to 
identify different recognition tests that can be used to tap episodic retrieval rather than 
semantic retrieval or familiarity judgements. The remember/know paradigm has 
instead been used to identify which particular items in a given recognition task are 
episodically remembered. Tulving’s findings of a difference in remember judgements 
between free and cued recall have, however, led to the conclusion by some theorists 
(e.g. Perner and Ruffman, 1995) that free recall tasks tap episodic cognition to a 
greater extent than cued recall tasks. 
 
Tulving’s findings were specific to a free recall task using a word-list. However there 
are a number of types of free recall tests. Some are purely verbal, in which a list of 
words (or a section of prose) is read by or read to subjects which then, after some 
delay, has to be repeated back. Some are partially verbal in that the studied item is not 
a word but an object or picture, but the recall is verbal, in that subjects must report the 
items they have seen. There is considerable evidence that all these types of free recall 
test draw upon hippocampal regions (e.g. Fernandez et al., 1998, Baxendale, 1998, 
Frisk and Milner, 1990, Baxendale et al., 1998). But it appears that free recall of 
different types of stimuli rely differently on the dominant (usually left) and 
subdominant (usually right) hippocampus, with recall of verbal and narrative stimuli 
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tending being more associated with the former (e.g. Frisk and Milner, 1990, 
Baxendale, 1998, Baxendale et al., 1998) and recall of images and objects being more 
associated with the latter (Baxendale et al., 1998). Thus it may be that different types 
of free recall task tap episodic memory differently, or to different extents.   
 
Subjects that are required to recall words from a list often use deliberate encoding and 
retrieval strategies to aid this task. Recalling a list of words seems intuitively not to 
lend itself to the use of episodic memory. The list has no spatial context, no “scene” 
and no coherent narrative. It is interesting to note, therefore, that many of the 
strategies people use to aid their memory for such stimuli have the effect of adding 
context and narrative and linking the words into a spatio-temporal scene. Possibly the 
most “episodic” technique is the “method of loci” in which subjects mentally place 
list-items at various points in a well-known journey, such as the journey through their 
own house. This allows the subject to recall not only the identity of the items, but 
their order with impressive accuracy (e.g. Roediger, 1980). It is notable that with this 
method a word-list is in essence converted into a what-where-when test: the subject 
remembers what word was presented, where in the house/room and at which stage of 
the journey. It is possible that such methodologies are so effective in part because by 
utilising both verbal and visual information, they enable contribution from both 
hippocampal formations to facilitate memory (rather than just the left or the right 
hippocampus). Indeed it has been shown that people who are highly skilled at the 
method of loci show increased activation in the right hippocampus when encoding 
relative to those untrained in the technique (Maguire et al., 2003). On the other hand, 
many mnemonic techniques have the effect of essentially turning a free recall test into 
a cued recall test: for example, the process of categorising words. Thus it is important 
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when considering performance on a free recall test, not only to record accuracy, but 
also encoding/retrieval techniques that may alter the contribution of episodic 
cognition to performance. 
 
In the majority of tests putatively assessing episodic memory, there are focal elements 
(e.g. words on a word list) that must be remembered and the subjects are explicitly 
informed of the impending memory test. These features set the majority of memory 
tests apart from the scenarios in which episodic memories are encoded and retrieved 
in everyday life. In reality, memories are often encoded without the encoder’s 
knowledge that they are later to be tested, and memories must often be retrieved about 
events that were not explicitly attended to at the time they occurred. Some schools of 
thought suggest that these features of episodic memory can be considered defining. 
That is, episodic memory is unique in its catch-all recording of entire events, whether 
or not they are deliberately memorized or even explicitly attended to (e.g Morris and 
Frey, 1997).  
 
This “automatic encoding” feature of episodic memory has been investigated in two 
ways. Some researchers have sought to explore the difference between the encoding 
of target items that have been deliberately or non-deliberately memorized. Here, the 
to-be-remembered item is the centre of attention at the time of encoding, but the 
subject does not deliberately encode it into memory. Others have investigated 
memories for contextual details of a learning event, rather than the “target” item. 
Here, the to-be-remembered detail is incidental at the time of encoding. 
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Episodic Memory Must … Be Memory for Unattended Context 
 
“It is useful to distinguish between the setting and the focal element 
(or elements) of an event” (Hollingworth, 1913, p.532-33) 
 
The importance of memory for contexts rather than focal items was highlighted in 
Tulving’s early writings on episodic memory: “As the remembering of settings has 
not yet been studied, it can be argued that research on episodic memory has not yet 
begun.” (Tulving, 1984, p.229). However, it has never appeared as part of any of 
Tulving’s definitions of episodic memory (though one might argue that it is implied).  
 
Fact memory for focal elements and source memory for contexts have been 
established as independent (e.g. Shimamura and Squire, 1987, Johnson and Raye, 
1981) suggesting that they represent differential memory systems and may be 
equivalent to semantic and episodic memory respectively. Some patients with 
amnesia have demonstrated relatively preserved memory for facts learned during an 
experimental session, but severely impaired memory for how and when those facts 
were learned (e.g. Shimamura and Squire, 1987, Schacter et al., 1984). This inability 
to remember the source of a semantic memory is known as source amnesia. Schacter 
and colleagues (1984) demonstrated that source memory impairment was correlated 
with measures of frontal lobe pathology, suggesting that memory for the source of 
knowledge may be related to the function of frontal lobe structures whereas general 
anterograde amnesia is related to medial temporal lobe function. In fact it seems that 
it is the retrieval of source information that may rely on frontal lobe structures, while 
the encoding of this information may depend on more temporal regions. Recent 
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investigations using fMRI have suggested that the anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC) is 
particularly important for source memory retrieval performance. Furthermore, 
different regions of the anterior PFC may be differentially engaged depending on 
whether the “source” being retrieved is internally (i.e. what task were you performing 
when you saw this word?) or externally generated (i.e. what position on the screen 
was this word in when you saw it?). Lateral regions, it is suggested, are activated by 
either source memory task, while medial regions are recruited specifically when 
subjects must recall their own cognitive processes (Simons et al., 2005, 2008a). In 
contrast, Davachi and colleagues (2003) found that activation in the hippocampus and 
posterior parrahippocampal cortex during encoding predicted later source memory but 
not item recognition, while perirhinal cortex activation predicted later item 
recognition, but not source memory.  
 
It could be argued that the difference in memory for focal and contextual features of 
an event may be due to the deliberateness of encoding. Focal items in a memory test 
may be encoded differently to contextual details because they are deliberately 
memorized while contextual features are incidentally encoded.  
 
Episodic Memory Must … Not Be Deliberately Encoded 
 
Zentall and colleagues (2001, 2008) argue that deliberate encoding of stimuli may 
lead them to be stored as semantic memories rather than episodic memories: “The 
critical aspect of the question is that at the time of encoding, there should be no 
expectation that one would be asked to retrieve the information” (Zentall et al., 2008, 
p.97). However, while there is evidence that deliberate encoding of information may 
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improve recall performance (e.g. Craik and Lockhart, 1972, Greene, 1986, Neill et al., 
1990, Bower and Reitman, 1972, Carlson et al., 1976, Paivio, 1971) there is little 
evidence to suggest that deliberate encoding reduces the contribution of episodic 
memory to recall performance. Shimamura and colleagues (1987) demonstrated that 
amnesic patients had comparable deficits in fact and source memory regardless of 
whether the fact learning and testing situations were explicit (i.e. subjects were taught 
a fact and then tested for the fact and when they had learned it) or incidental. This 
finding suggests that knowledge of the impending memory tests did not reduce the 
impairment of the amnesic patients on either fact or source memory, nor did it 
increase the relative performance of the controls. Furthermore, Holland and Smulders 
(2011) and Plancher and colleagues (2010) found that deliberateness of encoding did 
not change episodic markers of What-Where-When memory. 
 
Evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that both deliberately and 
automatically encoded memories are episodic, but that they rely on different yet 
overlapping components of the fronto-temporal neural network that underlies episodic 
cognition (Simons and Spiers, 2003, Moscovitch, 1992, Moscovitch, 2008). Morris 
and Frey (1997) argue that an explicit distinction must be drawn between automatic 
and effortful encoding, but that both are “episodic”. The former, they suggest, involve 
“online” catch-all information capture in which events are temporarily encoded in 
association with the contexts in which they occur. Such processes are dependant on 
hippocampal long-term potentiation (e.g. Treisman, 1996, Zimmer et al., 2006). 
Deliberate encoding, in contrast, incorporates intentions, goals and task demands and 
may be dependant on a broader fronto-temporal network (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 
1991, Shallice et al., 1994, Kapur et al., 1994, Tulving et al., 1996, Hayes et al., 
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2004, Isingrini and Taconnat, 2008, Moscovitch and Winocur, 1995, Piolino et al., 
2010, Tulving, 2002, Simons and Spiers, 2003, Dobbins et al., 2002, Fletcher et al., 
1998a, Fletcher et al., 1998b, Henson et al., 1999, Wagner et al., 1998). 
 
There seem to be distinctions between memory for items that have been deliberately 
or incidentally encoded and between memory for focal or contextual elements of an 
event. The suggestion is that while contextual details are remembered episodically, 
memory for focal items does not differ in its engagement of episodic cognition 
depending on whether it is deliberately or incidentally encoded. One can combine 
these approaches into a single task which assesses memory for the context of a 
learning episode with unexpected questions. Thus the memory tapped is both 
contextual and incidentally learned.  
 
Episodic Foresight? 
 
The behavioural criteria explored thus far have been designed to test only the 
retrospective aspect of episodic cognition. However, as mentioned earlier, there is 
growing consensus that the same system subserves both episodic memory for the past 
and episodic foresight, that is, the ability to imagine (or “pre-experience”) potential 
future scenarios. It has, moreover, been theorised that the adaptive advantage of 
episodic memory lies not in its recording of the past per se but in its potential for 
increasing fitness in the future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007, Schacter & Addis, 
2007b). While it is not obvious how the ability to re-experience a past event may 
increase the fitness of an individual, if this ability facilitates the generation of 
potential future scenarios, this would allow an organism to act in the present to 
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prepare for future need, giving that organism an obvious advantage over others 
without this capacity.  
 
The study of episodic foresight is a “younger” science than the investigation of 
memory, and as such there are fewer concepts of what would constitute behavioural 
criteria. There is not, for example, and equivalent of the “remember/know” paradigm 
for future thought. However, of the few specific paradigms and criteria proposed, 
there is a common consensus that evidence for episodic foresight requires an 
individual to act in the present to secure fulfilment of a future need. 
 
Episodic Foresight Must … Act for a Future Need 
 
 Tulving (2005) suggests that an example of a behaviour that demonstrates episodic 
foresight lies in an Estonian children’s story. In this tale, a young girl dreams of a 
party where the guests are served a delicious pudding, but she cannot eat because she 
doesn’t have a spoon. The following night, anticipating that she may return to the 
party in her dreams, she takes a spoon to bed with her. Tulving suggests that the 
“spoon test” requires an individual to “act analogously to carrying their own spoon to 
a feast that is likely to come in another place and time….they can do so, the argument 
is, if and only if they possess the ability to mentally travel into (or foresee, pre-
experience, anticipate) the future.” (p.44).  
 
One major criticism of the spoon test paradigm is that it is not clear whether it 
requires a concept of a future need or simply the association between a given tool 
(e.g. a spoon) and a reward (e.g. chocolate pudding; Cheke and Clayton, 2010). 
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Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007) suggest that a demonstration of episodic 
foresight can be obtained only if the need or motivational state that is to be addressed 
is different to that currently experienced. Thus saving a spoon can be seen as an action 
to fulfil a current desire for chocolate cake. If access to the chocolate cake happens to 
be in the future, then all this means is that the ongoing task of “obtaining chocolate 
cake” commences with spoon acquisition and ends with cake achievement and just 
happens to have a long frustrating period in the middle in which cake is not available. 
If however the girl were to have eaten her fill of chocolate cake (and in fact become 
quite sick of it) but still save the spoon this would indicate her understanding that 
while she is currently sick of chocolate cake, in the future she will not be and she will 
want a spoon with which to eat it2. 
 
Following the work of Köhler (1926), Bischof (1985), and Bischof-Köhler (1985) 
which argued that the actions of animals are always performed in pursuit of current 
goals, Suddendorf and Corballis’s “Bischof-Köhler” hypothesis (1997) suggests that 
episodic foresight is necessary for an individual to plan for the fulfilment of a need or 
motivational state that they are not currently experiencing. It furthermore suggests 
that this ability is unique to humans. This claim will be addressed in Chapter 2. The 
Bischof-Köhler criterion is useful as a conservative test for future thought, but may 
not be useful in differentiating between semantic and episodic cognition. Situations 
involving episodic foresight often involve the use of a current motivation to make 
plans for the future: I might plan a relaxing holiday in the sun (involving 
researching hotels, booking flights and much time imagining myself on a beach) 
because I am currently feeling cold, wet and overworked. On the other hand, an 
                                                 
2 Note that such a criterion does not explicitly address the issue of the associative explanation. This  is 
explored in chapter 2. 
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individual can logically infer a future motivational state (that is different from that 
currently being experienced) from factual regularities without the need to “pre-
experience” that motivational state (People who haven’t eaten for a while are 
hungry. Therefore if tomorrow I haven’t eaten for a while, I will be hungry). 
Arguably pre-experience of a drive state is in fact a less intuitive way of allowing an 
individual to plan for a future need than is inference from semantic knowledge; one 
cannot easily re-experience thirst or hunger from memory while currently quenched 
or sated (Osvath and Osvath, 2008, Loewenstein, 2000). The crux of the matter is 
that acting for a future motivational state over a present one does not prove episodic 
future thought any more than acting for a present motivational state rules it out.  
 
Behavioural Criteria: Helpful? 
 
Having reviewed the behavioural paradigms that have been argued to assess 
episodic cognition, are we any nearer in differentiating the needle from the 
haystack? Arguably not. Each of these paradigms has its supporters and its critics, 
its advantages and its caveats. Most importantly, each of these paradigms is being 
used by different researchers in different fields and quite often on different species. 
Thus we cannot be sure that any of these paradigms assess the same cognitive ability 
as each other let alone hope to identify what that ability is.  
 
This thesis represents an attempt to address the first of these issues. The different 
behavioural paradigms reviewed above are distilled into four (putative) tests of 
episodic cognition: 
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1. What-Where-When (WWW). A test of memory for what item was hidden 
where, when. 
2. Unexpected Question (UEQ). A test of memory for aspects of the context 
that was not focal at the time of encoding. 
3. Free Recall (FR). A test for memory for items presented on a list that is not 
cued by environmental features. 
4. Bischof-Köhler (BK). A test of planning for a future time in which the 
individual’s motivational state will be different from what it currently is. 
 
These different tests are presented to the same subjects, and the relationship between 
performances on each is assessed. In terms of surface features at least, these tasks are 
very different. As such, one would not expect 100% overlap in the cognitive 
challenges that they represent. The investigation undertaken in this thesis is thus not 
one of whether they are different tests of the same ability, but to what extent these 
different tasks assess the same underlying cognitive process. The overarching 
prediction is that, to the extent to which these tasks do assess the same cognitive 
ability, one would expect them to: 
 
1. Be phylogenetically consistent (i.e. if given species passes one test they should 
be more likely to pass another). 
2. Be related in development (i.e. performance should improve at the same rate 
and in the same pattern in children).  
3. Be related in maturity (i.e. adult humans who perform better at one should also 
perform better at the others).  
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4. Be affected in the same way in the same patients (factors that cause deficits in 
one should cause deficits in the others). 
 
These four predictions are addressed in the four empirical chapters. Chapter 2 
explores the evidence for episodic cognition in animals. The biggest challenge in the 
comparative cognition literature is often not in deciding upon a behavioural criterion 
for a given cognitive process, but in demonstrating that the specific experimental 
design did not allow the animal to solve the task through some simpler means such as 
associative learning (see Chapter 2). Despite this, the literature suggests that those 
species that have been found to pass some tests of episodic cognition also perform 
well on the others. Two experiments are presented in a previously untested species - 
the Eurasian jay. This species is an intensive food-caching corvid which caches both 
perishable and non-perishable food throughout the year (e.g. Clayton et al., 1996). It 
was thus argued to be a good candidate for a species whose ecological pressures 
might have selected for the development of episodic cognition (e.g. Grodzinski and 
Clayton, 2010). In the first experiment, the jays are shown to significantly adapt their 
caching behaviour to provide for their future needs. Moreover, they demonstrate an 
ability to account for two distinct future motivational states and provide for each 
appropriately. The second experiment failed to demonstrate convincing evidence that  
jays remember what food they cached, where and when. However, with the very small 
sample size this result is difficult to interpret. In the context of wider literature, these 
findings provide (very) tentative support for the first prediction of the thesis: that 
performance on different tests of episodic cognition are phylogenetically consistent.  
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Chapter 3 explores the literature on memory and planning development in human 
children. Much of the developmental psychology literature on episodic cognition is 
concerned with conceptualist notions of what it means to be a “owner” of episodic 
memory (Tulving, 2005, p.9). Chapter 3 reviews conceptualist and minimalist theories 
of episodic cognition and suggests potential hypotheses arising from the two. An 
experiment is then presented in which the same sample of 3-6-year-old children are 
tested on three putative tests of episodic memory (What-Where-When, Unexpected 
Question and Free Recall); one test that is thought to assess both episodic and 
semantic memory (Cued Recall) and one putative test of episodic foresight (Bischof-
Köhler). It is found that performance on all these tests increased gradually between 
the ages of 3- and 6-years. There was considerable inter-correlation between 
performance on all the memory tests, but much of this was lost when age was 
partialled out. This finding suggests that, beyond general cognitive development, 
there is little relationship between performance on these different tests in children. 
There was furthermore little to no relationship between performance on the memory 
tests and performance on the Bischof-Köhler test, beyond a trend towards a negative 
relationship with Unexpected Question performance.  
 
This result provides some refutation of the second prediction of the thesis: that 
performance on different tests of episodic cognition should be related in development. 
However, given that this age range (3-6) is a period of great development generally, it 
may be that immaturity of non-mnemonic factors (such as language and executive 
functions) may differentially affect performance on different tests. Thus to interpret 
these results it was necessary to conduct the same experiment with human adults. 
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Chapter 4 presents an experiment in which the three putative tests of episodic memory 
(what-where-when, unexpected question and free recall) and one putative test of 
episodic foresight (Bischof-Köhler) were presented to the same sample of healthy 
young adults. It is found that performance on all these tests is interconnected, but not 
always in a linear fashion. This finding suggested that multiple processes contribute to 
performance, and that all these processes may not always be shared by different tasks. 
Following from the finding of a negative relationship between Unexpected Question 
and Bischof-Köhler performance in the developmental data, it is found that memory 
performance is inversely related with performance on the Bischof-Köhler test. Thus 
those subjects that had better memories for non-focal elements of the experiment were 
more biased by their current motivational state when making decisions for the future 
than those subjects with poorer memory performance. Thus while these results 
support the third prediction of the thesis: that performance on the different tests 
should be related in maturity, the full picture is manifestly more complex, with 
evidence for contributions from other, non-shared, processes. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 explores factors that may impair episodic cognition and asks 
whether performance on different (putative) tests of episodic cognition is affected by 
the same factors. Evidence is explored for an association between excess body weight 
(obesity) and high levels of dietary fat and sugar, and poor hippocampal function. 
Given the evidence that patient groups with damage to the hippocampus show deficits 
in episodic cognition (Scoville and Milner, 1957, Addis et al., 2007, Squire, 1992, 
Isaacs et al., 2000, Golomb et al., 1993) it is predicted that episodic cognition deficits 
would also be evident in overweight individuals and those with high levels of dietary 
fat and sugar.  
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This prediction is assessed in two experiments. Experiment one compares the 
performance of individuals with varying body mass indices (BMIs) and diet content 
on an unexpected free recall test and a Bischof-Köhler bias test. The results revealed 
that BMI and diet differentially affect performance on these tests. There is a 
suggestion of a negative relationship between BMI and performance on an episodic 
memory test in women. In contrast, men (but not women) with high levels of dietary 
fat and sugar are less biased by their current motivational state in the Bischof-Köhler 
test relative to individuals with healthy diets. In the second experiment, free recall and 
Bischof-Köhler performance is assessed in a sample of obese binge-eating subjects. In 
the Bischof-Köhler test, current state is manipulated by reduction of hedonic 
experience (µ-opioid antagonism) rather than satiety (as was used in the previous 
experiments and chapters). It is found that obese binge-eating subjects are 
significantly impaired on the free recall task, and are completely unbiased by their 
current motivational state when choosing food for future consumption. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that performance on these different episodic cognition 
tasks is differentially affected by harmful lifestyle factors (e.g. poor diet and obesity), 
providing refutation for the fourth prediction of the thesis: That performance on all 
the tests should be affected in the same way in the same patients.  
 
The evidence from the four empirical chapters therefore suggest that the degree to 
which different (putative) tests of episodic cognition can be said to be assessing the 
same underlying psychological process is limited. This idea is expanded in Chapter 6. 
Two of the four central predictions of the thesis (that performance on all the tests 
should be related in development and affected in the same way in the same patients) 
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are actively refuted, while the other two predictions (that performance on all the tests 
should be phylogenetically consistent and related in maturity) are, at best, only 
tentatively supported. This suggests that behavioural tests born out of different 
theoretical conceptions of episodic cognition may not, to any significant degree, test 
the same cognitive process. Such evidence may indicate that  different theories of 
episodic cognition may not be theorizing about the same thing. These findings 
emphasize the need for greater coherence and communication in the field of episodic 
cognition in order to establish agreed criteria and definitions of the remarkable 
phenomena that allows us to travel mentally in time. 
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Chapter 2  
Episodic Cognition in Animals 
 
Fifteen years since Suddendorf and Corballis first claimed that episodic 
cognition was unique to humans, the ensuing debate remains unresolved. 
The chief difficulty in resolving this question has been how to translate 
theories of episodic cognition into meaningful behavioural tests. This 
chapter reviews the behavioural paradigms that have been used to assess 
episodic cognition in animals. It is suggested that greater coherence is 
needed within the field to establish the extent to which all – or any – of 
these behavioural tests are measuring the same ability, and to begin to 
establish what that ability might be. Two experiments are presented 
investigating performance on two putative tests of episodic cognition in a 
previously untested species: the Eurasian jay. It is found that jays are able to 
cache a food that they will want in the future, rather than that which they 
currently desire. There is also tentative evidence that Eurasian jays are able 
to keep track of what they cached, where and when. It is proposed that 
testing multiple paradigms in the same subjects will aid our understanding 
of the psychological processes underpinning performance on these tests. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The idea that humans and animals differ fundamentally in their mental capacities is an 
ancient and established one. Many modern theories, including those involving 
episodic cognition (Tulving, 1983), still draw their inspiration and essence from 
“intuitive” and philosophical notions of the human and animal mind (e.g. Descartes, 
1637, Jaynes and Woodward, 1974). More recently it has been possible to investigate 
such implicit assumptions using empirical enquiry. However, the success with which 
we have been able to truly divorce our interpretations of these data from intuitive and 
philosophical attitudes is perhaps questionable. One theory that has dominated the 
recent literature on animal cognition is Suddendorf and Corballis’s “Mental Time 
Travel” hypothesis (1997). This theory states that the processes by which we mentally 
re-experience our personal past are the same as those with which we mentally pre-
experience our personal future, and that this “mental time travel” is unique to humans. 
In their initial paper and many subsequent publications (e.g. Suddendorf and Busby, 
2005) the authors argue that non-human animals lack many of the necessary cognitive 
processes to support mental time travel (episodic cognition).  
 
The idea that episodic cognition represents a discontinuity between humans and 
animals continues to be the subject of much controversy and has been vigorously 
challenged experimentally (e.g. Clayton et al., 2003c, 2003a, Clayton et al., 2003b, 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2008, 1997, 2007, Clayton and Dickinson, 1998, Griffiths 
et al., 1999, Roberts, 2002, Zentall et al., 2001, 2005, 2006, 2008, Clayton et al., 
2008). The purpose of this chapter is not to explore the evidence for the existence of 
episodic cognition in nonhuman animals, as this has been done extensively elsewhere 
(e.g. Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007, Suddendorf and Busby, 2003b, Roberts, 
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2002, Raby and Clayton, 2009, Cheke and Clayton, 2010, Zentall, 2005) . The 
purpose of this chapter is to investigate how the animal cognition literature can 
address the main question of this thesis: Do tests born of different theories of episodic 
cognition test the same thing? That is, is there a single underlying psychological 
process that is targeted by tests that have arisen out of the different conceptualisations 
of episodic cognition?  
 
The literature on episodic cognition in nonhuman animals is now extensive. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, different experimental paradigms have arisen from varying 
conceptions of episodic cognition and, in particular, what various researchers and 
theorists consider to be the defining feature(s) of episodic cognition that can or 
should be empirically evaluated. The use of many different experimental paradigms 
limits the extent to which the findings of this literature can be interpreted. The 
following section shall briefly review the evidence that has accrued for episodic 
cognition in nonhuman animals using these paradigms.  
 
What-Where-When 
 
The first empirical test of the hypothesis that episodic cognition was unique to 
humans came from Clayton and Dickinson (1998). In their seminal experiment, 
Western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) learned that wax worms would degrade 
after a long period (124 hours) but not a short period (4 hours). These delays were 
chosen such that cache retrieval always occurred at the same time of day, to prevent 
the use of circadian cues. During training, the jays were given the opportunity to 
cache wax worms and peanuts in trial-unique trays. They were then permitted to 
retrieve their caches after 4 or 124 hours. In a final extinction test, in which no food 
40 
was present at retrieval (to make sure that memory was being used, rather than visual 
or olfactory cues) the birds returned to their caches after either 4 or 124 hours. When 
returning after the shorter interval, the birds searched in the location where they had 
cached wax worms. However, when returning after the longer retention interval, the 
birds seemingly understood that the wax worms would be degraded and searched in 
the location in which they had cached the peanuts. Controls and follow-up studies 
showed that this result was not due to familiarity cues, because the jays could identify 
how long ago they cached a given food even when both foods were cached in the 
same tray, or when the tray was experienced between caching and recovery (Clayton 
et al., 2001a). It was also shown that the precise identity and decay rate of each 
cached food was encoded by the jays (Clayton et al., 2001a), and that the “what”, 
“where” and “when” elements formed an integrated representation (Clayton et al., 
2001a). Furthermore the memory was highly flexible; the birds continued to respond 
appropriately when,  between caching and retrieval, new information was acquired 
about the decay rate (Clayton et al., 2003c) or value (Clayton and Dickinson, 1999b) 
of the food, or when the food “ripened” rather than degraded (de Kort et al., 2005).  
 
More recently, successful performance on a what-where-when (WWW) memory test 
has been demonstrated by another corvid using a slightly different experimental 
paradigm (Zinkivskay et al., 2009). Here, Magpies (Pica pica) cached egg pellets of 
two different colours in an open area. In training, birds returning to their caches later 
that day found that pellets of one colour had been replaced with wooden beads, while 
the other remained edible. A day later, however, the opposite would be true. When 
tested in extinction the magpies searched preferentially in locations where caches 
would be edible.  
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A very similar experimental design was used by Gould and colleagues (2012) to 
investigate WWW memory in a third corvid, the Clark’s Nutcracker (Nucifraga 
columbiana). They found that while the birds were able to differentiate between food 
that would or would not be edible after a long retention interval, they were unable to 
identify and retrieve food that would only be edible after a short retention interval 
(although both types of food were retrieved accurately, suggesting that it was not that 
they forgot the location of the beads after the long retention interval). Given that the 
exact same methodology was used, it is perhaps surprising that the Clark’s 
Nutcrackers failed this task when the Magpies passed (especially when nutcrackers 
have been shown to remember the locations of phenomenal numbers of cached items 
over long periods). The authors suggest that the explanation may lie in their diet. 
While Magpies and Western scrub-jays cache a wide variety of different foods, all 
with different decay-rates, Clark’s Nutcrackers “appear to cache only pine seeds, 
which remain palatable for many months” (Gould et al., 2012, p.38). Therefore they 
may be under less selective pressure to remember information about the contents of 
the cache (such as its decay rate). It is also possible that the Nutcrackers struggled to 
understand that something could be inedible after a short period but edible after a long 
period, as this is not a common natural phenomenon. Nonetheless, the results suggest 
that while Magpies and scrub-jays appear to demonstrate memory for what-where and 
when, Nutcrackers may be able to form only what-where memories 
 
The ability to remember what and where, but not when has been found in other 
genera, including rats (Rattus norvegicus) and Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 
(Bird et al., 2003, Griffiths and Clayton, 2001, Hampton et al., 2005). Others have 
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demonstrated memory for all three components, but have had assessed them 
separately (e.g. (Hoffman et al., 2009) or have failed to demonstrate integrated 
representations (Skov-Rackette et al., 2006, Ergorul and Eichenbaum, 2004) . Some 
studies show potential for demonstrating integrated WWW memory, but success may 
have been achieved through extra-target strategies such as circadian cues (Ferkin et 
al., 2008) or familiarity judgements (Babb and Crystal, 2006, see Cheke and Clayton, 
2010 for a detailed critique).  
 
Clayton and colleagues (1998) refer to WWW memory as episodic-like because a 
behavioural test cannot demonstrate the phenomenology of re-experiencing a past 
episode. However, there are other features of episodic cognition that can be 
investigated in nonverbal subjects. Martin-Ordas and colleagues (2010) showed that 
apes (chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus) and orang-utans 
(Pongo Pongo)) were able to keep track of which iced juice had been hidden and how 
long ago (and therefore how likely to be melted) when observing two events 
consecutively, suggesting that they were demonstrating integrated WWW memory. 
Interestingly, the authors also showed that performance on the WWW task, but not on 
a spatial memory task, demonstrated an inverse U-shaped developmental trajectory, 
with the youngest and oldest subjects performing worse than the young adults 
(Martin-Ordas et al., 2010). This is significant for two reasons. First, it matches the 
inverse U-shaped developmental trajectory seen in episodic, but not semantic, 
memory in humans (e.g. Tulving and Craik, 2000, Craik and Salthouse, 2000, 
Bialystok et al., 2006, Craik and Bialystok, 2006b, Craik and Bialystok, 2006a). 
Second, it is similar to the developmental trajectory reported for mirror self-
recognition in chimpanzees (Povinelli et al., 1993; see Chaper 3 for an in-depth 
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discussion of the potential relationships between self-awareness and episodic 
cognition).  
 
Thus there is evidence from a number of species (scrub-jays, magpies, chimpanzees, 
orang-utans) that some non-human animals may be able to pass WWW memory tests. 
What the literature highlights however, is how extra-target strategies or challenges 
may affect performance. As has been argued elsewhere (Cheke and Clayton, 2010), 
many studies claiming to demonstrate WWW memory fail to control for simpler 
strategies (including associative learning, familiarity or circadian cues), while others 
may limit the performance of the subject animal by imposing heavy cognitive loads 
beyond that of the memory performance (e.g. Dekleva et al., 2011). The What-
Where-When paradigm was inspired by the natural challenges experienced by food-
caching birds. However, the ecology of many animals may not have provided the 
evolutionary pressure to pay attention to the relevant stimuli involved in a WWW 
memory test, either because of the manner in which it is carried out (for example, 
with certain foods “disappearing” after a given interval (Dekleva et al., 2011) or 
having a set replenish rate (Babb and Crystal, 2006)) or because their natural 
behaviour in a given context does not need to take account of certain features (e.g. 
“when”: Clark’s nutcrackers cache only non-perishable foods (Gould et al., 2012), or 
“where”: rats are larder hoarders and never need to remember the location of several 
caches (Vander Wall, 1990, Bird et al., 2003)). Thus it may be that the WWW 
paradigm is not appropriate for assessing episodic cognition in all species. 
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The Unexpected Question 
 
Many theories (e.g. Morris and Frey, 1997, Zentall et al., 2001, 2008, Tulving, 1984) 
suggest that the defining feature of episodic cognition is that it is the memory for the 
unattended context of an experience, rather than its focal element. Zentall (2001) 
distilled this theoretical stance into a behavioural paradigm for testing episodic 
memory in animal subjects in which the subject of the memory test is incidental at the 
time of encoding: The Unexpected Question (UEQ). Zentall and colleagues (2001, 
2008) presented a proof of concept experiment with pigeons. They demonstrated that 
pigeons taught two separate response rules (e.g. “peck green if you’ve just pecked 
left” and “peck horizontal stripes if you’ve just seen blue”) can report on their 
previous actions correctly if the rules are combined such that first question 
unexpectedly follows the second. Thus, the authors suggest, this test assesses memory 
for something that was incidental at the time of encoding (i.e. where they pecked) and 
therefore requires episodic memory to retrieve. Zentall and colleagues (Zentall et al., 
2008) argue that their paradigm is better than the WWW procedure because there is 
no training for the test phase – it is an unexpected question about something that was 
incidental at the time of encoding. However, Cheke and Clayton (2010) argue that 
given the very short retention interval (2 seconds) and the repeated testing, Zentall’s 
study cannot be considered a test of memory let alone of anything “unexpected”. 
 
In a recent attempt to assess UEQ performance in rats, Zhou and colleagues (2012) 
trained rats to use whether or not they had just received food as a discriminative 
stimulus in a T-maze. They found that the rats could perform this task correctly when 
unexpectedly asked to do so after receiving (or not receiving) food as part of an 
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unrelated spatial memory task. They furthermore demonstrated that this performance 
was dependant on hippocampal function while an “expected question” (essentially 
another T-maze training trial) was not. However, the rats may well have used a 
physiological response to eating (such a feeling of fullness or a residual taste in the 
mouth) as a discriminative stimulus for passing the T-maze probe. Given that use of 
such physiological responses as a discriminative cue is dependant on the hippocampus 
(Davidson and Jarrard, 1993, Hock and Bunsey, 1998), Zhou and colleagues’ (2012) 
findings may not have been evidence for memory at all, let alone episodic memory. 
 
These studies are the only example to date of research using the UEQ paradigm in 
animals. This may speak to the practical difficulties inherent in asking animals 
unexpected questions while at the same time being sure that they understand what 
question is being asked and how to answer it. Thus it may be that, while conceptually 
sound, the UEQ test does not represent a realistic behavioural paradigm with which to 
assess episodic cognition in nonhuman animals. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
it may be that deliberateness of encoding does not affect the contribution of episodic 
memory to performance, but rather it is whether the to-be-remembered item is focal or 
contextual at the time of encoding that determines whether episodic memory is 
necessary for successful retrieval.  
 
Episodic Foresight and the Bischof-Köhler Test 
 
Some theorists have argued that the adaptive function of episodic cognition lies in 
the capacity for episodic foresight rather than episodic memory, and thus that the 
most promising paradigms for assessing episodic cognition in nonhuman animals 
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may be tests of episodic foresight (e.g. Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). The ability 
to act in the present in preparation for future events is fundamental to the survival of a 
number of species. However, the extent to which such action can be considered to be 
controlled by cognitive processes, and in particular, whether any qualify as examples 
of episodic foresight remains unclear. Suddendorf and Corballis, following Köhler 
(1926), have argued extensively (e.g. Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007) that 
while animals may perform actions that are functionally prospective, they are not able 
to perform any action that is not driven by a currently experienced motivational state: 
 
 “…the selective advantage of mental time travel is the increased 
flexibility in acting in the present to secure future needs. First, 
therefore, one has to be capable of conceiving having different future 
needs, such as imagining being thirsty when currently quenched.” 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, p.305).  
 
Thus, in their “Bischof-Köhler” hypothesis, Suddendorf and Corballis argue that only 
humans are able to disengage from their present motivational state to plan for a future 
need (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997). 
 
Suddendorf and Busby (2003b) suggest that the ability to save a currently useless item 
for a future time in which it would be needed would constitute evidence for episodic 
foresight. One candidate for future-orientated cognition is the tool transportation 
exhibited by many primate species (e.g. Goodall, 1986, Jalles-Filho et al., 2001, 
Cleveland et al., 2004, Boesch and Boesch, 1984). Mulcahy and Call  investigated 
whether tool transportation by great apes (orang-utans and bonobos) meets the 
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Bishof-Köhler criterion for future planning (Mulcahy and Call, 2006). The authors 
demonstrated that bonobos and orang-utans chose an appropriate tool that would be 
useful to access a reward an hour in the future. However, the results of their control 
for associative learning suggest that the apes may simply have associated that tool 
with reward rather than representing their future needs (Suddendorf et al., 2009, 
Cheke and Clayton, 2010). 
 
In an attempt to answer such criticisms, Osvath and Osvath (2008) showed that apes 
chose a tool that would be useful in the future above a favoured fruit that could be 
consumed immediately, suggesting that they could overcome a present drive state to 
achieve a future goal. In an elegant control, the authors also found that, when offered 
the same options twice in a row, subjects would only chose the functional tool on the 
first choice, and the fruit on the second, indicating that the tool had not become a 
secondary reinforcer. In a final experiment, the apes chose a novel functional tool 
over novel non-functional but visually similar tools. The authors argued that this 
indicates subjects’ ability to mentally pre-experience their future encounter with the 
apparatus to rehearse the potential functionality of the novel tools. While it is not 
clear that this performance necessitates pre-experience of a future scenario (rather 
than an understanding that the apparatus requires a long hollow tool), these results 
show impressive flexibility in planning for an explicitly future need (but see 
Suddendorf et al., 2009 for a critique). 
 
One study described by Shettleworth  (2007a) as the first that unambiguously meets 
the requirements for future planning (and is similar in design to the “Rooms Task” 
suggested by Suddendorf and Busby (2003b) to satisfy the Bischof-Köhler (BK) 
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criterion)  is that conducted by Raby and colleagues (2007). Western scrub-jays were 
given experience of two compartments on alternate mornings. In one compartment 
they were given food (the “breakfast” compartment) and in the other they were not 
(the “no breakfast” compartment). At test, the birds were unexpectedly given food to 
cache and eat in the evening. The authors argued that if the jays were capable of 
episodic future thinking, they should have cached more food in the “no breakfast” 
compartment than in the “breakfast” compartment, which they did. In a second 
experiment, when given one food type in one compartment and another food type in 
the other, subjects cached the food they would not receive in that compartment the 
next morning. This study shows remarkable flexibility in planning for a future need. 
However, it has been argued (Cheke and Clayton, 2010) that it is possible to explain 
these results with an associative account. Acquisition of associations between a 
location and food has been shown in rats, who ate more of a given food type when in 
a location associated with that food (Petrovich et al., 2007). That scrub-jays 
responded with the opposite behaviour means that a purely associative account is 
insufficient. However, it is plausible that scatter-hoarders would possess a heuristic 
leading them to avoid caching a food type in a place where it is plentiful. Thus 
entering the room associated with food A could activate a representation of “plenty of 
food A” and lead jays not to cache that food in that location. A similar criticism has 
been levelled by Suddendorf and Corballis (2008). 
 
Other studies have attempted to address such issues by manipulating the current 
and future motivational states of animals such that the choice of the correct option 
requires them not to be acting for their current desires. I have dubbed this paradigm 
the “Bischof-Köhler Test”. In the first of these, Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) 
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were taught that choosing a small quantity of food would lead to a short period of 
water deprivation, while choosing a large quantity would lead to a long period of 
water deprivation. Subjects learned to choose the small number of items despite 
showing a robust preference for the larger amount at the beginning of the study 
(Naqshbandi and Roberts, 2006). Follow-up experiments revealed that this pattern of 
choices was not shown with rats, and was not due to thirst experienced at the time of, 
or immediately after, the choice. Although it has been argued that the gradual learning 
of this behaviour implies associative processes (Shettleworth, 2007b, Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 2008). Cheke and colleagues (2011b) argue that it is not clear why speed of 
learning should be used as evidence for type of learning; associative learning can 
occur within a single trial or take hundreds of trials to appear. By standard operant 
learning criteria, the action and reinforcer in this study (food choice and return of 
water) were not sufficiently temporally contiguous to allow associative learning, nor 
were conditions met for “long delay” associative learning (Lett, 1975). However, the 
results of this study must nonetheless be treated with caution since they present the 
behaviour of only two subjects. 
 
In what is perhaps a more convincing experiment, Correia and colleagues (2007) fed 
scrub-jays to satiety on one food type, then allowed them to eat and cache this and an 
alternative food type. Later that day, subjects were fed to satiety on the other food 
type and then allowed to retrieve their caches. Thus at the time of caching they 
experienced a significantly different motivational state from that which they felt at the 
time of cache retrieval. After only one trial, the birds cached more of the food that 
would be desired at the time of retrieval, rather than the food more desired during 
caching.  
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In their critique of this study, Suddendorf and Corballis (2008) suggest that the birds 
could have learned a “simple rule” that they should stop caching items that turn out to 
be plentiful at recovery. This type of learning has been demonstrated in scrub-jays 
that cease caching an item that has been regularly degraded at recovery (Clayton et 
al., 2005). However, since Correia and colleagues’ birds were pre-fed both foods at 
some point during the day, an incentive learning account (Balleine et al., 1994, 
Balleine and Dickinson, 1998) would predict decreased caching of both foods, 
because a food’s incentive value is insensitive to when it had a low value (see Clayton 
et al., 2008 for an in-depth discussion of this). At the very least, then, the difference in 
the proportions of the two food types cached must have reflected some cognitive 
representation of a situation in which the value of these food types would be different. 
Recent work by Correia and colleagues (unpublished data) addresses this criticism by 
demonstrating that scrub-jays can not only overcome a current motivational state to 
cache what they will desire at the time of cache retrieval, but can distribute caches 
across two locations that they will have the opportunity to return to in two different 
motivational states. This within-subjects version of the original study indicates that 
the birds could not have been forming a simple rule about a given food item (“not 
good to cache”). 
 
Summary 
 
The debate as to the existence of episodic cognition in nonhuman animals continues. 
With little coherence in methodology and less agreement over precise definitions as to 
what kind of data would constitute bona fide evidence for episodic cognition, the path 
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ahead does not seem to be any clearer. The considerable influence of extra-target 
factors (such as executive function demands and associative learning) muddies the 
water still further. Some species (e.g. scrub-jays, chimpanzees) have been tested on 
multiple experimental paradigms and the data are consistently positive, potentially 
suggesting that the different tests of episodic cognition are phylogenetically 
consistent – that is, that if a given species passes one, they are more likely to pass the 
others. However, because of the tendency not to publish negative results – and the 
considerable differences in experimental effort put into testing different species – 
even this finding is difficult to interpret. What is needed is a focus on testing multiple 
paradigms on the same species and for the negative results to be considered alongside 
the positive. In this way it may be possible to form a coherent picture of the 
phylogenetic consistency of different tests of episodic cognition.  
 
This chapter presents the first explorations into episodic cognitive abilities in a 
previously untested species: the Eurasian jay. Eurasian jays share many ecological 
traits with previously tested corvid species. Like magpies and Western scrub-jays, 
Eurasian jays cache a wide variety of foods with different decay rates (Goodwin, 
1951, Clayton et al., 1996) and rely on these caches over long periods. Eurasian jays, 
like Clark’s nutcrackers, are classed as “intense” cachers. This differentiates them 
from Western scrub-jays and magpies, which are classed as “moderate” cachers. As 
such, Eurasian jays represent a prime candidate for an animal model that has had the 
ecological pressure to develop long-term, flexible memory and foresight.  
 
To investigate the phylogenetic consistency of different tests of episodic cognition, 
the jays were tested on two different behavioural paradigms. Experiment 1 was a 
52 
putative test of episodic foresight (based on the within-subjects design of Correia and 
colleagues [unpublished data] and named the “Bischof-Köhler” test, in deference to 
the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997)). Experiment 2 was 
a putative test of episodic memory (a variant of the WWW test (Clayton and 
Dickinson, 1998)). It was predicted that if the birds passed one of the tests they would 
also pass the other. 
 
In Experiment 1, the birds were fed to satiety on one of two foods. They were then 
given the opportunity to cache these two foods in two trays. One of these trays was 
later returned to the birds at a time when they had just been pre-fed the same food as 
at caching (the “Same” tray) and one was returned when they had been pre-fed the 
other food (the “Different” tray). The hypothesis is that, if the birds are able to make 
decisions for the benefit of their future selves, and not based on current feelings, they 
should cache food in the two trays differentially depending on the state they will 
experience on receiving those trays. 
 
2.2. Experiment 1 
2.2.1. Methods 
Subjects 
 
The subjects were five 2-year-old Eurasian jays (two females: Hunter and Wiggins; 
three males: Ainsley, Hoy and Romero). Romero was subsequently excluded for 
failing to consistently cache both foods, leaving N=4. The jays were pair-housed in 
4x1x1 m cages that could be divided into two test areas by insertion of opaque 
dividers. Birds were maintained at 21±1 ºC on a 12:12-hour light-dark cycle. Birds 
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received a maintenance diet (MD) of kibble, vegetables, fruit and seeds. Water was 
always available. Subjects cached in Tupperware boxes (17x24 cm) filled with wood 
chips and individuated by coloured blocks. Work adhered to Home Office licence 
PPL 80/1975. 
 
Specific satiety 
 
To use the specific satiety procedure in the Bischof-Köhler (BK) test, it was necessary 
to first establish specific satiety in Eurasian Jays. Subjects were food-deprived and 
isolated in half of their home cage for 2 hours before testing. They were then given 15 
minutes’ access to a powdered/liquidized version of one of the test foods (Food A: 
peanuts; Food B: suet pellets or raisins, depending on each bird’s preference). This 
processed food was not cacheable. Subjects were then given a caching tray, 40 items 
of Food A and 40 items of Food B, and were allowed to eat and cache for 15 minutes 
before trays were removed and the cages cleaned. Trays were inspected for caches out 
of sight of the birds. The number of food items eaten was calculated as the items 
missing when the bowls, cage and trays had been searched. Trays were then returned 
to allow cache retrieval. Finally, birds were reunited with their cage-mate and MD 
was returned. This procedure was then repeated on a different day such that each bird 
was pre-fed both foods once. 
 
Bischof-Köhler Test 
 
Each bird received three trials of a three-stage procedure (Figure  2.1). Subjects were 
food-deprived and isolated for 1 hour before each stage. On the first trial (“Baseline”) 
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subjects were pre-fed MD before the caching phase such that they would cache 
according to their general preference. On the two subsequent trials they were pre-fed 
one of the test foods (powdered/liquidized), such that a preference for the non-pre-fed 
food was established before the caching period. Pre-feeding order across all stages 
was counterbalanced between birds (Fig. 1b).  
 
Stage 1 – Caching: Subjects were pre-fed for 15 minutes before being given access to 
two caching trays (Trays 1 and 2) placed equidistantly from two bowls each 
containing 40 food items (Foods A and B) and allowed to cache and eat for 15 
minutes. Bowls and trays were then removed, birds reunited and MD returned. Trays 
were checked for caches out of sight of the birds.  
 
Stage 2 – Retrieval 1: Food-deprivation for Stage 2 began 3 hours after the end of 
Stage 1. Subjects were pre-fed one of the test foods (powdered/liquidized) for 15 
minutes before caching trays were returned. Retrieval lasted for 15 minutes, during 
which time Tray 2 was blocked by a transparent cover and Tray 1 was accessible. 
Birds were then reunited and MD returned.  
 
Stage 3 – Retrieval 2: Stage 3 occurred the following day, at the same time of day as 
Stage 2. Stage 3 was the same as Stage 2, except that the birds were pre-fed the other 
test food, and Tray 1 was blocked while Tray 2 was accessible. 
 
Thus one of the trays was accessible when the birds were in the same motivational 
state as at caching (the “Same” tray) and one was accessible when birds were in a 
different motivational state (the “Different” tray). 
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Figure  2.1. a. Experimental Procedure. In Stage 1, birds are pre-fed, then cache foods 
A and B in Trays 1 and 2. In Stage 2 birds are pre-fed one food then allowed to 
retrieve from one of the two trays. In Stage 3 birds are pre-fed the other food and 
allowed to retrieve from the other tray. b. Experimental timetable, pre-feeding orders 
and counterbalancing. Reproduced from Cheke & Clayton 2011. 
 
Analysis 
Data were analysed using two-tailed repeated-measures ANOVAs with number of 
eaten/cached items as the dependant variable. Alpha was set at 0.05.  
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2.2.2. Results 
Specific satiety 
 
Birds showed specific satiety by eating and caching less of the pre-fed food than the 
non-pre-fed food (Figure  2.2a). There was a significant effect of the pre-fed food type 
on the birds’ subsequent food preferences (repeated-measures ANOVA: Pre-fed: 
F1,3=12.4, p=0.039), and a trend suggesting that the birds cached more food than they 
ate (F1,3 =6.593, p=0.083). The effect did not differ between eating and caching, 
suggesting that both behaviours responded similarly to pre-feeding (Action x Pre-fed: 
F1,3=0.97, p=0.400).  
 
Bischof-Köhler Test 
 
Birds cached both foods in equal amounts in both trays on Trial 1, but then developed 
a differential preference between the trays, preferentially caching in each tray the food 
they would desire when retrieving from it (Figure  2.2b). There was no general 
preference for one food (repeated-measures ANOVA; Food: F1,3=0.66, p=0.480) or 
tray (Tray: F1,3=5.55, p=0.100), and birds did not reduce caching overall during the 
experiment (Trial: F2,2=0.26, p=0.800). Crucially, there was a significant interaction 
between trial, tray and food (Trial x Tray x Food: F2,2=24.95, p=0.039), suggesting 
that birds altered their caching behaviour according to what they would desire at 
retrieval. Note that there was no difference between what was cached in the two trays 
on Trial 1 (Repeated Measures ANOVA; Tray x Food: F1,3=3.0, p=0.180), but there 
was by Trial 2 (Repeated Measures ANOVA; Tray x Food: F1,3=14.24, p=0.030). On 
Trial 3 this interaction was lost (Tray x Food: F1,3=2.258, p=0.230), but while 
behaviour on Trials 1 and 2 was consistent across birds, the loss of significance on 
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Trial 3 may be due to the behaviour of a single bird (Hunter) whose preference 
disappeared on Trial 3 (Figure  2.2c). When the data were analysed without her, the 
effect approached significance (Tray x Food: F1, 3=15.429, p=0.059).  
 
The birds’ consumption of Foods A and B in Stage 1 (caching) of Trials 2 and 3 
showed a specific satiety effect that approached significance and was similar to that 
shown in the specific satiety experiment (Pre-fed:F1,3=9.64, p=0.053). Importantly, in 
contrast to the specific satiety experiment, the birds’ caching behaviour differed from 
their eating behaviour (Action x Pre-fed: F1,3=19.99, p=0.021). The birds were thus 
responding to their current specific satiety in their eating, but not in their caching 
behaviour. 
2.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results indicate that Eurasian jays, like scrub-jays (Correia et al., unpublished 
data), distribute their caches according to their future, rather than current, desires. 
This within-subjects design addresses many of the criticisms of the original scrub-jay  
study (Correia et al., 2007). Not only are these birds capable of planning for a future 
desire, but of planning for two temporally distinct future desires. 
 
Three out of four birds showed a reliable pattern across Trials 2 and 3 of choosing 
where to cache each food type according to what they would desire when retrieving 
caches from those locations. One bird, Hunter, lost this preference on the third trial. 
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Figure  2.2. a) Performance in Specific Satiety Experiment. b). BK  test. Proportion of 
total food cached that was pre-fed food in “same” and “different” tray. c) 
Proportions cached in BK test by individual birds. Reproduced from Cheke & Clayton 
2011. 
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It is possible that this bird used a different strategy. Instead of adapting her caching to 
account for food consumed immediately before cache retrieval, she may have decided 
not to eat before cache-retrieval. This would be a valid strategy, particularly if she 
preferred whole to powdered peanuts. Such a strategy cannot be fully investigated 
here as we lacked sufficiently sensitive weighing equipment to confirm if powdered 
food had been consumed, but visual observations (of bill-probes, food spillage) 
indicated that while the other birds had eaten the pre-feeding powder on trial 3, 
Hunter had not. This warrants investigation in future studies. 
 
The major critique of the previous work on scrub-jays (Correia et al., 2007) was that 
the jays could have “learned not to cache items that turned out to be of little value” 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2008). However, it is not clear by which learning 
mechanism this could occur (Raby and Clayton, 2009), or how such a criticism could 
be extended to the work presented here. In the current study, while it is possible to 
form an association between motivational states and cache locations, this association 
would need to have a sufficiently powerful impact on the bird’s current motivational 
state to overcome its current desires. We have argued elsewhere (Cheke et al., 2011a, 
Cheke and Clayton, 2012) that there is limited value in attempted to contrast “simple” 
associative processes with higher cognitive abilities. Associative processes can be 
highly complex, flexible and adaptive and they mediate much of our behaviour (e.g. 
Shettleworth, 2010; Epstein, 1984; Dickinson, 2011). Our aim should not be to “rule 
them out” but to explore the ways in which apparently high-level cognition may 
interact with associative processes so as to employ simple, “cost-effective” learning 
processes for complex tasks. 
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Episodic cognition may be uniquely useful in providing a means by which associative 
learning processes can be recruited in contexts in which they wouldn’t normally be 
effective: to provide, through re- or pre-experience, the outcome of an action at the 
time of the action itself. Boyer (2008b) argues that a crucial part of episodic cognition 
is the re- or pre-experience of emotions and that often these emotional experiences 
clash with current goals. Boyer argues that this clash may represent the function of 
episodic cognition: to give an action’s (temporally distant) consequences emotional 
salience in the present and act as a counter-motivation against current desires. This 
process would be entirely outside of cognitive control, as it would be triggered 
without deliberate construction. Given that caching birds have been shown to have 
semi-independent motivational systems for eating and caching (Clayton and 
Dickinson, 1999a),they would be ideally placed to exploit such a mechanism. 
Couching this theory in associative learning terms, episodic cognition may provide a 
means for temporal contiguity of action and outcome to be artificially increased to 
allow learning of its consequences. A similar account, the “Mnemonic Associative 
Theory” (MAT; de Kort et al., 2007, Dickinson, 2011), suggests that, rather than 
previous outcomes being re-experienced at the time of action, previous actions are re-
experienced at the time of the outcome. This, it is argued, leads to the formation of an 
association between action and outcome that drives future behaviour in similar 
contexts. Thus “future-oriented” action is performed in response to previously formed 
associations rather than direct response to a retrieved memory. These two theories 
share many commonalities (for instance the necessity for episodic memory). 
Fundamentally, both accounts suggest the possibility that when an episodic memory 
of an event is retrieved at the time of another event, an association can be formed 
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between the two, and that this may be a mechanism for long-delay associative 
learning. 
 
This mechanism may have allowed humans to be long-term planners despite our 
overarching tendency to make decisions based on our present feelings (Read and van 
Leeuwen, 1998). Indeed, there is evidence that use of episodic cognition can reduce 
impulsive behaviour (Benoit et al., 2011, Peters and Buchel, 2010, Boyer, 2008b). 
There is no controversy in the statement that human episodic cognition is extremely 
flexible and domain-general, and that it is this that makes it so powerful in guiding 
our behaviour. It allows us to simulate complex scenarios in great detail and combine 
features of innumerable past events into novel scenes. However, there are some 
puzzling elements of episodic cognition; it is often “involuntary, goal incongruent, 
emotion laden and uncontrollable” (Boyer, 2008b, p.6). These elements may suggest 
that full-scale human episodic cognition may have its roots in a less-sophisticated 
mechanism of automatic involuntary re-/pre-experience of emotions or motivational 
states. Such a system would not involve many of the features that some believe to be 
the “hallmarks” of human episodic cognition, such as self-awareness and sense of 
subjective time (Tulving, 2002, Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), but would be a 
functional means of bringing future motivational states into the present and thus 
encouraging prospective behaviour.  
 
Whether jays “pre-experience” the future remains an open question, but these results 
provide strong evidence that they can act for a future motivational state that is 
different from their current one, and do so flexibly (i.e. based on learned 
contingencies rather than “instincts”). This evidence directly challenges the Bischof-
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Köhler Hypothesis. However, if Boyer is correct and episodic cognition allows future 
motivational states to be experienced in the present, then episodic cognition may have 
developed in some animals precisely because the Bischof-Köhler Hypothesis is 
correct. If an individual can act only on a current motivational state, then the only way 
for them to be prospective is by changing that motivational state, rather than 
disengaging from it.  
 
If the birds in this study were utilising episodic cognition to solve this task (i.e. if the 
BK test genuinely taps episodic cognition in jays), one might expect the same birds to 
do well on a completely different test of episodic cognition. Thus the same cohort of 
birds were tested on a variant of the WWW procedure, based on test used by Clayton 
and colleagues (2001b) and Zinkivskay and colleagues (2009). The birds were trained 
that the peanuts would become inedible (turn into baking beads) after a 28 hour delay 
and that suet would become inedible (turn into a short length of dowel) after a 52 hour 
delay, but that both would be fresh after a 4 hour delay. In the final extinction test, the 
birds had two caching sessions and one retrieval session. In the first caching session 
they cached suet pellets and peanuts in one tray, with another tray present but closed 
off. At the second caching session the birds cached suet pellets and peanuts in the 
second tray, with the original tray present but closed off. At retrieval, the birds were 
allowed to access both caching trays at a time that was 52 hours after the first caching 
session and 28 hours after the second. This meant that only the more recently cached 
suet would still be edible. Birds that remembered what the caches where, and from 
how long ago, should therefore search in the location that they cached suet during the 
second caching period. The test was carried out in extinction (with no food actually in 
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the trays) such that visual or olfactory cues could not be used by the birds to locate 
their caches.  
 
It was predicted that, since the birds had performed well on the BK experiment, they 
should also perform well on the WWW experiment. Furthermore, the individual 
differences in performance in the BK experiment should be mirrored by the individual 
differences in performance in the WWW experiment, reflecting the episodic cognitive 
ability of individual birds. 
 
2.3. Experiment 2 
2.3.1. Methods 
Subjects 
The subjects were six 3.5-year-old Eurasian jays (three female: Hunter, Wiggins and 
Webb; three male: Ainsley, Hoy and Romero). Webb and Ainsley were subsequently 
excluded for failing to produce a minimum number of valid trials, leaving N=4. The 
jays were pair-housed in 4x1x1 m cages that could be divided into two 2x1x1 m test 
areas by insertion of opaque dividers. Birds were maintained at 21±1 ºC on a 12:12-
hour light-dark cycle. Birds received MD, and water was always available. Subjects 
cached in caching trays formed from seed trays consisting of 15 (three rows of five) 
5.5 cm diameter x 6 cm depth plant pots (“cells”) in a 20x30 cm tray. These pots were 
filled with wood chips, and each of the trays was a different colour to allow the use of 
“trial-unique” trays. Work adhered to Home Office licence PPL 80/1975. 
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Training 
 
Caching: Birds were food-deprived for 1.5 hours before caching sessions. They were 
then given two trial-unique trays, one covered and one uncovered (available to cache 
in), and given the opportunity to cache peanuts and suet pellets. A single “caching 
session” consisted of two consecutive 15-minute intervals, such that one of the foods 
was available to cache for the first 15 minutes, and the other was available for the 
second 15 minutes. The order in which the two foods were available to cache was 
counterbalanced between birds and across trials.  
 
The quantities of the two foods varied relative to the birds’ tendency to eat and cache 
them, with the aim of having relatively even numbers of each food cached in the 
trays. As such, 10 peanuts (which are readily cached but not eaten in great numbers in 
short periods) and 20 suet pellets (which are also readily cached but eaten in larger 
quantities) were available. Greater numbers of suet pellets were provided because of 
the birds’ tendency to eat (rather than cache) a higher proportion of these, which are 
also slightly smaller than the peanuts.  
 
The trays were then removed, the cages were cleaned and checked for out-of-tray 
caches, MD returned and the birds reunited with their cage-mates. The trays were 
checked for caches out of sight of the birds. The quantity and location of each food 
type was recorded. Trials were considered valid if birds cached at least one item of 
each food. 
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Retrieval: Birds were food-deprived for 1.75 hours before retrieval sessions to ensure 
that they were motivated to recover the caches they had made. Retrieval sessions 
occurred 4 hours, 28 hours or 52 hours after caching (the order of these delays was 
counterbalanced between birds and across trials; see figure 2.4). During the 15-minute 
retrieval sessions, the birds were given the same two trays they had at caching, with 
the same one covered and the same one open. The caches they had made in the open 
tray were still present, but varied in condition according to the delay. Both foods were 
edible after 4 hours. After 28 hours peanuts were inedible (i.e. replaced with baking 
beads) but suet was still edible. After 52 hours both foods were inedible (peanuts were 
replaced with baking beads, suet pellets were replaced with short lengths of dowel).  
 
After 15 minutes, the trays were removed, the cages were cleaned and checked for 
out-of-tray caches, MD returned and the birds reunited with their cage mates. The 
trays were checked for remaining caches and re-caches out of sight of the birds. 
The delay between caching and retrieval was varied between trials such that the birds 
could not, at caching, predict the delay until recovery (see Figure  2.4). 
 
To assess the accuracy with which caches were recovered, a “retrieval quotient” (RQ) 
was calculated for both food types. This measure followed the procedure used by 
Smulders and colleagues (2000) to determine cache-retrieval accuracy relative to 
number of items cached. RQ was calculated using the following formula: 
           r(n)- c(n) 
RQ =   n – c(n) 
 
In which n is the total number of items cached, r(n) is the number of cells containing 
that item searched after the bird has searched n unique locations (revisits not counted) 
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and c(n) is the number of items that would be expected to be retrieved after the bird 
has searched n unique locations if searching at random (i.e. chance). C(n) is calculated 
Inedible
Inedible
Inedible
 
Figure  2.3. Schematic of training 
by dividing the total number of items by the total number of storage sites and 
multiplying by n. As such, an RQ of 1 would indicate perfect performance, while an 
RQ of 0 would indicate chance performance. 
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Extinction Test 
 
The extinction test occurred after the birds had experienced at least five valid trials of 
each delay. Some birds received more than five trials for some delays to make sure 
they did not go for a long period without experiencing one of the delays (see Figure 
 2.4). In particular, 4-hour-delay trials were given regularly to maintain the jays’ 
willingness to cache (as food was always edible on these trials). Both caching and 
retrieval sessions were identical in form to those in the training trials. 
 
The extinction test consisted of a three-stage procedure. The birds were given two 
caching sessions 24 hours apart followed by a single retrieval session that was 52 
hours after the first caching session and 28 hours after the second caching session. In 
Hoy 285245244522828284428524524
Hunter 2852282852452428285245245244
Romero 2852452445228428285244285228
Wiggins 28285245244522842852524428524  
Figure  2.4. Timeline of valid trials undertaken by each bird. The numbers represent 
the hours of delay between caching and retrieval each bird experienced in each trial.  
 
 
each of the caching sessions the same two trays were used, but in the first caching 
session Tray 1 was available and Tray 2 was covered, and on the second caching 
session Tray 2 was available and Tray 1 was covered. As such, the birds first had the 
opportunity to cache both foods in Tray 1 and then 24 hours later had the opportunity 
to cache both foods in Tray 2. Both trays were then available during the retrieval 
period, which was 52 hours after the first caching session and 28 hours after the 
second caching session (Figure  2.5). Thus, according to the decay rule the birds 
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learned in the training, the only food that was edible at retrieval was the suet cached 
in Tray 2. 
 
 
Figure  2.5. Schematic of extinction test. 
 
To be considered “successful” in the extinction trials, the birds had to integrate their 
knowledge of the decay rates of the two foods (peanuts = 28 hours, suet = 52 hours) 
and their memory for how long it had been since they had cached both these two 
foods in the two trays (tray 1 = 52 hours, tray 2 = 28 hours), to conclude that only the 
suet from the tray 2 would still be edible. The birds could make different kinds of 
errors in integrating these rules. They could search for the wrong food (a “what” 
error), they could search for food cached at the wrong time (a “when” error) or they 
could search in cells in which they had not, in fact, cached (a “where” error). They  
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Table  2-1. Details of six “types” of cell in which the birds could probe in the 
extinction test. These 6 “types” represent the different types of what-where-when 
success/error combinations available for the birds to make. The grey column 
represents the correct combination. 
 
Tray 1 (i.e. cells that were 
available in first caching 
period) 
Tray 2 (i.e. cells that were 
available in the second caching 
period) 
 
In which 
cached 
suet 
In which 
cached 
peanuts 
In which 
did not 
cache  
In which 
cached 
suet 
In which 
cached 
peanuts 
In which 
did not 
cache 
What Correct Incorrect Incorrect Correct Incorrect Incorrect 
Where Correct Correct Incorrect Correct Correct Incorrect 
When Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Correct Correct Correct 
Name: S1 P1 E1 S2 P2 E2 
 
could also make combinations of these errors. Table  2-1 demonstrates the 6 different 
cell types available. These are cells in which suet is cached from the first and second 
caching periods (S1 and S2), cells in which peanuts were cached from the first and 
second caching period (P1 and P2) and cells which were available, but not cached in, 
during the first and second caching periods (E1 and E2). The “target” cell is thus S2.  
 
Analysis 
Data were analysed using two-tailed repeated measures ANOVAs with alpha set at 
0.05. 
2.3.2. Results 
Training 
Figure  2.6 shows the RQ for peanuts and suet across the training trials in the different 
delay conditions, averaged across birds. From this figure it is clear that the jays were 
not more accurate in locating suet than peanuts in the 28-hour condition (when 
peanuts would be inedible but suet edible). It is possible that differential motivation to 
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retrieve suet may have been revealed in search effort rather than retrieval accuracy. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the change in proportions of total probes 
that were made in cells containing suet and peanuts over the course of the training 
trials. No bird showed a pattern of increased preference for probing in the suet cells 
after the 28 hour delay compared with peanuts, or compared with suet in the other 
delay conditions.  
 
 
Figure  2.6. Retrieval Quotient of peanuts suet for 4-, 28- and 52-hour delay 
conditions, averaged across birds.  
 
 
Figure  2.7. Proportion of total probes made in cells containing suet and peanuts 
across the training trials, averaged across birds. 
 
It is, however, inappropriate to draw conclusions from training data alone. As the 
birds received feedback for their probing (i.e. they found the items) it is difficult to 
know what their behaviour indicates: the jays could have responded to finding a 
baking bead in place of a peanut by reducing searching in the other peanut cells 
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(deciding that all were now inedible). On the other hand, finding an unexpected item 
(e.g. a baking bead) in a cell where they were expecting food (e.g. a peanut) may 
cause a bird to probe more in that location to try to find the missing peanut. It is 
furthermore likely that a proportion of time was spent eating during trials in which 
actual food was available (e.g. 4-hour delay and 28-hour delay), which would reduce 
both probing rates and retrieval numbers. 
 
Figure  2.8. a) Number of probes in each cell type. b) RQ of each bird for target item 
(correct what-where-when), suet (correct what), Tray 2 (correct when) or any item 
(correct where). c) RQ of each type averaged across birds. 
 
Extinction trials 
 
There were six “types” of cell in which birds could probe: S1, S2, P1, P2, E1 and E2 – 
of which S2 was correct (see Table  2-1). Table 2.2 shows the number of probes made 
in each different cell type in the extinction trials. It can be seen from this that, 
numerically, the birds searched more in S2 cells than in any other type of cell (see 
figure 2.8a). However, this result was not statistically significant. Birds probed more 
in S cells than P cells (repeated measures ANOVA, food: F1,3=32.767, p=0.011) but 
they did not probe more in Tray 2 cells than Tray 1 cells (when: F1,3=0.219, p=0.671). 
There was, crucially, no significant difference between number of probes in S2 
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(correct) cells and other cached-in cells (food x when: F1,3=2.335, p=0.224). These 
results suggest that while birds searched preferentially in areas in which they had 
cached suet, they did not take account of whether that suet would be inedible. They 
also did not probe more times in each individual cell in which they had cached suet 
than in each individual cell in which they had cached peanuts. However, this may be 
because more suet was cached than peanuts (see Table  2-2). As such, RQ was 
calculated for target item (correct what-where-when), suet (correct what), Tray 2 
(correct when) or any item (correct where). Figure 2.8b and c show that birds were 
not accurate in any of these areas (with the possible exception of Hoy, who’s 
accuracy, while very low, was higher than that of the others).  
 
Table  2-2. Distribution of Caches.  
 
 S1 S2 P1 P2 E1 E2 
Mean Cells of 
This Type (sd) 
4  
(2.2) 
4.75 
(1.2) 
3.25  
(1.7) 
3.25 
(1.0) 
7.5 
(3.4) 
6.75 
(2.5) 
 
 
Relationship Between Individual Performance on Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Three birds (Hoy, Wiggins and Hunter) took part in Experiment 1 (BK) and 
Experiment 2 (WWW). An overall “score” was calculated for these experiments. The 
BK scores were calculated using the following formula: 
 
                              (CC1-CI1) + (CC2-CI2) 
BK =                   2 
 
 
In which CI is caching rates in those food-tray combinations that should have reduced 
over time (i.e. suet cached in the tray where suet would be devalued), CC is caching 
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rates in those food-tray combinations that should have increased over time (i.e. suet 
cached in the tray where peanuts would be devalued) and 1 and 2 indicate the first and 
second trials. The WWW score was the RQ for the target item. The birds were then 
ranked relative to one another (1=high, 3=low) on these two scores. Table  2-3 
indicates that, with such a small sample at least, there is little evidence to indicate a 
relationship between performances on the two tasks.  
 
Table  2-3. . Ranking of relative performance of Hoy, Hunter and Wiggins on the BK 
and WWW tests. 
 
 Bischof-Köhler What-Where-When 
 Score Rank Score Rank 
Hoy 5 1 0.25 1 
Hunter -1 3 -0.11 2 
Wiggins 2.5 2 -0.3 3 
 
 
2.3.3. Discussion 
 
Four adult Eurasian jays took part in the What-Where-When experiment. It was found 
that the birds probed in cells in which they had cached the correct food more often 
than cells in which they had cached the incorrect food (what), but that there was no 
significant preference for probing in the cells that should contain edible food (what x 
when interaction). It is possible that the failure to find a positive result in this 
experiment may be due to the very small sample size. Figure 2.8Error! Reference 
source not found. indicates that, numerically, the target cell-type (S2) was the most 
probed. However, the retrieval accuracy (RQ) was very low.  
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There are some factors that may have limited the birds’ performance. Firstly, unlike 
the scrub-jay studies (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998, Clayton et al., 2003c), the 
“degrading” process used in this study was artificial – the foods did not in fact 
degrade but turned into inedible objects. This may have been difficult for the birds to 
understand and they may, while searching, have dismissed the presence of these 
objects as irrelevant and continued to look for the food, thus considering the food 
“missing” rather than “degraded”. It may be that jays find it more difficult to associate 
food going missing with a particular timeline, compared with food degrading, which 
is more naturally associated with a timeline. Indeed, the “pilfer” group in Clayton and 
Dickinson’s original study showed a reduced effect, suggesting that Western scrub-
jays found this rule harder to learn (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). This may have 
been why the Clarks Nutcrackers (Gould et al., 2012) also struggled with the “when” 
element. Such an account requires an explanation, however, for how magpies 
managed to learn on a task in which egg pellets became wooden beads after a given 
amount of time (Zinkivskay et al., 2009). Furthermore, the replacement items very 
closely resembled the foods (see Figure  2.9). It is possible that the jays’ previous 
experience with caching and retrieving these foods over long time periods (see 
Experiment 1) may mean that they found it difficult to relearn the decay rates. It is 
also possible that the close proximity of the cache sites may have decreased accuracy 
both because of the very fine level of spatial resolution required (a “correct” cell 
would be only 5cm from an “incorrect” cell) and because of the low cost in non-
accurate searching. Indeed, Feeney and colleagues (2009) found that black-capped 
chickadees were able to remember what, where and when if tested in a large foraging 
site, but not when tested using small boards. Finally, this experiment represents a 
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Figure  2.9. Top left: baking beads, top right: peanuts, bottom left: Dowel, bottom 
right: suet pellets 
 
much more challenging version of the WWW test than has previously been 
conducted. In the extinction test, the birds needed to simultaneously keep track of two 
degrade rates (peanuts = 28 hours and suet = 52 hours), two delays (52 hours since the 
first caching session and 28 hours since the second) and 30 potential object locations. 
It is possible that the sheer executive challenge imposed by this task reduced 
performance levels irrespective of memory ability 
2.4. General Discussion 
 
Eurasian Jays were shown to adapt their caching to provide for their future needs on 
the BK test of episodic foresight. There was, however, little evidence to suggest that 
they were able to take account of what they cached where and when on the WWW 
test of episodic memory. The data presented in this chapter thus provide little support 
for the idea that good performance in one putative episodic cognition test predicts 
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good performance on another. Direct relationships between individual performances 
on the two tests are, however, difficult to interpret with such a small sample.  
 
Different intuitive, theoretical and philosophical stances have culminated in a plethora 
of different behavioural tests of episodic cognition in animals. Each of these 
emphasizes different factors. Of those explored here, the WWW paradigm, 
originating in Tulving’s original definition of episodic memory (1972), emphasizes its 
integrated spatiotemporal nature, while the BK test emphasizes the ability to 
disengage from current feelings to consider noncurrent needs. These two tests, like the 
others explored in the Introduction, are designed to assess a single ability, but stem 
from different conceptions of that ability, and emphasize different criteria for an 
animal to be considered capable of demonstrating it. Intuitively, one might say that all 
of these factors are central to episodic cognition, insofar as humans understand our 
own experience of it. However, the capacity of these tests to inform about the 
potential for episodic cognition of nonhuman animals is severely limited by the fact 
that they have rarely been conducted in the same species let alone the same subjects. 
There is thus no way of knowing what, if any, relationship exists between the 
psychological capacities required to pass each test. 
 
The experiments presented in this chapter represent a modest attempt to address this 
problem. Of course, species differences on a number of factors apart from episodic 
cognition may contribute to successful or unsuccessful performance on a number of 
putative episodic cognition tests. One solution to this difficulty is to assess individual 
differences within a given species. If multiple behavioural tests do tap the same 
psychological process, then one would expect a high level of correlation in 
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individuals’ performance on these tests. This is obviously difficult to achieve in 
animal studies such as this one, which often contain very small sample sizes. As such, 
the assessment of related performance in animals on a number of episodic cognition 
tasks need to be accompanied by other arms of investigation. The next chapter 
assesses a number of these tests in young children. The prediction is that if these tasks 
assess the same underlying psychological process, they should show the same 
developmental trajectory and be correlated in children. 
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Chapter 3  
Episodic Cognition in Children 
 
A sample of 106 children aged between 3- and 6-years were tested on three 
different putative episodic memory tests (What-Where-When, Unexpected 
Question and Free Recall), one test thought to tap both episodic and 
semantic memory (Cued Recall) and one putative test of episodic foresight 
(Bischof-Köhler). It was predicted that performance on the memory tests 
would be positively correlated with one another. It was furthermore 
predicted that children who passed the Bischof-Köhler test would perform 
better on the memory tests than those who failed. Children were found to 
perform well on all the memory tests, but no age group passed the Bischof-
Köhler test. Performance improved gradually with age. It was found that 
while performances on all the tests were related, few relationships survived 
when age was partialled out. Furthermore, performance on the Bischof-
Köhler test was negatively related to age and performance on the 
Unexpected Question test. It is suggested that episodic cognition may, at 
least in development, be a multifactorial process in which different 
component processes develop at different rates. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 explored the evidence for episodic cognition in nonhuman animals. It was 
concluded that the different theoretical perspectives from which the different tests of 
episodic memory were developed may limit the ability to interpret the literature. At 
present, evidence concerning episodic cognition can originate from studies testing 
essentially different skills (such as remembering what happened where and when, and 
the ability to plan for a non-current need state) that have been hypothesised to tap the 
same psychological process. A previously untested species (the Eurasian jay) was 
tested on two different behavioural tests of episodic cognition, and was found to adapt 
its behaviour appropriately to provide for its future needs (the Bischof-Köhler test), 
but showed little evidence of an ability to remember the spatiotemporal aspects of a 
past event (the What-Where-When test). These results suggest that the same animal 
model can perform well on very different tests of episodic cognition, perhaps 
indicating that they do indeed test the same underlying ability. Were this the case, one 
would expect performance on these tests to be developmentally, as well as 
phylogenetically, consistent. In other words, tests that assess the same psychological 
process should show similar developmental trajectories. This chapter explores 
performance on different putative tests of episodic cognition in children. 
 
The development of memory in children has been a subject of scientific investigation 
for almost a century. The literature, as with that on animal memory, is plagued by 
contrasting and often contradictory definitions, theoretical perspectives and 
assumptions. In contrast, the study of prospective thought in children is a relatively 
recent development (Suddendorf and Moore, 2011). To date, there is little agreement 
on what children of different stages of development experience when they remember 
80 
or think about the future, and at what point this cognition can be referred to as 
“episodic”.  
 
There is evidence that some form of long-term memory exists in humans even before 
we have left the womb: children as young as a few days are able to recognise stimuli 
that were presented to them prenatally (DeCasper and Spence, 1986). From birth, the 
speed of encoding, longevity and, most importantly, flexibility of memory continues 
to develop at a considerable rate. Hayne and colleagues (2000) argued that it is this 
increase in flexibility of the long-term memory system, allowing the retrieval of 
memories outside of the context in which they were encoded, that is the crucial 
development in infant memory. As infants’ brains develop, memories can be encoded 
with sufficient flexibility to be retrieved in increasingly divergent contexts. This may 
also explain the longevity of the memories, given that the passage of time can be 
considered as a change in temporal context. Eventually, these memories are of 
sufficient flexibility to be able to be recalled by adults, who, by definition are in an 
utterly different internal and external context to their infant selves.  
 
This gradual development may explain why most adults cannot recall events that 
occurred before the age of about 2 years (e.g. Usher and Neisser, 1993). Between the 
ages of 6 and 18 months, while an action can be remembered and memory 
demonstrated in the same way (as shown in deferred imitation paradigms), there is 
significant development in the extent to which children need to be cued by contextual 
cues that were present in the encoding episode. It is significant to note that children of 
16-20 months generalize to new objects, but do not forget the specifics of the original 
event (Bauer and Dow, 1994). Thus there is a gradually increasing ability to engage in 
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“free recall” (i.e. recall of events without cues that were present at encoding). Indeed, 
at 18 months, children begin to verbally report past events, though these tend to refer 
to the immediate past or familiar routines. At about 20-24 months children make more 
extended verbal references to events that occurred in the more distant past (Nelson 
and Ross, 1980). 
 
This continuing increase in memory longevity and flexibility continues during the 
pre-school years, and is reflected in the development of prospective thought. Sachs 
(1983) and Nelson (1989) both report on references to the past and future made in 
spontaneous speech by 2-year-old children, which refer to specific events involving 
the self. This type of “displaced speech” increases significantly between the ages of 
1.5 and 4.5 (e.g. Adamson and Bakeman, 2006). Using a questionnaire for parents, 
Benson (1994) found that children from 12 to 36 months show increasing levels of 
behavioural expectation of the future. Much of the debate in the developmental 
literature concerns the point at which we can consider children’s memories and 
prospections to be “episodic”. 
 
Clayton and Russell (2009) formalised the theoretical positions in developmental 
psychology into two camps: the conceptualists and the minimalists. This is a useful 
perspective from which to consider the episodic cognition literature, which is so rich 
in theory that it can often be difficult to differentiate empirical findings from 
theoretical inferences. The following section shall briefly review these theoretical 
approaches.  
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Conceptualist theories posit that for episodic cognition to be defined as such, it must 
be accompanied by a conceptual grasp of what is being experienced. There is, 
however, no absolute agreement about the specific concept that needs to be grasped. 
Many theorists (e.g. Howe and Courage, 1993, Fivush and Nelson, 2004, Levine, 
2004, Povinelli et al., 1996, 1999, McCormack and Hoerl, 1999, Hoerl and 
McCormack, 2001, Tulving, 2002) have suggested that maturation of the sense of self 
is fundamental in the development of episodic cognition. They argue that, while the 
memory traces exist before this time, the emergent concept of self allows the encoded 
traces to become organised around a “me” who experienced them. This consciousness 
of memories as events previously experienced by the self is referred to elsewhere as 
“autonoetic consciousness” (Tulving, 2002, Wheeler et al., 1997). Thus before 
development of the sense of self, memory exists, but it only becomes episodic 
memory when one is capable of self-knowledge (autonoesis). This has been expanded 
(e.g. Fivush and Nelson, 2004, Levine, 2004) to suggest that the concept of the 
“temporally extended self” (Povinelli et al., 1996, 1999, 2001) is required; that is, a 
self-identity that extends into the personal past and personal future: “It is only the self 
with a specific past that is endowed with the unique capacity to re-experience the 
past” (Nelson, 2001, p.21). These theorists authors cite Povinelli’s work (1996, 1999) 
showing that when children were filmed having a sticker surreptitiously placed on 
their head and subsequently shown the video, 75% of 4-year-olds reached up to 
remove the sticker, while no 2-year-olds and very few (25%) 3-year-olds did so. 
Furthermore, while 4-and 5-year-olds tended to refer to an image of themselves as 
“me”, children of 3 years and younger tended to refer to the image in the third person, 
with a proper name. This evidence for the emergence of a concept of “self in time” at 
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4 years has been taken by many (e.g. Levine, 2004, Suddendorf and Busby, 2005) as 
evidence that episodic memory cannot exist before the age of 4 years. 
 
Arguing along similar lines as the self-awareness theorists, Perner and colleagues 
(Perner, 1991, Perner, 2000, Perner, 1990, following Tulving, 1985b) argued that for 
episodic memory to exist, children must be capable not only of experiencing a 
memory trace, but of also recognising that trace as a representation of an event 
previously experienced by a past self. This, it is argued, requires not only the ability to 
understand that the past self had a mental life different from that which the child 
currently experiences, but also the understanding that the trace currently being 
experienced is not direct experience or imagination but a memory (that is, a 
representation) of a past experience. Perner thus theorised that episodic memory 
development depends on the development of representational theory of mind (that is, 
the ability to understand that one’s own and other’s minds contain representations of 
the world which may or may not be accurate), which is thought to develop around the 
age of 4 years (e.g. Flavell et al., 1983, Gopnik and Astington, 1988, Moore et al., 
1990, Perner et al., 1987, Wimmer and Perner, 1983, Flavell et al., 1993). 
 
There is some empirical support for the idea that the development of episodic 
cognition is related to development of self-awareness and theory of mind. Early in 
development, autobiographical memory skills are related to mirror self-recognition 
(Reese, 2002), and there is a relationship between performance on the delayed self-
recognition test (Povinelli et al., 1996, 1999) and ability to tell a detailed personal 
narrative (Lemmon and Moore, 2001). Lemmon and Moore (2001) demonstrated that 
4-year-olds’ delayed self-recognition performance was significantly related to 
84 
memory for order and context, and that these memory scores were furthermore 
associated with ability on a delay-of-gratification test. These relationships were not 
seen in 3-year-olds, although the performance of these younger children was not 
convincingly different from that of 4-year-olds. However, Zelazo and colleagues 
(1999) and Suddendorf (1999) both showed that 3-year-olds’ apparent inability to 
recognize delayed video images of themselves may stem from an inability to 
understand external representations rather than an undeveloped sense of self. 
Furthermore, Naito  and Suzuki (2011) demonstrated that, when age and verbal ability 
were controlled for, delayed-self recognition was not related to source memory, 
delayed gratification or performance on a test assessing sequencing of future events. 
 
 In terms of the relationship between episodic memory and representational theory of 
mind, Perner and Ruffman (1995) showed that, in 3- to 6-year-old children, 
understanding the relationship between sensory experience and information 
acquisition was related to free recall performance (when cued recall and verbal 
intelligence were controlled for). Similarly, Perner and colleagues (2007) found that 
theory of mind performance related to memory accuracy on a “directly experienced” 
paradigm (thought to allow/require re-experience of an event) but not on an 
“indirectly experienced” paradigm (thought not to allow re-experience). However, 
Naito (2003) found that free recall was not related to either the “Sally-Anne”/Unseen 
Displacement test or Deceptive Appearance False Belief test. They found that the 
Deceptive Appearance test correlated with source monitoring (that is, knowing how 
you know something) only in 6-year-olds (see Templeton and Wilcox, 2000 for 
similar findings). This suggests that, rather than one ability preceding and underlying 
the other, memory and theory of mind may develop se
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in childhood (although see Karmilof-Smith (e.g. , 1994, 1997) for an argument 
favouring increasing modularity with age).  
 
It is interesting to note that proponents of both self-awareness and metarepresentation 
theories allow the existence of memory traces in early childhood, but suggest that they 
become episodic only with the development of the necessary conceptual ability. Such 
an account raises the question: what were they before? What seems not to be 
discussed in this literature is that this difference between self-conscious and non-self-
conscious re-experiencing is not the same as the difference between semantic and 
episodic memory. Semantic memory is knowledge that does not involve re-
experiencing. If we accept Tulving’s (1985b) definition of episodic memory as 
requiring autonoetic consciousness, what then do we call a memory that involves re-
experiencing but does not occur in the presence of autonoetic consciousness?3 Surely 
the distinction between a self-conscious re-experience and a conscious re-experience 
in the absence of self-awareness is not necessarily one of the nature of the memory 
(i.e. mere knowledge versus re-experience), but of the same self-consciousness that 
can be applied to any aspect of mental life. It is true that episodic cognition as we 
experience it as human adults involves an understanding of the temporally extended 
self,4 but only in the same degree required by every other mental experience of the 
human adult . In contrast, I argue that the underlying cognitive phenomenon is 
capable of existing independently of an organism’s conscious awareness of it, and this 
                                                 
3 Note that in Tulving’s work with patient NN (1985) he did not report seeing pictures in his mind that 
he can’t identify - he reports blankness. Is this, then, failure of autonoetic consciousness or lack of re-
experiencing?  
 
4 Although see Tulving’s (2005, p.27) report of the episodic amnesic KC, in which he states that it “is 
not unreasonable to imagine that giving KC a Gallup mirror test, or even Povinelli’s delayed video test 
in order to check his self-awareness would be equivalent to giving a Columbia university professor a 
test of the alphabet.”  
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argument is not purely theoretical. Conceptualist theorists argue that, because the 
temporally extended self concept (Povinelli et al., 1996, 1999) or representational 
theory of mind (Perner, 1990, 1991, 2000) do not develop until the age of around 4 
years, episodic cognition cannot develop until this age. It is manifestly true that if one 
defines episodic memory as incorporating self-awareness or metarepresentation, and 
then proves that these capacities do not develop until 4 years, then by definition 
episodic memory cannot develop until 4-years. However, one might ask if this is a 
useful line of argument. If a cognitive ability is defined by its most sophisticated 
manifestation, then by definition it cannot exist in any other form. Furthermore, self-
awareness and metarepresentation are general cognitive capacities that enrich and 
alter all forms of experience. One might just as well say that drinking water cannot be 
defined as such if it is not accompanied by the self-conscious awareness of drinking 
water, the understanding that the need to drink is in response to thirst and the 
flexibility to drink when one is not thirsty (such as to avoid a hangover the next day). 
Were drinking water defined in this way, we would be arguing that infants and 
animals do not drink.  
 
Against such conceptualist theories, Russell and colleagues have proposed a 
“minimalist” approach (Clayton and Russell, 2009, Russell et al., 2010, Russell et al., 
2011) 5. These authors suggested that there currently exist two forms of minimalism: 
“Episodic-like” minimalism, which emphasizes the binding of spatiotemporal features 
(and makes no assumptions or claims pertaining to phenomenology (Clayton and 
Dickinson, 1998), and “Kantian” minimalism, which emphasizes that memory must 
take the first-person perspective. Russell and colleagues (2011) cite Kant’s (1992) 
                                                 
5 This paper (Russell, Cheke, Clayton & Melzoff, 2011) includes research carried out by myself when I 
was a research assistant and Part II undergraduate student in the Experimental Psychology department. 
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statement that “[H]e who sees his first tree does not know what he sees” and argue 
that “children lacking adults’ sophisticated conceptual apparatus might still exhibit 
some legitimate form of episodic memory and foresight” (Russell et al., 2011, p.2). 
That is, that children do not need to understand what is going on in their heads for it 
to be going on their heads.6 
 
Thus it seems that conceptualist and minimalist theories agree that some form of 
memory trace exists before such time as children are able to conceptualise the nature 
and content of that trace, but disagree on whether the memory can be considered 
“episodic” before this time. If there were there a distinct change in memory and 
prospective processing with the development of self-awareness and 
metarepresentation (around the age of 4 years), then one might expect such an abrupt 
change to be evident in performance on tests assessing episodic cognition at around 
that age. Furthermore, if various methodological paradigms are differently able to tap 
episodic cognition, then this change should be evident in studies using some 
paradigms but not others. The following section will explore the extent to which there 
is evidence for such a developmental discontinuity. 
 
The Developmental Trajectory of Episodic Cognition 
 
A number of different paradigms have been employed to investigate cognition in 
developing children, but very few authors make explicit claims to tap episodic 
                                                 
6 One point requires clarification and that is the difference between imagination and a re-experience in 
the absence of self-aware knowledge that what is being experienced is a memory. Imagination differs 
from memory in the way it is produced (purely constructive vs. retrieved) and its novelty (imagined 
scenes are novel (if built from familiar components); memories are familiar as a whole). One can 
experience familiarity in the absence of understanding of why one is feeling it (e.g. deja vu). I suggest 
that memories differ from imagination insofar as they are familiar or recognised experiences rather 
than necessarily being understood experiences.  
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memory. In the following section of this chapter I shall explore the findings from 
paradigms that do make this claim, or are potential candidates for episodic cognition 
research. 
 
Free and Cued Recall 
 
As has been discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2, the free recall (FR) paradigm 
involves the subject learning a series of items (usually words or pictures) and then 
being asked to recall these at a later time without the aid of any external cues. In 
contrast, cued recall (CR) paradigms provide subjects with external cues (such as 
category words) to aid their recollection. Tulving (1985) found that people were much 
more likely to report “remembering”, rather than “knowing”, the words in a free recall 
test than in a CR test. As such, the FR paradigm is thought to preferentially tap 
episodic memory, while the CR paradigm is thought to assess both episodic and 
semantic memory. If there was a developmental discontinuity in episodic, but not 
semantic memory, one might expect to see an abrupt change in performance in FR, 
but not CR, tests at around the age of 4 years.  
 
Perner and Ruffman (1995) found a significant improvement in both FR and CR 
performance between the ages of 3 and 4 years. However, this development appears 
to be part of a gradual increase in performance in both these abilities between the ages 
of 3 and 8 years (Naito, 2003, Sluzenski et al., 2004). This suggests that the increase 
in performance is not specific to free recall, and is not “abrupt”. 
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Free recall can also take the form of autobiographical report. This type of technique 
has been used to investigate children’s episodic cognition both into the past (episodic 
memory) and future (episodic foresight). Suddendorf and Busby (2005) and 
Suddendorf (2010) asked children to report what they did yesterday and what they 
would do tomorrow (questions that amnesic patients are unable to answer  (Klein et 
al., 2002, Tulving, 1985b)). Around 30% of 3-year-olds, 50-60% of 4-year-olds and 
60-75% of 5-year-olds were able to successfully report a past event and a planned 
future event. The authors thus suggested that the ability to envisage future scenarios 
develops at the age of 4 years. However, given that 30% of 3-year-olds were 
successful, one might more accurately say that this ability improves between the ages 
of 3 and 4 years. Similarly, Hudson and colleagues (1995) found that specific plans 
for a future event (episodic) increased significantly across the ages of 3-5 years, while 
general descriptions of similar events (semantic) were relatively consistent across this 
age range. Hayne and colleagues (2011) conducted a similar experiment in which 
children were asked to describe events in the past and future. The authors found that 
5-year-olds reported significantly more information about their personal past and 
future than did 3-year-olds, but interestingly that there was no age difference in the 
proportion of first-person references or future-oriented talk.  
 
The difficulty with these purely verbal tests is that, in the period in question (0-7 years 
of age), both language in general and temporal language specifically develop 
dramatically (Veneziano and Sinclair, 1995, Friedman and Kemp, 1998, Friedman, 
2000, Friedman, 2002, Harner, 1976, Harner, 1980, Harner, 1982, Trosborg, 1982, 
Weist, 1991, Busby-Grant and Suddendorf, 2011). Thus, reliance on verbal measures 
puts researchers at risk of assuming an absence of memory because of a lack of ability 
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to communicate it, and of assuming the existence of memory because of sophisticated, 
yet misleading, language use (e.g. Lyon and Flavell, 1994). There is also the risk of 
assuming gradual increases in mnemonic abilities from gradual increases in verbal 
abilities. As Suddendorf and Busby (2005) themselves allow, “children can hardly be 
expected to answer a question about yesterday if they don’t know what the word 
means.” (Suddendorf and Busby, 2005, p.7). It is because of these language 
difficulties that many researchers have adopted more behavioural tests for assessing 
episodic cognition. 
 
Tool Choice/Transportation (the “Spoon Test”) 
 
In a similar way to autobiographical report tests, the “tool-transportation” (Mulcahy 
and Call, 2006) or “Spoon-Test” (Tulving, 2005) paradigm has been used to 
investigate episodic cognition into the past and future. This test is based on an 
Estonian folk story in which a child dreams of attending a party in which she is unable 
to eat her favourite cake because she hasn’t got a spoon. The following night, fearing 
that she will again dream of the party, she takes a spoon to bed with her (Tulving, 
2004). Thus this test assesses the ability of subjects faced with tools that are not 
currently useful to save them for a time or transport them to a place in which they will 
become useful.  
 
Atance and colleagues (2001, 2005) examined children’s ability to choose tools for 
hypothetical future trips. They found that 4- and 5-year-old children chose the correct 
items significantly more often than 3-year-olds and that 3-year-olds were more likely 
to be misled by incorrect but semantically related items. In addition, 4- and 5-year-
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olds made more references to the future in their reasoning than younger 3-year-olds 
and were better at predicting their future actions. While these results indicate an 
improvement from 3 to 4 years of age, in both instances the performance of the 3-
year-olds was still reasonable, suggesting that they were able to demonstrate 
prospective thought. Given this, it seems premature to conclude that these tests 
indicate any particular discontinuity between 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds on future-
planning tests. Indeed, the only studies that seem to demonstrate a developmental 
discontinuity in future-oriented decision making are those employing pass/fail tests. 
For example, Suddendorf and Busby (2005) showed that, while 4- and 5-year-olds 
were able to appropriately choose an item that would be useful in the future 
significantly more often than a control group, 3-year-olds were not. Similarly, 
Suddendorf and colleagues (2011) showed that 4-year-olds were able to use the 
memory of a problem previously experienced – but never directly solved – to choose 
the appropriate tool for its future solution. However, 3-year-olds’ performance did not 
differ from chance. With these tests it is difficult to determine whether it is the 
presence or absence of a cognitive ability that is being demonstrated, or merely a 
relatively arbitrary threshold imposed by the test demands on what would be a 
gradually improving performance if tested differently. Such a conclusion may be 
supported by the finding of Scarf and colleagues (2011) that 3-year-olds’ ability to 
use a memory of a past problem to choose an appropriate tool for future use decreased 
gradually with increasing time since exposure to the original problem, while the 4-
year-olds’ performance remained relatively stable for up to a week. Thus it may be 
that, in younger children, the memory trace is successfully formed and they are able to 
use it, but it is more vulnerable to decay and disruption (see also Atance and Meltzoff, 
2005).  
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One major criticism of tool-transportation/spoon-test paradigms is that they may be 
solved on the basis of the functional features of the tool/apparatus/situation rather than 
the concept of a future need. Russell and colleagues propose that the subject will be 
required to “take the perspective” of their future self only if they are not required to 
envisage themselves acting from a particular spatial position. Russell and colleagues 
(2010) adapted this paradigm such that children were required to predict what they 
would need to play a game of “blow-football” from a novel spatial perspective. 
Children were asked either to predict which tools they themselves would need to play 
in the future, or which tools another child would need. The authors argued that in the 
latter condition children would be more likely to use semantic functional reasoning 
(i.e. what does the game need) rather than imagining playing from a particular spatial 
position. While 3-year-olds were unable to pass either condition (though able to pass 
control conditions in which they were choosing for “right now”) and 5-year-olds 
passed both conditions, 4-year-olds were successful only when choosing for another 
child, and not when choosing for themselves. Russell and colleagues suggest that this 
represents a transitional phase in which episodic cognition is present but cannot be 
used flexibly.  
 
The What-Where-When Paradigm 
 
The What-Where-When (WWW) paradigm has only recently been used to investigate 
episodic cognition in children. This test requires subjects to take account of the time 
and location of a particular event when making a decision. It has been argued 
(Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) that this requires an integrated spatiotemporal 
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representation of the event, which corresponds to Tulving’s (1972) original definition 
of episodic memory. 
 
Hayne and Imuta (2011) used a hide-and-seek WWW paradigm to reveal that while 3-
year-olds performed significantly worse than 4-year-olds, they still remembered a 
good proportion of what toys they had hidden where, particularly on the non-verbal 
test. We (Russell et al., 2011) previously used a WWW paradigm to investigate 
episodic foresight. In this test children were presented with two locations (a hot box 
and a cold box) and two foods (preferred chocolate and non-preferred-but-acceptable 
biscuit). The children received training that the chocolate would melt if left in the hot 
box for a long time, but not a short time, and that the biscuit would stay fresh in both 
boxes. There were then two conditions. In the “Future-Self” condition, children were 
asked to place the chocolate in the hot box and the biscuit in the cold box. They were 
then asked to predict which box they would open if they came back after a short or 
long delay. In the “Self-Caching” condition, children were provided with only the hot 
box, informed that they were going to go away for a short or long time, and asked 
which food they would like to place in it. We hypothesised that the former condition 
would require children to imagine their own future actions, while the latter condition 
could be solved though functional/semantic reasoning. We found that 3-year-olds did 
not perform above chance on either test. The 4- and 5-year olds performed above 
chance in the self-caching condition but not the future-self condition, although there 
was no significant difference between performance in the two conditions. The 
performance of the 4-year-olds was replicated in a follow-up study in which food 
ripened (cake-mix became cake) rather than degraded. Based on these data, we 
concluded that children of 4- and 5-years struggle to overcome their current 
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preference for the presently preferable/edible food to predict their future actions or 
needs at a time when the world will be different. Thus this study suggests that 
children struggle with tests in which the state of the world changes between the 
present and the future. While we (Russell et al., 2011) tested this with a change in 
state of the external world, the Bischof-Köhler test investigates the ability of children 
to plan for a change in internal state.  
 
The Bischof-Köhler Paradigm 
 
The ‘Bischof-Köhler’ (BK) paradigm involves manipulation of a subject’s current or 
future motivational state to assess whether they are able to plan for a time at which 
their motivational state will be manifestly different. Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 
2007) suggest that one of the central functions of episodic cognition is to allow an 
organism to disengage from their current needs to provide for the needs of their future 
selves. To date there is only one exploration of performance on the BK test in 
children. Atance and Meltzoff (2006) conducted a test in which children were made 
thirsty by eating a bowl of pretzels. After this they were asked if they would like 
water or pretzels tomorrow. All 3- 4- and 5-year-olds reliably chose water for 
tomorrow, despite the 4- and 5-year-olds passing comprehension tests about the word 
“tomorrow”. This result is particularly interesting as it suggests that the BK test is 
passed later in development than other tests aiming to assess episodic foresight.  
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The Unexpected Questions Paradigm 
 
Zentall (2001, 2008) argued that when an organism experiences an event in the 
knowledge that what they learn will be important later, they are more likely to encode 
target features of the event semantically than if they were passively experiencing it. It 
is suggested that only through asking ‘unexpected questions’ (UEQ) can the memory 
for the unattended context be tested.  
  
There is little direct literature assessing the impact of “unexpectedness” on memory 
tests in developing children. There is, however, literature on the development of 
effortful encoding strategies, which may speak to the development of a difference 
between “expected” and “unexpected” questions in the extent to which children are 
capable of preparing for a memory test. Children have been shown not to start 
spontaneously rehearsing to-be-remembered items until around the age of 7 years 
(Flavell et al., 1966) and are only adept at this strategy at around 10-11 years (Cuvo, 
1975, Ornstein et al., 1975, 1977) . Similarly, only children of 10-years and older 
spontaneously categorise to-be-remembered items to facilitate encoding (Moely et al., 
1969). These data suggest that it is only relatively late in childhood that the 
“expectedness” of a memory test would alter the nature of the encoding process.  
 
Source memory tests, it has been argued (Wheeler et al., 1997), test memory for the 
context of an event rather than its focal targets. Here, subjects are required to report 
not only what was learned, but (unexpectedly) also how or when they learned it. 
Studies have reliably indicated very poor performance on source memory in children 
under the age of 5 years (O'Neill and Gopnik, 1991, Gopnik and Graff, 1988, 
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Wimmer et al., 1988, Whitcombe and Robinson, 2000, Taylor et al., 1994, Drummey 
and Newcombe, 2002) However, models of source memory suggest that that 
qualitative differences in the experience of remembering information acquired from 
different sources are used to differentiate between these memories and determine their 
source (Johnson et al., 1993, Lindsay and Johnson, 1987). Thus this monitoring 
requires not only the re-experience of the event(s), but also the ability to distinguish 
between multiple representations. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the 
difficulty young children experience lies in the ability to mentally re-experience the 
learning event, or to use elements of it (such as, for example, its vividness) as 
discriminative stimuli in decision making. Indeed, Sluzenski and colleagues (2004) 
argue that it is possible that young children (in the case of their own study, 4-year-
olds) may struggle with source/reality monitoring because “their memories are often 
relatively impoverished and that, in such a circumstance, it is hard to distinguish 
between real and imagined events using the richness of memories as a criterion for the 
decision” (p. 16). An alternative possibility may be that “4-year-olds do not 
consistently appreciate that the richness of memories can be used to judge reality 
status” (p. 16).  
 
Both strategic remembering and source monitoring are known to rely on the frontal 
lobes (“Effortful encoding strategies”: (Moscovitch, 1992, Gershberg and 
Shimamura, 1995, Hirst and Volpe, 1988), “Source monitoring”: (Janowsky et al., 
1989, Squire and Knowlton, 1995, Knowlton and Squire, 1995, Schacter et al., 1984, 
Shimamura and Squire, 1987, Shimamura and Squire, 1991, Senkfor and Van Petten, 
1998). It is thus possible that the same gradual development of frontal function over 
the first decade of life (e.g. Huttenlocher, 1979, Bourgeois, 2001) is responsible for 
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the reduced ability to use encoding strategies and for poor source monitoring in young 
children (Schacter et al., 1995, Leichtman et al., 2000, Ruffman et al., 2001). These 
data produce inconsistent predictions for young children’s performance on an 
unexpected memory test. On the one hand, children may not be able to employ the 
strategies through which one might expect episodic traces to be recoded into semantic 
knowledge until around the age of 7 years. On the other hand, they also seem unable 
to answer unexpected questions about the source of their knowledge until around the 
same age, while being perfectly capable of acquiring and retaining that knowledge. 
One possible explanation is that both the use of deliberate encoding strategies and the 
capacity to understand the source of one’s own knowledge require a level of reflexive 
self-awareness and/or theory of mind. That is, they must understand that their own 
knowledge state is a result both of their external experiences and internal strategies. 
This understanding may be cognitively demanding above and beyond the memory 
tests themselves. 
 
In summary, there is mixed evidence for a developmental discontinuity in 
performance on episodic cognition tests. While most studies show a distinct 
improvement between the ages of 3 and 5 years, few show total failure in the under-4s 
or asymptotic performance in the over 5s. The widespread use of binary pass/fail 
paradigms means that there often appears to be a discrepancy between 3- and 4-year-
olds’ performances, when this may in fact result from a gradual improvement. 
 
What is required is a thorough investigation of the relationship between different 
putative tests of episodic cognition across a wider age range. This would allow us to 
reconcile the existing evidence that uses different paradigms, as well as assess the 
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extent to which development can be considered abrupt or gradual. There is one 
current example of such a study. Atance and Jackson (2009) conducted a correlational 
study to relate the performance on several different tests of prospection on the same 
sample of children. Children between 3 and 5 years were tested on Delay of 
Gratification, Planning (Tower of Hanoi & Truck-loading tests), Prospective Memory 
and Episodic Foresight. The delay of gratification task used the Mischel procedure 
(Mischel et al., 1989) in which children must resist an immediate reward to receive 
two rewards after a delay. The planning tests included an adapted version of the 
Tower of Hanoi test in which children must move a series of discs from peg to peg to 
create a structure that matches a target arrangement (e.g. Carlson et al., 2004) and a 
truck loading test (e.g. Carlson et al., 2004) in which children must plan the shortest 
possible route through a series of destinations while taking into account a growing 
number of rules). The prospective memory assessment used a test developed by 
Kvavilashvili and colleagues (2001), in which children must sort through a pack of 
cards while remembering to put the card in a basket if it contains a picture of an 
animal, and a test developed by Guajardo and Best (2000), in which children were 
told to remind the experimenter about something after they’d finished playing a game. 
Finally, the episodic foresight assessment included a test identical to that used by 
Atance and Meltzoff (2005), in which appropriate items must be chosen that will be 
useful for a hypothetical future trip, and a test similar to that used by Busby and 
Suddendorf (2005) to assess children’s ability to report what is likely to happen 
tomorrow. Atance and Jackson (2009) found significant improvement with age on all 
the tests, and performance on all tests were correlated with each other except for 
Busby and Suddendorf’s test, which correlated only with Atance and Meltzoff’s test 
and one prospective memory test. This relationship between the two episodic 
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foresight tests was one of the only correlations to remain once age and receptive 
vocabulary were partialled out. The authors suggest that this is “notable, given that 
both were independently designed to assess children’s [episodic foresight].” (p.9). 
However, while showing a correlation between two tests suggests that they may 
assess the same ability, it cannot indicate what that ability is. Thus while Atance and 
Jackson (2009) have provided evidence that these two tests assess similar processes – 
although the correlation coefficient was only 0.38 – they do not provide evidence that 
the process in question is episodic foresight. I suggest therefore that the authors are 
not justified in their statement that “these two tests appear to be a good means of 
assessing [episodic foresight] developmentally” (p.9). It should, for example, be noted 
that while many of the other tests were behavioural, both episodic foresight tests were 
distinctly verbal, and that while the authors controlled for receptive vocabulary, they 
did not control for productive vocabulary, which is heavily required for both episodic 
foresight tests. The authors conclude that “in addition to some form of future 
orientation, these tests differentially require abilities such as theory of mind, working 
memory, and inhibitory control”. Despite caveats of interpretation, this methodology 
of assessing intercorrelation between multiple tests putatively testing the same or 
overlapping psychological processes has the potential of offering new and vital 
insights into the mechanism and development of those processes. 
 
In the experiment presented in this chapter, three different putative tests of episodic 
memory (WWW, UEQ and FR), one putative test of both episodic and semantic 
memory (CR) and one putative test of episodic foresight (BK) are presented to the 
same group of children aged 3 to 6 years. Autobiographical report and spoon tests 
were not conducted. The former because it is heavily reliant on both receptive and 
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productive verbal ability, the latter because it is heavily confounded with both 
functional reasoning (Russell et al., 2010) and instrumental learning (Cheke and 
Clayton, 2010, Suddendorf et al., 2009) and thus requires control groups to be 
interpretable. All the memory tests are designed to produce continuous data (i.e. they 
are not binary pass/fail tests). This enables us to investigate three central questions: 
 
1. Is there a developmental discontinuity in episodic cognition performance?  
2. Does children’s’ performance on the different tests of episodic cognition 
correlate? 
3. Do different tests of episodic cognition produce different developmental 
trajectories? 
  
3.2. Methods 
Subjects 
 
106 children aged between 3 and 6 years (3-year-olds, N=27; 4-year-olds, N=18; 5-
year-olds, N=27; 6-year-olds, N=34) were recruited form schools and nurseries in the 
Cambridge area. The sample consisted of 49 girls and 57 boys (3-year-olds: 15 girls, 
12 boys; 4-year-olds: 6 girls, 12 boys; 5-year-olds: 15 girls, 12 boys; 6-year-olds: 13 
boys, 21 girls).  
 
The study was approved by the Cambridge University Psychological Research Ethics 
Committee. Informed written consent was received from parents before any child took 
part. 
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Tests 
Free Recall 
 
Children were shown eight images and were asked to name each one in turn. They 
were then told to look at the images and try to remember what was in them. After a 
delay of around 5 minutes, children were asked to tell the experimenter what pictures 
had been on the cards. This methodology followed that of Perner & Ruffman (1995). 
 
Cued Recall 
 
Children were shown eight images, half of which were of animals and half of which 
were of toys, and were asked to name each one in turn (the category of each item was 
highlighted by the experimenter prompting the children for the name with “what 
animal/toy is this?”). They were then told to look at the images and try to remember 
what was in them. After a delay of around 5 minutes, children were asked to tell the 
experimenter what pictures of animals had been on the cards and what pictures of toys 
had been on the cards. This methodology followed that of Perner & Ruffman (1995). 
 
What-Where-When 
 
Fewer children took part in this experiment because children were split between this 
and another experiment (not reported). As such, 68 children took part in this 
experiment. 
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Children were told to pretend that they were a pirate with some treasure to bury. They 
were given three pieces of “gold treasure” (plastic £1 coins) and three pieces of 
“silver treasure” (plastic 20p coins). Children were shown two location-trays in which 
they could hide the treasure: the “forest” and the “town” (see Figure  3.1). These 
consisted of two upside-down 15-pot (3 x 5) seed trays, one painted green and one 
painted red, each of which contained five distinct land-marks. They were first asked 
to choose one tray to bury treasure in, and the other was then removed. They were 
then free to hide all six coins in any order under pots in their chosen location. Every 
time a coin was picked up the experimenter highlighted its identity by saying “Where 
are you going to hide that gold/silver treasure?”. After a delay (approx 5-10 minutes), 
children were told that they were going to bury some more treasure and were given 
three more “gold treasure” coins and three more “silver treasure” coins, as well as the 
location-tray they had not previously used. Again they were free to hide them in any 
order and each coin identity was highlighted by the experimenter as it was hidden. 
After another delay (approx 5-10 minutes), Children were shown a toy crow (“Mr 
Crow”) and informed that he was a “cunning thief” and had been watching them bury 
the treasure. The children were told that Mr Crow had stolen all of the treasure from 
one hiding-period (counter-balanced between subjects) and all of one type of treasure 
(counter-balanced between subjects) from the other hiding-period. Children were then 
asked to say which treasure was left. If they were unable to, they were told which 
treasure was left. All elements of the treasure that was left (particularly the “when” 
element) was described to them in a number of ways (e.g. “before”/”earlier”/”first”/ 
”longer ago”) to increase their chances of understanding what was being asked. 
Children were then asked to identify the pots in which there should be treasure 
remaining by pointing to them. After they had done so, the trays were lifted and it was 
103 
revealed that Mr Crow had not in fact stolen any coins and that they could swap the 
coins for a sticker.  
 
 
 
Figure  3.1. Illustration of the What-Where-When Test. The two locations were the 
“forest” (left) and the “town” (right), and the items were “Gold” and “Silver”. Items 
could be hidden under the pots as illustrated at the bottom of the figure.  
 
 
Unexpected Question (UEQ) 
 
One week after the end of the experiment, the children were unexpectedly asked about 
elements of the “games” that had been played. Both open ended (e.g. “What animal 
stole the treasure in the pirate game?”) and cued-choice (e.g. when we looked at 
picture of animals and toys, were they on cards or on the computer?) questions were 
asked. Some questions referred to games they had played that day, others referred to 
games they had played the previous week (see Table  3-1). 
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Table  3-1. Unexpected Questions7 
Question Answer(s) Score 
What Animal Stole the 
Treasure in the Pirate Game? 
Crow/ Mr Crow (accepted: any bird) 1 
Which video had a skeleton in 
it? 
The Jungle Video (can answer by 
pointing) 
1 
When we looked at pictures of 
animals and toys, were they on 
cards or on the computer? 
Cards 1 
What was the prize in the 
shapes game? 
Stickers 1 
What were the two places we 
hid treasure 
Town (accepted: city, village, street, road) 1 
 Forest (accepted: jungle, wood, 
countryside) 
1 
Which video had a teddy bear 
in it? 
Spotty Video (can answer by pointing) 1 
Which drinks did I show you on 
a card? 
Water 1 
 Orange Juice (accepted: Juice, squash) 1 
What kind of treasure did you 
hide? 
Gold and Silver (accepted: money, gold or 
silver, £1 and 20p, coins) 
1 
 
Bischof-Köhler (BK) 
 
There were two versions of this test that were conducted simultaneously. BKA was 
inspired by Klossek and colleagues’ (2011) study in which ”boredom” satiation was 
induced by multiple exposures to a short video clip. BKB was a replication of Atance 
and Meltzof’s (2006) study in which “thirst” satiation was induced by ingestion of 
large numbers of salty biscuits. Children were shown two short (30s) video clips, one 
of which was pre-selected as “interesting” and one as “dull”, and were asked which 
they preferred. Once they had chosen they were told they could “have something” 
while they were watching and were given the choice between Ritz biscuits or a glass 
of water. Most children were expected to choose the “interesting” video and the Ritz 
                                                 
7 The items that appear in these questions were elements of other tasks. The teddy bear and skeleton 
videos as well as pictures of drink appeared in the BK experiment, the treasure and treasure-hiding 
areas appeared in the WWW experiment, the shapes game was an unreported experiment. 
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biscuits. These children were given a bowl of Ritz biscuits and shown a video that 
contained 16 repetitions of the interesting video interspersed with other similar clips. 
To keep them focussed, children were asked to watch out for particular items or 
events. If at any time they stopped eating the Ritz biscuits they were prompted that 
they could have as many as they wanted. After finishing the video the children were 
told that next week8 the experimenter would come and play with them again, and that 
at that time they could watch a video and “have something” while they watched it. 
They were shown stills from both video clips and asked to indicate which video they 
would like to watch next week, and then shown pictures of Ritz biscuits and water and 
asked to choose which they would like to have while watching the video next week. 
After these choices had been made, children were asked the same question for right 
now. This was to ensure the efficacy of the satiation procedure: If children did not 
choose the dull video and the water for right now their data were excluded from the 
analysis. The following week, the experimenter returned and asked the children once 
again to choose a video and food for next week. This was to ensure that the satiating 
effects of the Ritz biscuits and video had not been so strong as to still be in effect the 
following week.  
 
Procedure 
 
The study had a nested design in which elements of each test formed the retention 
intervals for the other tests (see Figure  3.2). Children first undertook the encoding 
phase of the free/cued recall picture test (counterbalanced between subjects). They 
then played the first session of the pirate WWW game before the free/cued recall 
                                                 
8 The term “next week” was supplemented with other descriptions such as “after 7 days” and “between 
now and then you will go to bed and get up many times” to try to ensure understanding of a significant 
time gap. 
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phase. Children then undertook the encoding phase of the recall (free/cued) test they 
had not previously done, followed by the second pirate WWW session, then the recall 
phase of the picture test. This was followed by the future-planning test and finally the 
recall phase of the pirate WWW game. The following week (7 days later) children 
returned and played some games (experiments not reported here) involving shapes 
and stickers. They then completed the second phase of the future planning test, and 
were finally asked the unexpected questions.  
 
CR/FR
encoding
CR/FR
encoding
CR/FR
retrieval
CR/FR
retrieval
WWW
Hiding1
WWW
Hiding2
WWW
Retrieval
BK Test
Shapes
Game UEQ
BK
Preference
Check
---7 days later---
 
Figure  3.2. Schematic of experiment order.  
 
Analysis 
 
Where assumptions of normality were met, data were analysed using t-tests, one-way 
ANOVAs, Pearson’s correlations and partial correlations. Where assumptions were 
violated, nonparametric equivalents (Mann-Witney U test, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
Kruskal-Wallis test, Friedman’s ANOVA, Kendell’s Tau correlation) were used. The 
developmental trajectory of different tests was assessed using a general estimating 
equations (GEE) analysis. Alpha was set at 0.05. Where multiple comparisons were 
conducted, a Šidák correction was used.  
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3.3. Results 
 
Boys and girls did not differ in their performance on any test (see Table  3-2). 
 
Table  3-2. Difference in performance between boys and girls in the memory tests 
 
 FR CR WWW UEQ 
3-year-olds t(25)=0.13, 
p(corr)=0.999 
t(25)=1.05, 
p=(corr)0.738 
t(25)=0.93, 
p(corr)=0.831 
t(16)=2.41, 
p(corr)=0.185 
4-Year-olds t(16)=-0.004, 
p(corr)=0.999 
t(16)=-1.340, 
p(corr)=0.998 
t(16)= 0.732, 
p(corr)=0.999 
t(16)= 0.343, 
p(corr)=0.999 
5-Year-olds t(25)= 0.066, 
p(corr)=0.999 
t(25)=-0.00, 
p(corr)=0.999 
t(25)=0.891, 
p(corr)=0.853 
t(25)=-1.482, 
p(corr)=0.492 
6-Year-olds t(31)=-0.427, 
p(corr)=0.988 
t(31)= 0.222, 
p(corr)=0.633 
t(31)=0.422, 
p(corr)=0.988 
t(31)=-1.454, 
p(corr)=0.497 
 
Free Recall 
 
Figure  3.3 indicates that performance on the FR test was normally distributed, with 
most children remembering 50% of the pictures. 
 
Figure  3.3. Number of children who recalled 0-8 out of 8 words in the free recall test 
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Figure  3.5 shows a gradual increase in performance on the free recall test with age. 
Children of different age groups differed in their performance on the test (one-way 
ANOVA: F3,101=14.721, p<0.001) with children of each age performing worse than 
children two years their senior,  (simple effects test: 3/4, p[corr]=0.243; 3/5, 
p[corr]<0.001; 3/6, p[corr]<0.001; 4/5, p[corr]=0.644; 4/6, p[corr]=0.004; 5/6, 
p[corr]=0.227). 
 
Cued Recall 
 
Figure  3.4 shows that performance on the CR test was normally distributed, with most 
children remembering 4 to 6 out of 8 items. 
 
Figure  3.4.  Number of children who recalled 0-8/8 words in the cued recall test 
 
 
Figure  3.5 shows a sharp transition from the performance of 3-year-old children to 
that of 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children in the CR test. There was a significant 
difference between age groups (one-way ANOVA: F3,101=26.082, p<0.001). Post hoc 
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investigations revealed that 3-year-olds differed significantly from all other age 
groups, while none of the other age groups differed significantly from one another; 
(3/4, p[corr]<0.001; 3/5, p[corr]<0.001; 3/6, p[corr]<0.001; 4/5, p[corr]=1.0; 4/6, 
p[corr]=0.059, 5/6, p[corr]=0.086) 
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Figure  3.5. Mean proportion of items correctly remembered by children of different 
age groups on different tests. Comparison of developmental progression from 3-6-
years in different episodic memory tests. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Comparisons of Free and Cued Recall 
 
Overall, children were significantly better at CR than at FR (paired samples t-test: 
t[104]=7.182, p<0.001). A difference was present for every age group (4 years: t 
[17]=4.208, p=0.001; 5-years: t[26]=3.882, p=0.001; 6-years: t[32]=4.570, p<0.001) 
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although it was only a trend for the 3-year-olds (t[26]=1.925, p=0.065; see Figure 
 3.6). 
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Figure  3.6. Mean performance on FR and CR. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
What-Where-When 
 
Overall, the proportion of children who identified correct coins was higher than would 
have been if children were choosing at random (chi square test: chose at least one coin 
correctly: χ²[1]=96.2, p>0.001; chose at least two coins correctly χ²[1]=465.3, 
p>0.001; chose all three coins correctly: χ²[1]=644.7, p<0.001). All age-groups 
identified at least one coin more often than would be expected by chance (3-year-olds: 
χ²[1]=4.8613, p>0.05; 4-year-olds: χ²[1]=12.913, p<0.01; 5-year-olds: χ²[1]=29.393, 
p<0.01; 6-year-olds: χ²[1]=49.009, p<0.01). All age-groups identified at least 2 of the 
3 coins more often than would be expected by chance (3-year-olds: χ²[1]=5.628, 
p>0.05; 4-year-olds: χ²[1]=10.60285, p<0.01; 5-year-olds: χ²[1]=125.113, p<0.01; 6-
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year-olds: χ²[1]=411.4243, p<0.01). None of the 3- or 4- year-olds identified all three 
coins correctly, while the 5- and 6-year-olds performed about chance (3-year-olds: 
χ²[1]=639.114, p<0.01; 6-year-olds: χ²[1]=433.3255, p<0.01) (see Figure  3.7). 
 
 
Figure  3.7. Proportion of children of each age group that identified at least 1, at 
least,2 or all 3 coins in the What-Where-When test. Chance was calculated by the 
probability of pointing to a cup containing the correct coins given the number of 
available pots. Chance was therefore set at 0.22 for at least 1/3 coins, 0.0157 for at 
least 2/3 coins and 0.000366 for all 3 coins. 
 
 
Figure  3.5 shows what appears to be a developmental jump between the performance 
of 3/4-year-olds and the performance of 5/6-year-olds on the WWW test. There is a 
trend for an effect of age groups on performance (one-way ANOVA: F4,67=2.454, 
p=0.071) but no age group differed significantly from any other (3/4: p[corr]>0.999; 
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3/5: p[corr]>0.999; 3/6: p[corr]=0.407; 4/5: p[corr]=0.567; 4/6: p[corr]=0.121; 5/6: 
p[corr]>0.999). Because fewer children took part in this test, this result may be due to 
reduced sample size. When 3/4-year-olds and 5/6-year-olds were grouped into two 
age groups (<5 and >5), the older children performed better than the younger children 
(t[67]=2.644, p=0.01). 
 
 Unexpected Question 
 
Performance on the UEQ test was not normally distributed (Skewness: -1.938, 
SE=0.271; Kurtosis: 4.176, SE=0.535; see Figure  3.8). The data were transformed 
with an arcsin transformation. The transformed data were normally distributed 
(Skewness: -0.764, SE=0.271; Kurtosis: -0.507, SE=0.535). As such, parametric 
analysis could be used. 
 
 
Figure  3.8. a) Number of children who recalled 0-10/10 items in the Unexpected 
Question test 
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Figure  3.5 shows a gradual improvement in performance in UEQ in increasing age 
groups (F3=14.569, p<0.001).  As with the FR test, post hoc investigations revealed 
that while children did not differ in performance with those only a single year older, 
they differed significantly in performance from children two years their senior, no 
matter what their age (simple effects test: 3/4:p[corr]=0.069; 3/5: p[corr]<0.001; 3/6: 
p[corr]<0.001; 4/5: p[corr]=0.399; 4/6: p[corr]=0.028; 5/6: p[corr]=0.809). 
 
Relationship between Memory Tests 
 
Performance on all memory tests improved significantly with age in months (FR: 
r=0.539, p<0.001; CR: r=0.632, p<0.001; WWW: r=0.268, p=0.029; UEQ: r=0.617, 
p<0.001; See Table  3-3). Performance on many of the memory tests were related (see 
Table  3-3). However, many of these relationships were dependant on age, and thus the 
correlations were lost when age was partialled out (see Table  3-4). 
 
Table  3-3. Correlations between memory tests, and between memory tests and age. 
Numbers represent Pearsons’ R. 
 Free Recall Cued 
Recall 
Unexpected 
Question 
What-
Where-
When 
Age 0.539*** 0.632*** 0.617*** 0.268* 
Free Recall - 0.544*** 0.396*** 0.172 
Cued 
Recall 
- - 0.422*** 0.323** 
Unexpected 
Question 
- - - 0.085 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
 
Specifically, children who performed well on the CR test also showed high scores in 
the FR test, independent of age. Similarly, children who perfomed well on the WWW 
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test showed high scores in the CR test regardless of age. Children who performed well 
on the UEQ test, also performed well on the FR and CR tests, but this relationship 
was dependent on age. No other relationships between the memory tests were found.  
 
Table  3-4. Correlations between memory tests with age partialled out. Numbers 
represent Pearsons’ R. 
 
 Cued Recall Unexpected 
Question 
What-Where-
When 
Free Recall 0.312*** 0.105 0.048 
Cued Recall - 0.066 0.205† 
Unexpected 
Question 
- - 0.001 
†p<0.1 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
 
Table  3-4 indicates that very few memory tests were correlated with each other 
independently of age. However, given the strong relationship of each test with age, it 
may be that an analysis partialling out age masks underlying relationships between 
performance on tests that have exactly matching developmental trajectories. For this 
reason, the data from all of the memory tests were entered in a GEE model assessing 
differences in developmental trajectory (i.e. change in performance over age in 
months) between the tests. The GEE had a linear response and an identity link 
function. Score was the dependent variable and the independent factors were age 
(years) and test. A generalized score chi-square was used as well as a model based 
estimator. The results suggested that performance on the different memory tests 
improved at different rates. There was a trend suggesting that the tests differed in the 
developmental trajectory (GEE: Test of model fit [Quasi-likelihood under 
Independence Model Criterion [QICC] =44.444 χ² = 16.149, p=0.064; see Figure  3.9).  
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Bischof-Köhler Test 
 
There were two variants of the BK test. Both required children to predict their future 
desires while in a current state of satiety. BKA used satiety for entertainment (or 
boredom) (inspired by Klossek et al., 2011), and BKB used satiety for salty food (or 
thirst (equivalent to Atance and Meltzoff, 2006). 
 
Bischof-Köhler A: Boredom 
The satiety procedure had a significant effect on children’s choices for future 
consumption. Children chose a dull video over an interesting video for their future 
 
Figure  3.9. Developmental trajectory of the different memory tests, with fit lines and 
R
2
 values. 
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selves significantly more often when they had just watched the interesting video on 
repeat than when they had not (Related sample McNemar test: χ²[1]=18.89, p<0.001). 
 
Overall, there was a trend suggesting that children were worse than chance at 
choosing an appropriate video for their future selves (one- sample binomial: p=0.093), 
in that they chose the dull (but new) video more than they chose the interesting (but 
old) video. All age groups performed at chance, except 6-year-olds, who performed 
significantly worse than chance (3-year-olds: p=1; 4-year-olds: p=1; 5-year-olds: p=1; 
6-year-olds: p=0.021). Performance on this test did not improve with age: there was 
no significant difference between age groups (χ²[3]=4.827, p=0.185; see Figure  3.10). 
Interestingly, children who passed the test (picked the interesting but old video) were 
significantly younger than those who failed (t[21]=2.168, p=0.042). 
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Figure  3.10. Performance on the video future-planning test. No age group performed 
above chance and there was no difference between age groups. 
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Bischof-Köhler B: Thirst 
 
The satiety procedure had a significant effect on children’s choices for future 
consumption. Children chose water (over Ritz biscuits) for their future selves 
significantly more often when they had just eaten Ritz biscuits than when they had not 
(Related sample McNemar test: χ²[1]=10.316, p<0.001). 
 
Overall children did not perform above chance when choosing a snack for their future 
selves (one-sample binomial test, p>0.999). In fact, they chose the Ritz biscuits and 
water exactly as often as each other. No age group performed above chance (one 
sample binomial test: 3 years: p=0.424; 4 years: p=0.607; 5 years: p=0.503; 6 years: 
p=0.824; see Figure  3.11). There was no difference in age between children who 
passed and children who failed (t[22]=0.477, p=0.638). 
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Figure  3.11. Performance on the food future-planning test. No age group performed 
above chance and there was no difference between age groups. 
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Relationships between Bischof-Köhler and Memory tests 
 
Children who passed the BKA test showed a tendency to perform worse on the UEQ 
test than those who failed (t[21]=1.904, p=0.071). There were no other significant 
differences between children who passed or failed BKA in terms of memory test 
performance (FR: t[21]=0, p=1; CR, t[21]=0.762, p=0.455; WWW: t[15]=0.633, 
p=0.536). There was no difference between children who passed or failed BKB in 
performance on any of the memory tests (FR: t[22]=-0.842, p=0.409; CR: t[22]=-
0.482, p=0.635; UEQ: t[22]=0.475, p=0.640; WWW: t[14]=-1.293, p=0.217). 
3.4. Discussion 
 
 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the developmental trajectory and 
coherence of a number of different tests putatively assessing the same underlying 
psychological process: episodic cognition. Children between the ages of 3 and 6 years 
were shown to perform well on WWW, UEQ, FR and CR memory tests. Performance 
on all memory tests improved across age groups. For the most part, this improvement 
was gradual: there was no abrupt development from poor performance in younger 
children to good performance in older children. Such a developmental discontinuity 
might be predicted by conceptualist accounts positing that episodic cognition is not 
possible before the development of various other abilities (e.g. self awareness, 
representational theory of mind). The possible exception to this pattern of gradual 
development was in the CR test, in which 3-year-olds performed significantly worse 
than all other age groups, but no other age group differed from the others. This 
particular result is unexpected because CR is the only test in this battery for which an 
argument has been made that it is heavily affected by both semantic and episodic 
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cognition. In other words, CR is the one memory test in which conceptualist theorists 
would not predict an abrupt developmental advance.  
 
There was a significant relationship between performance on FR and CR, and 
between both of these and UEQ. There was no relationship between WWW and UEQ 
or FR, but there was a relationship between WWW and CR. Of these, the relationship 
between FR and CR, and the relationships between CR and WWW persisted when 
age was controlled for (see Figure  3.12).  
 
 
Figure  3.12. Interrelationships between memory tests when age is (right) and is not 
(left) partialled out. 
.  
 
Children were not able to dissociate from their current motivational state (boredom or 
thirst) to choose the appropriate food/drink or entertainment for their future self. No 
age group performed above chance on this test and there was no development across 
age groups (if anything, children got worse as they got older). There was no 
relationship between performance on the BK tests and performance on any of the 
memory tests, except for a suggestion that children who passed BKA (the video test) 
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performed worse on the UEQ test than children who failed. This trend is difficult to 
interpret given the relationship of each with age.  
 
Overall, these results show some interrelationships between the different memory 
tests (see Figure  3.12), and perhaps a negative relationship between UEQ and BK 
performance. However, while performance on all these tests improves with age, a 
non-significant trend towards different developmental trajectories means that we can’t 
say with any confidence that they improve at the same rate. These findings suggest 
two things. First, that there is apparently no age at which episodic cognition 
“emerges”. That is, performance on episodic memory tests does not abruptly improve 
and then plateau (or, at least, it does not plateau in children under 7 years). Instead, it 
appears that, no matter how you test for it, episodic memory improves gradually with 
age. Second, these different memory tests appear to tap somewhat different 
underlying processes in children; while there is some overlap, this is by no means 
overwhelming (no correlation statistic was higher than 0.55), there was also a trend 
that suggesting that they have slightly different developmental trajectories.  
 
The finding that performance on all tests improved gradually with age is in contrast to 
the common assertion that episodic cognition “emerges” at the age of 4 years (e.g. 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, Suddendorf and Busby, 2005, Suddendorf et al., 
2011, Levine, 2004, Nelson and Fivush, 2004). The results presented here suggest that 
the only memory test for which children showed a sudden developmental jump 
between 3 and 4 years was CR, which has often been suggested as more reliant on 
semantic memory processes than other tasks (e.g. Tulving, 1985b, Perner and 
Ruffman, 1995). One possible account for this jump may lie in the increased semantic 
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knowledge that comes from the transition from nursery into school: increased 
semantic competency has been shown to greatly impact performance on episodic 
memory tests that have a semantic component - such as recognition memory tests 
(Robertson and Köhler, 2007). 
 
There are, of course, many cognitive and non-cognitive abilities that develop across 
this age range. While partially behavioural, all the memory tests involved a linguistic 
element, and thus improvement of linguistic ability may be responsible for some of 
the developments in performance on all of the tests – and may differentially affect 
performance of some tests over others depending on the extent to which they offer a 
linguistic challenge. Similarly, children’s willingness to talk to the experimenter (a 
strange adult) would differentially affect different tests. For example, in the WWW 
test, children’s response was in the form of pointing, while in all the other tests the 
response was verbal. This may have contributed to the closer interrelationships 
between CR, FR and UEQ than between these and WWW. There were also 
differences between retention interval for different memory tests, as the CR, FR and 
WWW tests all had retention intervals of between 10 and 30 minutes, while some 
elements of the UEQ test assessed memory for events that had occurred one week 
previously; memory, especially in younger children, has been shown to decay 
dramatically over such a timeline (e.g. Scarf et al., 2011). Finally, given that the UEQ 
test was conducted on a different day to the other tests, it is possible that day-to-day 
variation may have reduced inter-task correlation. 
 
In discussing this point, a distinction proposed by Carlson and Moses (2001) and 
highlighted by Atance and Jackson (2009) may be of relevance. Carlson and Moses 
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emphasized a difference between “emergence” and “expression” in terms of the role 
of, in their specific argument, executive function in theory of mind development. The 
authors argued that in an “emergence” account one might argue that it would be 
impossible for children to conceive of mental states (or future events) without a 
certain level of functioning in some other psychological process (e.g. executive 
functions/self-awareness/meta-representation). In contrast, an “expression” account 
suggests that children may possess the psychological ability (e.g. theory of mind/ 
episodic cognition) but be unable to translate “their knowledge into performance” 
(Carlson and Moses, 2001, p.1048) in the context of psychological tests with certain 
additional test demands.  
 
I would like to extend this account and combine it with Clayton and Russell’s  (2009) 
minimalist approach to defining episodic cognition. I would argue that there are a 
number of features that come together to form adult human episodic cognition, and 
that the difficulty in defining what that cognition is stems from different theorists’ 
relative emphasis on different contributing processes. Wheeler and colleagues (1997) 
suggest that “the development of episodic memory parallels the gradual growth of 
autonoetic consciousness and that both mature slowly over time” (p. 15). I would 
argue that, in the extent to which episodic cognition is defined in its most complex 
form (i.e. that enjoyed by adult humans); this argument is true of a number of 
capacities in addition to self-awareness/autonoetic consciousness. Moreover, 
depending on the level of development, these contributing processes may enable both 
emergence and expression at different times. Thus, depending on which contributing 
factor is emphasized by the theorist, and which target and extra-target processes are 
challenged by the experimental paradigm, the development and maturation of 
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completely different psychological processes may lead to successful or unsuccessful 
test performance. This account thus argues for a model of episodic cognition as a 
multifactorial process whose elements begin developing at or before birth, and whose 
peak performance is present to report for a relatively brief period in adulthood (before 
cognition begins to decline: e.g. Addis et al., 2008). Neurological evidence can 
support such a view. Carver and Bauer (2001) and Bauer (2007) argued that 
components of the temporal-cortical circuit essential for episodic cognition are 
present very early, but that the network begins to function as such only around the 
time of the child’s first birthday (e.g. Gao et al., 2009). Furthermore they do not finish 
developing until adulthood. While much of the hippocampus is formed prenatally 
(Seress et al., 2001, Angevine, 1975, Rakic and Nowakowski, 1981, Arnold and 
Trojanowski, 1996),the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex have a 
much more protracted development. Specifically, the dentate gyrus is not adult-like in 
structure until around 12-15 postnatal months (e.g. Seress and Mrzljak, 1992, 
Eckenhoff and Rakic, 1988) and, at least in animal models, neurogenesis continues 
throughout childhood and into adulthood (e.g. Altman and Das, 1965). The Prefrontal 
cortex similarly continues to develop for at least the first decade of life (Huttenlocher, 
1979, Huttenlocher, 1990, Bourgeois, 2001). Following Goldman-Rakic (1987), Baur 
(2007) argues that this evidence suggests that the temporal-cortical network probably 
only reaches functional maturity during the second year of life, and that it then 
continues to develop and improve gradually for years afterwards. 
 
 
 
124 
No Relationship between Tests of Episodic Memory and Foresight: a Challenge 
for the Mental Time Travel Hypothesis? 
 
Children who passed the BK tests were the same age (BKB) or younger (BKA) than 
children who failed them. There was no significant relationship between performance 
on either of the BK tests and any of the memory tests. There was, however, a trend 
suggesting that children who passed the BKA (the “boredom” test) were worse at the 
UEQ test than children who failed. There are several possible explanations for a lack 
of relationship or even a negative relationship between BK and memory tests. It is 
possible (even likely) that the BK test draws much more heavily on executive 
processes of self-inhibition than the other episodic cognition tests used in this 
experiment. As has been discussed above, this extra-target task-demand may have 
prevented the children from “translating their knowledge into performance” (Carlson 
and Moses, 2001, p.1048). However, this explanation does not account for the decline 
in performance with age and UEQ performance. An alternative explanation is that the 
abilities underlying the BK test may be negatively related to episodic cognition 
ability. This idea is discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
 
If the different putative tests of episodic cognition used in this experiment differ in the 
extent to which extra-target test demands limit children’s performance, then we 
should expect to see a very different pattern of relationships between performance in 
these tests in an adult sample, whose theory of mind, autonoetic consciousness and 
linguistic abilities are all, presumably, fully developed. However, if these tests tap 
fundamentally different memory processes, then we might expect the pattern of 
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relationships in a sample of human adults to appear more or less the same as at least 
the 5- and 6-year olds in this sample. This question is explored in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4  
Episodic Cognition in Human Adults 
 
A sample of undergraduates were tested on three different 
episodic memory tests (What-Where-When, Unexpected 
Question and Free Recall) and one test of episodic foresight 
(Projection Bias). It was predicted that performance on the 
memory tests would be positively correlated with one another. It 
was furthermore predicted that there would be a positive 
correlation between performance on the memory tests and the 
extent to which subjects were biased by their current 
motivational state in the Projection Bias test. It was found that 
performances on all the tests were related but that this 
relationship was not always linear. Instead, many of the tests 
showed a quadratic relationship, suggesting the contribution of 
multiple psychological processes. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 explored the relationships between performance on different putative tests 
of episodic cognition in human development. It was found that while there were some 
relationships between the tasks, these were dependant on age, and did not remain 
when age was partialled out. There are a number of possible interpretations for this 
finding. The first is that these tests (What-Where-When [WWW]; Unexpected 
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Question [UEQ], Free Recall [FR] and Bischof-Köhler [BK]) all assess different 
psychological processes in humans. The second is that these tests assess the same 
psychological mechanism in adults but that disparate elements do not come together 
to form that mechanism until later in development. The third possibility is that these 
tests do tap the same psychological process, and do so in children, but that age-
independent relationships cannot be seen due to the significant development of 
general cognitive capability that occurs between the ages of 3 and 6 years. Finally, it 
is possible that the different tests tap the same psychological process but are 
differently affected by extra-target factors (such as executive functions) that also 
develop dramatically during this period.  
 
The current Chapter aims to differentiate between some of these interpretations by 
assessing performance on the same tasks (WWW, UEQ, FR and BK) in healthy 
young adults. If it is found that performance on these tasks is highly related in adults, 
it would suggest that the lack of (age-independent) relationship in children may be 
due to developmental factors. If, however, it is found that a similar lack of 
relationship between performance on these tests exists in adults, it would suggest that 
different tests of episodic cognition may not tap the same psychological processes in 
humans.  
 
Much of the evidence concerning tests of episodic cognition in human adults was 
explored in Chapter 1. As such, the following section shall explore the literature 
concerning the central investigation of this chapter: whether WWW, UEQ, FR and 
BK assess the same psychological process, and whether that process is episodic 
cognition. 
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Episodic Memory Tests 
 
To date there have been relatively few attempts to investigate WWW memory in 
humans. This has probably been the result of the perceived lack of requirement for 
nonverbal behavioural tests in verbally competent humans, as well as the considerable 
separation between the fields of animal cognition (in which the WWW test was 
developed) and human psychology. There have, however, been some recent attempts 
to apply this paradigm to human subjects (Easton et al., 2012, Holland and Smulders, 
2011, Plancher et al., 2008, 2010). In all cases, these experiments have attempted to 
relate performance on the WWW test to other indices and putative tests of episodic 
memory.  
 
Plancher and colleagues (2010) used memories of a tour around a virtual town to 
assess WWW memory in young and elderly adults, and compared performance on 
this test to FR and self-reported memory complaints in everyday life (i.e. a tendency 
to lose keys, forget names, etc.). The authors found that younger subjects were 
significantly more able than older adults to bind what, where and when components 
together (i.e. more able to remember integrated representations rather than only 
individual elements). It was also found that levels of memory complaint in everyday 
life correlated significantly with this WWW binding ability, but not with individual 
elements (what/where/when) or with FR. This emphasis on the binding of components 
corresponds with Clayton and colleagues’ (2003b) arguments that it is not the content 
but the integration of the what, where and when elements that makes the memory 
episodic. Furthermore, the discovery that it is the binding of contextual features that is 
impaired in older adults – and that this is the feature most correlated with experience 
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of memory problems in everyday life – corresponds with related research that the 
binding of what-where, what-when and where-when features is more affected by age 
than memory for individual what, where or when elements (Kessels et al., 2007). It is 
also consistent with the finding that episodic amnesics are impaired on object-
location-, object-order- and object-person-binding memory, but not on object 
recognition (Burgess et al., 2002).  
 
Holland and Smulders (2011) found that people’s accuracy in remembering where 
they had hidden two different types of coin (what) on two consecutive days (when) 
was related to their ability to remember incidental features of the hiding episodes (i.e. 
a UEQ test). They also found that subjects were generally more likely to associate 
their WWW memories with the experience of “remembering” rather than the feeling 
of “knowing”. This pattern was replicated by Easton and colleagues (2012), who 
found that subjects were significantly more likely to report “remembering” than 
“knowing” when they had previously seen a specific object-location combination.  
 
Together, these studies suggest that there are some relationships between different 
putative tests of episodic memory in human adults. Furthermore, the relationship 
between WWW (but not FR) and memory complaints (Plancher et al., 2010) and 
tendency for items to be reported as “remembered” rather than “known” (Easton et 
al., 2012, Holland and Smulders, 2011) suggests that the WWW test may tap episodic 
memory.  
 
One point explicitly investigated by both Plancher and colleagues (2010) and Holland 
and Smulders (2011) was the extent to which active encoding (that is, the active 
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intention to memorize) affected performance and the contribution of episodic 
processes to performance. Plancher and colleagues (2010) found that the 
intentionality of encoding did not affect the bound what-where-when memory, but did 
improve memory for the individual elements in young, but not older, subjects. 
Holland and Smulders (2011) found that while intention to encode improved 
performance, it did not affect the extent to which memories were reported as 
remembered (rather than known). This is in line with the finding that intentional 
encoding may improve memory for aspects of an episode, but does not improve 
binding (Lekeu et al., 2002). It also corresponds to the findings of the cognitive 
neuroscience literature that both deliberately and incidentally learned information can 
be episodic, but may draw upon different elements of the episodic neural network 
(e.g. Morris and Frey, 1997; see Chapter 1). It also suggests that intentional encoding 
may not alter the contribution of episodic cognition to performance. Such a finding 
would be contrary to Zentall’s argument that an “unexpected question” is more likely 
to tap episodic memory than an “expected question”.  
 
However, it is possible that the effect of deliberate encoding on the contribution of 
episodic cognition to memory performance may depend on the type of memory test. 
For example, in a WWW test, a subject knowing that they are going to have to 
remember what they hid where and when might purposefully hide items in a way that 
reduces the future memory load (such as , for example, hiding acorns under oak tress 
and conkers under horse chestnut trees). Note that this is not only a deliberate 
encoding strategy, but also a manipulation of the content of the memory (in this 
example, purposefully confounding what with where). However, such an account 
would predict that subjects in Plancher and colleagues’ (2010) WWW test would not 
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show an effect of deliberate encoding on the contribution of episodic cognition 
(because they had no control over the memory content) but those in Holland and 
Smulder’s (2011) WWW test would (because they could choose where to hide the 
coins). However neither study found an effect.  
 
Episodic Foresight and the “Bischof-Köhler” Test 
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 1, there are few established behavioural measures 
for episodic future thinking, the most popular being tests of the Bischof-Köhler 
Hypothesis. These involve dissociating from currently felt motivational states to plan 
for a future time in which motivational state will be different (see Chapter 1 for a 
discussion). In the following section, evidence shall be discussed that suggests that 
this ability to dissociate from current needs to plan for the future is something even 
adult humans are very poor at. It is hypothesised that, far from being an indicator of 
episodic cognition, the ability to plan for a future motivational state may be limited by 
the use of an episodic strategy.  
 
Episodic Construction is Vulnerable to Bias from Current Feelings 
 
Episodic memory is widely accepted to be a reconstructive process (e.g. Bartlett, 
1932, Neisser, 1967, Schacter and Addis, 2007b, Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). 
Neisser (1967) poetically likens it to the work of a palaeontologist, who must build a 
dinosaur skeleton from only fragments of bone, but also from extensive knowledge of 
dinosaurs: “out of a few stored bone chips, we remember a dinosaur” (p.285). Thus 
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memories (much like the early constructed dinosaur skeletons) can often be more 
representative of misconceived knowledge than of fact.  
 
Tulving (1983) argued that “recollective experience and measured aspects of 
recollective experience do not provide evidence about the properties of information 
stored about the event, but rather about the joint (synergistic) effects of both the 
stored information and the retrieval information…memory distortions, rememberers 
‘remembering’ things that did not occur, could be attributed to the constructive role of 
retrieval information” (pp. 180-181). It has been argued that this tendency for episodic 
memory to be skewed by current facts and feelings is a by-product of the flexibility 
required to construct future events:  
 
“…future events are not exact replicas of past events, and a memory system 
that simply stored rote records would not be well-suited to simulating future 
events. A system built according to constructive principles may be a better 
tool for the job… Such a system will occasionally produce memory errors, 
but it also provides considerable flexibility” (Schacter et al., 2007, p.27)  
 
Episodic cognition acts to create or recreate an experience (be that emotional, 
visceral, perceptual etc.). Because of this, there is likely to be “seepage” from our 
current experience into our episodic representations; one cannot easily maintain two 
distinct emotional/visceral states simultaneously (e.g. Loewenstein, 1998, 
Loewenstein et al., 2000). Semantic (or “non-episodic”) representations of 
emotional/visceral states should, however, be less influenced by current state as they 
do not involve the creation of an internal state. They may, however, be more 
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influenced by semantic knowledge about types of situations that are likely to induce 
such states. For example, one may semantically know that newlyweds are happy, but 
after a messy divorce find it difficult to remember feeling happy after one’s own 
wedding. As Levine and Safer (2002) put it, “Memory for emotions is partially 
reconstructed on the basis of current feelings about, and appraisals of, past emotion-
eliciting events.” (p.3). Thus, to return to Neisser’s (1967) analogy, one might 
consider that if the fragments of dinosaur bone have been stored in the same deposit 
as fragments of elephant bone, it would be very difficult to construct the dinosaur 
skeleton without accidentally including some erroneous bits of elephant. 
 
There is evidence that current state affects the content and availability of episodic 
memories. Memories may be easier to recall if they are congruent with current moods, 
or may be altered in content such that the experience of the former self is more in line 
with current experience (See Box 2). For example, Safer and colleagues (2002) found 
that the grade achieved by students in an exam affected how anxious they 
remembered feeling before the exam: those who were informed that they had done 
well were less likely to remember high levels of pre-exam anxiety than those that had 
not yet been informed of their grade. The impact of current state on episodic cognition 
may be even more apparent in episodic foresight than episodic memory, given that 
“even the most plausible recollections can come in conflict with physical evidence 
and with other, inconsistent, recollections” (Read and van Leeuwen, 1998, p.15),. 
Indeed, the same pattern of errors is shown for predicted future experiences as for 
memories of the past (see Box 2). For example, heroin addicts asked to choose 
between extra rations of the heroin replacement buprenorphine (BUP) or extra cash on 
their next visit (5 days later) differed substantially in their choices depending on 
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whether they made them immediately before or immediately after BUP 
administration. Indeed, those making the choice before BUP administration valued the 
future BUP by almost twice as much as those who made the choice immediately after 
BUP administration (Giordano et al., 2002). 
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This model of a failure of episodic cognition to construct past or future states 
independently of the influence of current state is in line with the “projection bias” 
theory of Lowenstein and colleagues (2003). They present a formal model of 
projection bias: the tendency to exaggerate the degree to which future tastes will 
resemble current tastes. They argue that while people understand the direction and 
qualitative nature of their changes in tastes, they underestimate their magnitude 
because it is extremely difficult to imagine what it is like to be in a different state 
from the one currently experienced (Loewenstein, 1998). 
 
In light of these arguments, I suggest that, contrary to the suggestions of Suddendorf 
and Corballis (1997), the ability to disengage from one’s current motivational state to 
plan for future needs is negatively related to the contribution of episodic cognition. 
Furthermore, the more vivid one’s episodic simulation of a future need state, the more 
vulnerable that simulation is to bias from current feelings. Consider, for example, an 
attempt to predict how much one will enjoy watching a newly released romantic 
comedy next month. A person may know (semantically/non-episodically) that they are 
a great fan of romantic comedies, and therefore will enjoy it. However, they may be 
attempting to predict their future enjoyment at a time when they have just sat through 
a romantic comedy marathon and feel rather tired of the format. If this person were to 
make a decision on the basis of general trends, or semantic knowledge, they may opt 
to buy a ticket to the movie next month, as this would match their standard behaviour 
and preferences. However, if they attempt to put themselves into the shoes of their 
future self and imagine how they will feel about that movie, there is likely to be an 
effect of their current feelings of boredom on the tone of the projected scenario. Thus 
this person would be more likely to reject the movie on the basis of current feelings 
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the more they were absorbed into the imagined future, and the less they were 
influenced by timeless intransient facts (see Kahneman and Snell, 1992). 
 
This chapter will investigate the relationship between performance on three putative 
tests of episodic memory (WWW, UEQ and FR). To investigate the potential 
contribution of episodic memory to performance, the subjects were asked to report on 
what “strategies” they used in performing these memory tests. It is predicted that 
those individuals who perform best on one test will also perform best on the others, 
and that the extent of the relationship will be predicted by the subjects’ use of 
“episodic” strategies. Performance on these memory tests was compared to a version 
of the BK test. To assess the proposal that the contribution of episodic cognition may 
reduce the ability to disengage from current feelings, it was necessary to adapt the BK 
test to produce continuous data. Rather than a pass/fail test for the ability to dissociate 
from current feelings to plan for the future (as was used in Chapters 2 and 3), this test 
assesses the extent to which subjects are biased by their current feelings. As such, in 
deference to Lowenstein and colleagues (2003), it shall be referred to as the 
“Projection Bias” (PB) test. It is predicted that subjects who report using episodic 
strategies in the memory tests should show a negative relationship between 
performance on this test and memory accuracy. That is, the better they perform at the 
(putative) episodic memory tests, the more biased they should be in the PB test. 
People who report using a semantic strategy in the memory tests should show no 
relationship between memory and planning (because there is currently no reason to 
believe that semantic memory ability should relate to the ability to logically infer 
future events).  
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4.2. Methods 
 
The experiments took place in a room in the department of Experimental Psychology, 
Cambridge, in the spring of 2011. 
 
Subjects 
 
The sample consisted of 77 subjects, of whom 42 were male. Subjects were 
undergraduates at the University of Cambridge, aged between 18 and 23 years, 
recruited and tested as part of an undergraduate research project conducted by 
Mathilda Hay and Stephanie Bailey, under my supervision. 
 
Tests 
 
Three (putative) episodic memory tests (WWW, UEQ and FR) were conducted 
alongside one (putative) episodic foresight test (PB).  
 
Memory Tests 
What-Where-When 
 
The WWW test was conducted in the form of a computer game. Participants took on 
the character of “Swashbuckle”, a pirate who has run aground on a desert island and 
must hide all his treasure before his evil rival “Pinkbeard” arrives to steal it. To hide 
the treasure, subjects could navigate between three locations on a “treasure map”: the 
138 
beach, the village and the mountain. Clicking on any of these locations took the 
subject to the appropriate “scene”, where they could then hide the treasure. The 
treasure was presented in two virtual treasure chests, one containing gold coins and 
one containing silver coins, from which subjects could drag and drop individual coins 
into virtual scenes, where they would disappear (see Figure  4.1). Before beginning to 
hide the treasure, subjects were informed that Swashbuckle would have to find the 
treasure again, and thus to try to remember where it was hidden. After the subjects 
had hidden half of their treasure (5 gold and 5 silver coins) they were informed that 
the sun was going down and they would have to continue “in the morning”. Subjects 
undertook the PB test and were then told that it was now morning and that they should 
finish hiding the treasure. When all the treasure was hidden, it was revealed that 
Swashbuckle’s treasure was in fact stolen from a leprechaun, meaning that the gold 
coins would disappear if left outside overnight. The subjects were then asked to 
identify on each scene the locations (“where”) gold coins (“what”) had been hidden 
before Swashbuckle slept (“when”) (i.e. the treasure that would have disappeared). 
They did so by clicking on the area of the map that they thought they had hidden it, 
thus producing an “X” to mark the spot. Subjects made five “X marks the spot” 
judgements in total. 
 
The accuracy of subjects’ coin location was measured in terms both of integrated 
WWW and individual what, where and when elements. The integrated WWW score 
was calculated by assessing whether there was a “target” coin (i.e. a gold coin from 
the first hiding period) within 60 pixels (two coin widths) of the subject’s “X marks 
the spot”. The individual “What” and “When” elements were coded in terms of the 
identity (what) and origin (when) of the nearest coin to the subject’s “X marks the 
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spot”. Thus if the nearest coin was gold, subjects were coded as correct for “what” 
and if the nearest coin was hidden during the first hiding session they were coded as 
correct for “when”. The “Where” element was calculated in terms of absolute distance 
from any coin. If there was a coin within 60 pixels of the subject’s “X marks the 
spot”, they were coded as correct for “where”. To prevent subjects from reporting the 
same coin multiple times, individual coins that had contributed to the score (either 
integrated or individual) on a previous “X marks the spot” judgement it was 
discounted from subsequent judgements and the next nearest coin was considered.  
 
Figure  4.1. Schematic of WWW pirate game hiding phase. Clicking on any of the 
symbols on the map takes the subject to one of the three scenes: mountain (top), beach 
(right) or village (bottom). At the bottom of each scene were two treasure chests from 
which subjects could drag and drop gold or silver coins into the scene to hide them. 
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Unexpected Questions 
 
Participants were unexpectedly asked 11 questions about aspects of the WWW test at 
the end of the computer session (see Table  4-1). Questions were relatively evenly 
distributed between asking identity related questions (e.g. “what animal was there in 
the village scene?”), spatial questions (e.g. “which of the pirate’s shoulders was the 
parrot sitting on?”) and number questions (e.g. “how many birds were there in the 
beach scene?”). This was designed such that the questions did not differ in content 
from the WWW questions, but simply differed in the fact that they a) were 
unexpected and b) did not explicitly require integration of memory for what, where 
and when. The questions were open-ended; subjects typed their answers into blank 
boxes. To make sure all subjects answered all questions, participants were not 
permitted to continue until they had typed an answer in every box. 
 
Table  4-1 “Unexpected” Questions asked at the end of the session 
Unexpected Questions 
1. What colour was Swashbuckle’s shirt? 
2. Which of Pinkbeard’s shoulders was his parrot sitting on? 
3. Was the beach on the east or west of the island? 
4. Of the three scenes, how many contained a bird’s nest? 
5. How many trees were there in the volcano scene? 
6. Was the lake on the left or the right of the screen in the volcano scene? 
7. Which animal was there in the village? 
8. What colour were the roofs of the huts in the village? 
9. How many birds were there in the beach scene? 
10. What colour were the birds in the beach scene? 
11. How many starfish were there in the beach scene? 
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Free Recall 
 
A list of 28 words was selected from a list of 925 nouns that were rated for 
abstractness and imagery (Paivo et al., 1968) (see Table  4-2). 14 words were selected 
for scoring highly in “imagery” and “concreteness” while 14 words were selected for 
having low “imagery” and “concreteness” scores.  
 
Table  4-2. 14 high-concreteness, (m=6.49) high-imagery words (m=6.39) and 14 
low-concreteness, (m= 2.44), low-imagery words (m= 1.72) from Paivio et al., (1968) 
High-concreteness, high-imagery words Low-concreteness, low-imagery words 
Umbrella Truth 
Mountain Tendency 
Orchestra Thought 
Kettle Misconception 
Magazine Intellect 
Ink Idea 
Hotel Gist 
Forehead Essence 
Garden Fate 
Elbow Ego 
Engine Criterion 
Book Disposition 
Car Concept 
Clock Attitude 
 
 
Participants were read the word list and then immediately asked to recall it. They 
were then read the list in a different order and informed that they would be asked to 
recall the list again at the end of the experiment. The retention interval lasted 
approximately 30 minutes, in which subjects undertook the computerised tests 
(WWW, UEQ and PB).  
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Projection Bias Test 
 
Participants were presented with eight menus, each containing six food items. Four of 
these menus were “distracter” menus containing savoury food and four were “test” 
menus which contained sweet food. In the test menus, the food was divided according 
to the extent to which it was considered “refreshing” by nine independent raters (see 
Appendix 1.). To control for specific taste effects, two items were chocolate-based, 
two items were citrus-based and two were neutral. Within these, one of each was 
highly refreshing (e.g. sorbet/milkshake) and one of each was highly thirst-inducing 
(e.g. chocolate fudge brownie/lemon drizzle cake). Pilot data (see Appendix 2.) 
indicated that pre-feeding had a robust effect on choice for refreshing foods, so this 
was the variable chosen for analysis. Subjects were told to pretend that tomorrow they 
would be visiting a restaurant with a group of friends, but that the restaurant had 
asked for menu choices in advance. Subjects were asked to rank the foods on the 
menu from 1 to 6 according to how much they would like to receive them tomorrow 
(see Figure  4.2).  
 
After completing half of the menus (two distracter and two test) subjects underwent 
the pre-feeding procedure, which was presented to them as a “taste test”. Subjects 
were split into two groups (“Chocolate” and “Citrus”) and presented with 27 
questions about specific features of six foods (see Appendix 3). The Chocolate group 
received and compared six chocolate-based foods and drinks (Frijj® Milkshake, 
Mars® Milkshake, Sainsbury’s Basics® Chocolate Mousse, Cadbury’s Buttons 
Chocolate Mousse®, Sainsbury’s Basics® Milk Chocolate and Cadbury’s Dairy 
Milk®), while the citrus group received and compared six citrus-based foods and 
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drinks (satsuma, clementine, and four squash drinks, the latter made up of differing 
proportions of Sainbury’s Basics® Orange Squash and Robinson’s® Lemon Squash, 
matched for strength). To encourage maximum consumption the participants were 
asked to retry the food and drink for every question. 
 
After the pre-feeding period, subjects completed the final four menus, which 
contained non-identical but comparable foods. Again, they were asked to rank the 
foods from 1 to 6 based on how much they would like to receive it tomorrow. Thus 
choices made both before and after the pre-feeding session were made for the future 
(i.e. a time at which the satiating effect of the pre-feeding would no longer be felt). 
 
 
Subjects’ “before” and “after” scores were calculated by multiplying the rank given to 
each food by its category-score (e.g. whether it was rated as highly “thirst-inducing” 
by the independent raters [1=thirst-inducing, 0=refreshing]). The resulting numbers 
were then summed for each set of menus. Thus, if highly thirst-inducing foods were 
 
Figure  4.2. Example of a test menu 
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ranked 1st, 3rd and 6th in the first “before” menu and 2nd, 4th and 5th in the second 
“before” menu, the subject would receive a “before” score of 21. The difference 
between “before” and “after” scores (calculated by subtracting the “after” score from 
the “before” score) was used as the index of bias for each subject. The greater the 
distance from zero, the more the subject’s preferences had altered between the two 
sets of menus.  
 
Procedure 
 
The subjects were asked to refrain from eating for at least an hour before taking part 
in the experiment. The WWW, UEQ and PB tests were computer based and in the 
form of video games. The FR test was administered orally by the experimenter. 
 
The procedure was a nested design in which the phases of the different tests formed 
the retention interval for the other tests. The subjects underwent the learning phase of 
the FR test before starting the computer-based tests. They then undertook the first 
leaning phase of the WWW test, followed by the “before” section of the PB test. 
Subjects were then pre-fed (chocolate for the chocolate group, citrus for the citrus 
group) and undertook the “after” section of the PB test, followed by the second 
learning phase and then test phase of the WWW test. The final section of the 
computer game was the UEQ test. Finally, the subjects were asked to verbally recall 
the words that were read to them at the beginning of the session.  
 
The subjects were then debriefed about the nature and purpose of the experiment, 
during which they were asked to give their consent for the use of their data and to 
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report on how they went about the different memory tests (see Table  4-3). Their 
answers were coded into categories that captured the essence of the report (Table  4-4). 
For FR and UEQ, these were then further coded into episodic and semantic strategies. 
For the WWW test, many of the different strategies could be interpreted as either 
episodic or semantic. Interestingly, many strategies offered by subjects involved 
methods both of encoding and retrieval, and often the encoding and retrieval  
 
Table  4-3. Self-report questions asked to subjects for each memory test. 
 
 
elements of the strategies could not be separated. As such the strategies are not 
subdivided into encoding and retrieval strategies but coded as episodic or semantic on 
the basis of whether it added spatio-temporal information to the memory at encoding 
(such as creating a “narrative” from the hiding period [this included memory palaces 
and method of loci techniques] or used episodic strategies/phenomenology at retrieval 
[such as reporting “re-experiencing”]). 
 
Analyses 
 
To make them comparable, scores on all memory tests were re-calculated as a 
proportion, such that the maximum score was 1 and the minimum score was 0.  
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Table  4-4 Categories of self-reported memory strategies. These were categorised by 
two coders with 91% agreement. Those presented in pale grey were coded as episodic 
strategies and those presented in darker grey were coded as semantic strategies, 
while those presented in white were coded as either/neither. 
Free Recall Unexpected Question What-Where-When 
Heard  
(felt that they could hear 
experimenters voice in 
their head) 
Visualised 
(felt that they could see the 
scene in their head) 
Order 
(hid the coins in a specific 
order and used this rule to infer 
“what” and “when”) 
Visualised  
(felt that they could see 
the words in their head) 
Failed Visualisation 
(attempted to see the scene in 
their head, but couldn’t) 
Colour-Matching 
(hid coins in areas of a similar 
colour and thus used colour as 
a retrieval cue for “what” and 
“where”) 
Categorise 
 (Categorised words into 
different types) 
Guessed 
(aware that answer was total 
guess) 
Landmark  
(used salient landmarks when 
hiding and retrieving) 
Linked 
(Linked words together) 
Semantics 
(used logical inference to 
reach answer) 
Revisited  
(mentally “went back” to the 
hiding event) 
Knew 
(“just knew”) 
Knew 
(“just knew”) 
Story/memory palace  
(made the hiding event into a 
narrative) 
Made a Story 
(Turned the word list 
into a narrative) 
 Geometry 
(used the geometry of the 
screen when hiding and 
retrieving) 
Remembered own 
Thoughts 
(remembered what they 
were thinking at the 
time) 
  
 
 
 
Where assumptions of normality were met, data were analysed using paired and 
independent samples t-tests and Pearson’s correlation. Where the data did not meet 
assumptions of normality, Friedman’s ANOVA, related-sample Wilcoxon and 
Kendell’s tau correlations were used. Nonlinear relationships between tests were 
assessed using a univariate general linear model (GLM).  
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4.3. Results 
 
Performance for each of the tests (WWW, UEQ, FR and PB) is reported, followed by 
the relationships between performance on the different tests. 
 
Gender Effects  
 
Men and women did not differ in their performance on any of the tests (FR: t[75]=-
1.061, p=0.292; UEQ: t[75]=1.441, p=0.154; WWW: t[65]=1.471, p=0.145; PB: 
t[75]=0.737, p=0.463). As such, all of the following analyses were conducted with 
data from men and women combined. 
 
What-Where-When 
 
Subjects had an average integrated WWW score of 0.73 (±0.242) - equivalent to 
correctly locating 3.6 of the 5 target coins. In terms of the individual what, where and 
when elements, subjects on average correctly identified gold coins (“what”) with a 
score of 0.8 (±0.217), correctly identified coins from the first hiding episode (“when”) 
with a score of 0.91 (±0.188) and correctly located coins (“where”) with a score of 0.9 
(±0.164). Thus subjects were generally very successful at the individual elements of 
the WWW test, but less successful at integrating this information. Subjects were 
differentially successful at the different elements of the test (Friedman’s ANOVA: 
F2=16.39, p<0.001). Planned contrasts (related samples Wilcoxon) revealed that 
subjects were significantly worse at identifying the type of coin (“what”) than at 
identifying a coin from the correct hiding period (“when”; W=487, p=0.001) or 
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identifying coin location (“where”; W=486, p=0.015), but that these latter two 
elements did not differ from each other (W=245, p=0.322).  
 
Subjects reported their strategies for remembering the location of the treasure, 
although it was often difficult to categorise these reports, given that many of them 
could be either semantic or episodic. Conservatively, only “re-experiencing” and 
“narrative” strategies were termed episodic; 30% of subjects reported using such 
methods. Overall, 48% of subjects reported hiding coins in a specific order and then 
using the order as a retrieval cue, 35% reported using landmarks, 26% reported “re-
experiencing” the hiding event, 19% reported matching the colour of the background 
to the colour of the coin when hiding, and thus identifying location-identify 
combinations according to colour, 4% reported creating a story out of the locations 
and 4% reported using the geometry of the screen to identify locations. There was no 
significant difference in performance between those reporting “episodic” strategies 
(re-experiencing or story-creation) and those not (t[69]=0.887, p=0.378). 
 
Unexpected Question 
 
Subjects scored an average of 0.61 (±0.119) in the UEQ test, which is equivalent to 
6.7 correct answers out of the 11 questions.  
 
In the debrief, 87% of subjects reported using an episodic strategy in the UEQ test, 
while only 27% reported using a semantic strategy. Specifically, 80% of subjects 
reported visualising the context they were attempting to remember, 40% reported 
guessing, 19% “just knew” the answer, 10% reported using logical inference to infer 
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the answer and 6% reported attempting to visualise, but being unable to. Because only 
4 people did not report at least one episodic strategy, it was not possible to compare 
performance of those reporting episodic strategies and those reporting only semantic 
strategies or guessing. 
 
Free Recall 
 
On average, the subjects achieved a score of 0.389 (±0.146) on the free recall test. 
This is equivalent to recalling approximately 11 words out of a possible 28. The 
words were divided into concrete “imaginable” words (e.g. magazine, elbow) and 
non-concrete, hard-to-visualise words (e.g. idea, gist). Subjects on average recalled 
6.2 (±2.55) concrete words (out of a possible 14) and 4.8 (±2.3) non-concrete words 
(out of a possible 14). Subjects remembered significantly more concrete than non-
concrete words (paired samples t-test, t[70]=4.377, p<0.001).  
 
In the debrief, 53% of subjects reported using an episodic strategy while 48% reported 
using a semantic strategy (subjects could report as many strategies as they felt they 
used, so the same subjects contribute to multiple categories). Specifically, 40% 
reported visualising the words, 35% reported linking the words together, 20% of 
people reported mentally hearing the experimenter’s voice, 14% reported that they 
“just knew” that the words had appeared on the list, 10% reported creating a narrative 
out of the words, 5% reported sorting the words into categories and using these as 
retrieval cues and 5% reported remembering their own thoughts in response to hearing 
the words. There was no significant difference in performance between people 
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reporting (any) episodic and those reporting (only) semantic strategies (t[38]=-0.230, 
p=0.819). 
 
Memory tests overall 
 
The subjects’ scores on all three memory tests were averaged into a single “memory 
score”, influenced equally by performance on all three tests. The subjects’ self-
reported strategies were grouped across the memory tests and scored according to the 
number of tests in which subjects reported using episodic strategies (1, 2 or 3). This 
was used as a metric of “tendency to use episodic cognition”. There was no “0” score 
because only two subjects never reported using an episodic strategy in any of the 
tests. There was no effect of the tendency to use episodic strategies on the overall 
memory score (F3=0.845, p=0.474). This suggests that those subjects reporting 
episodic strategies were neither more nor less successful overall in the memory tests. 
 
The relationship between memory tests 
 
Relationships between the memory tests were assessed using Pearson’s correlations to 
assess linear relationships and using univariate GLMs to assess nonlinear 
relationships. There was a significant positive correlation between WWW and FR 
(R=0.233, p=0.041), which was driven by subjects who reported episodic strategies in 
the FR test (episodic: R=0.514, p=0.014; semantic: R=-0.344, p=0.163; see Figure 
 4.3). There was no correlation between UEQ and either FR or WWW (FR-UEQ: R=-
0.124, p=0.281; WWW-UEQ: R=-0.024, p=0.833). 
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The lack of correlation between the performance in the WWW and UEQ tests may 
have been due to a nonlinear relationship. Univariate GLM revealed a quadratic 
relationship between WWW and UEQ scores (UEQ: F1,74=3.733, p=0.057; UEQ²: 
F1,74=4.343, p=0.041). This suggests that subjects who performed very well or very 
badly on the WWW test performed well on the UEQ test, while subjects who 
performed moderately on WWW performed badly on UEQ. There was no quadratic 
relationship between FR and UEQ (UEQ: F1,74=0.660, p=0.419; UEQ²: F1,74=0.713, 
p=0.401) overall, or when only subjects who reported episodic strategies in the FR 
test were included (UEQ: F1,74=0.023, p=0.881; UEQ²: F1,74=0.022, p=0.884).  
 
 
Figure  4.3. Relationship between memory tests. a) Relationship between WWW and 
UEQ. B) Relationship between WWW and FR. C) Relationship between UEQ and FR. 
Error bars represent standard error. 
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Figure  4.4. Relationship between memory tests and PB. aI) Relationship between 
WWW and PB. aII) Relationship between UEQ and PB. aIII) Relationship between 
FR and PB bI-III) Relationships as divided by memory strategy. Error bars represent 
standard error. 
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Relationships between sub-elements of the memory tests 
 
There was no significant correlation between any of the what, where or when 
elements and UEQ, although there was a trend for “where” (Kendell’s tau: what: R=-
0.016, p=0.878; where: R=-0.177, p=0.096; when: R=0.057, p=0.596). There was also  
no significant correlation between any of the what, where or when elements and FR 
(Kendell’s Tau: what: R=0.085, p=0.380; where: R=0.112, p=0.264; when: R=-0.08, 
p=0.434).  
 
There was no significant correlation between UEQ and free recall of either concrete 
(R=0.016, p=0.893) or non-concrete (R=-0.048, p=0.690) words. There was, however, 
a significant correlation between WWW performance and free recall of non-concrete 
(R=0.253, p=0.033) but not concrete (R=0.193, p=0.107) words. 
 
Projection Bias Test 
 
It was predicted that subjects in the chocolate group would be more biased towards 
refreshing food than subjects in the citrus group (see appendix 2). Subjects were 
generally consistent in their choices: the menu choices made before pre-feeding were 
positively correlated with the menu choices made after pre-feeding (R=0.681, 
p<0.001). However, people were substantially biased by the pre-feeding. A difference 
score was calculated for each subject for menu choices made before and after pre-
feeding. The chocolate group were significantly more biased towards choosing 
refreshing food for tomorrow than the citrus group (independent samples t-test 
t[75]=2.690, p=0.009). When the difference score for the two groups was combined 
154 
such that the pre-feeding effects went in the same direction (i.e. the scores of one 
group were multiplied by -1), this difference score was significantly different from 
zero (t[76]=2.672, p=0.009) suggesting that subject’s choices for the future were 
significantly biased by their current motivational state, rather than changing in a 
group-independent manner over time.  
 
Relationship between Memory Tests and Projection Bias 
 
The relationship between PB and the memory tests was assessed using Pearson’s 
correlation to test for linear relationships and univariate GLM to test for nonlinear 
relationships.  
 
Free Recall 
 
Subjects who performed very well or very badly on the FR test were more biased in 
the PB test than those that performed moderately. There was no linear relationship 
between FR and PB (R=-0.110, p=0.343). However, there was an effect of FR in the 
univariate GLM (F1,74=4.327, p=0.041) as well as a trend towards a quadratic 
relationship (F1,74=3.751, p=0.057; see Figure  4.4). There was no significant 
difference in magnitude of PB between subjects that reported episodic and those that 
reported semantic strategies in the FR test (t[38]=-0.201, p=0.841). 
 
Subjects who reported episodic strategies but not semantic strategies (N=22) showed 
no linear relationship between FR and PB (R=-0.083, p=0.715). Figure  4.4 indicates, 
however, that there was a U-shaped curve in which people who performed badly at 
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FR and people who performed very well at FR were the most biased in PB, and 
people who performed moderately at FR were the least biased in PB (and, indeed, 
more likely to overcompensate9). This curve was associated with a trend in the GLM 
suggesting a main effect of FR on PB (F1,74=4.265, p=0.054) as well as a quadratic 
relationship (F1,74=3.991, p=0.061).  
 
Subjects who reported semantic strategies but not episodic strategies (N=18) showed 
no relationship between FR and PB (Pearson’s R=-0.261, p=0.295; univariate GLM, 
no effect of FR on PB: F1,74=1.676, p=0.216; quadratic relationship: F1,74=1.185, 
p=0.295).  
 
Unexpected Question 
 
Subjects that performed better on the UEQ tests were more biased in the PB test. 
There was a significant positive correlation between PB and UEQ (R=0.279, p=0.014; 
see Figure  4.4). There was neither a main effect of UEQ on PB (F1,74=0.00, p=0.999) 
nor a quadratic relationship (F1,74=0.109, p=0.743) in the univariate GLM.  
 
Among subjects who used only episodic strategies (N=50), there was a significant 
positive correlation between UEQ performance and PB (Pearson’s R=0.331, 
p=0.019), but no main effect of UEQ on PB (F1,74=0.071, p=0.791) or quadratic 
relationship (F1,74=0.251, p=0.619) in the GLM.  
 
                                                 
9 Which is perhaps unsurprising given the finding that people tend to overestimate the satiating effects 
of consumption (e.g. Kahneman and Snell, 1992).  
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Only four subjects reported using solely semantic strategies in the UEQ test, thus the 
relationship between performance on the UEQ test and PB could not be assessed in 
this group. 
 
What-Where-When  
 
Subjects who were very accurate, or very inaccurate, at locating their treasure in the 
WWW test were more biased in the PB test than those who were moderately accurate 
(see Figure  4.4; univariate GLM effect of WWW on PB: F1,74=9.612, p=0.003, 
quadratic relationship: F1,74=8.206, p=0.005). This relationship was negatively 
skewed, suggesting that those who performed badly on WWW were more biased than 
those that performed well. There was, however, no linear relationship between 
integrated WWW score and PB (R=-0.160, p=0.168). 
 
There was no significant difference in extent of bias in the PB test between people 
who reported episodic strategies and those who did not (t[69]=0.194, p=0.847). There 
was, however, a difference in the nature of the relationship between WWW and PB 
between subjects reporting different strategies. The quadratic (U-shaped) relationship 
between WWW and PB appears to have been driven by those not reporting episodic 
strategies. Among subjects who reported either re-experiencing or story-creation (the 
episodic strategies), there was no correlation between integrated WWW score and PB 
(R=-0.151, p=0.492). There was also no effect of WWW on PB (F1,74=2.158, 
p=0.158) or quadratic relationship (F1,74=1.872, p=0.187) in the GLM. Among 
subjects who did not report an episodic strategy there was no correlation between 
integrated WWW score and PB (R=-0.213, p=0.146). There was, however, a 
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significant main effect of WWW on PB (F1,74=7.753, p=0.008) and a quadratic 
relationship (F1,74=6.279, p=0.016).  
 
 
Overall Memory Tests 
 
There was no significant effect of the tendency to use episodic cognition (i.e. number 
of memory tests in which episodic strategies were used) and magnitude of bias in the 
PB test (univariate GLM: F1,74=0.971, p=0.412).  
 
Impact of Pre-feeding on Memory 
 
In the design of this study, it was assumed that the pre-feeding (performed as part of 
the BK test) would not impact the other tests undertaken. However, there is a 
possibility that the pre-feeding may have affected  the ability of subjects to remember 
episodically. There was a trend for an interaction between the tendency to use 
episodic cognition and pre-feeding condition to affect overall memory score 
(F1,74=2.634, p=0.057). This analysis is post-hoc and exploratory, but raises the 
possibility that consumption of the chocolate pre-feeding foods between encoding and 
retrieval actually affected performance on the episodic memory tests. This is a 
possibility that is explored in the next chapter. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
A sample of undergraduates was tested on three putative episodic memory tests 
(WWW, UEQ and FR) as well as a putative test of episodic foresight (PB). There 
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were some relationships between performance on the memory tests, although these 
relationships were partial and relatively weak. Performance on the WWW test 
correlated positively with performance on the FR test. There was a possible quadratic 
relationship between WWW and UEQ, suggesting that those who performed very 
well or very badly on WWW were more accurate on UEQ than those who performed 
moderately. Degree of bias in the PB tests was related to performance on the memory 
tests in a similarly complex fashion. There was a positive correlation between PB and 
UEQ, suggesting that the better subjects performed on UEQ, the more biased they 
were by their current motivational state when making choices for the future. Both FR 
and WWW showed a U-shaped relationship to bias in the PB test, suggesting that 
those who performed very well or very badly on these tests were more biased by their 
current motivational state than those who performed moderately. 
 
In general, the findings presented in this chapter roughly correspond to those found in 
Chapter 3. There was little linear relationship between different memory tests, and 
those subjects who were better at answering unexpected questions were more biased 
by their current state when making choices for the future. This suggests that the lack 
of relationship between memory tests found in Chapter 3 was not purely the result of 
developmental factors. There were not sufficient degrees of freedom to assess 
potential quadratic relationships between tests in the experiment presented in Chapter 
3. However, an interesting focus of future research would be to assess the extent to 
which the nature of such a relationship may alter with age. For example, it would be 
interesting to discover if the relationship between UEQ and WWW is quadratic in all 
age groups, or whether it becomes so as children get older.  
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The finding that WWW did not correlate with UEQ is in contrast to previous findings 
that WWW performance correlated positively with UEQ (Holland and Smulders, 
2011). However, there are a number of methodological differences between that study 
and the one presented here that may have resulted in this contrasting finding. In the 
first instance, the unexpected questions in Holland and Smulders’ study were in a 
yes/no format, while in the present study they were open-ended. In a sense, this means 
that Holland and Smulders’ study used a “cued recall” UEQ test, while the present 
study used a “free recall” UEQ test. Given the difference in the reported memory 
experience in free and cued recall paradigms (see Chapter 1), this may mean that the 
contribution of episodic cognition to UEQ performance might have been different in 
these two studies. Secondly, Holland and Smulders required participants to recite 
nursery rhymes during the hiding period to stop them verbally practicing the location 
of the coins, this was not done in the present study. This may mean that subjects in the 
present study had more opportunity to memorize the location of the coins using verbal 
rehearsal techniques. This may have altered the contribution of episodic cognition to 
WWW performance. Thirdly, the retention interval of Holland and Smulder’s test was 
over the course of 3 days, while the retention interval for the current test was over the 
course of around 20-30 minutes. This may have meant that the memories retrieved in 
Holland and Smulder’s study were differently consolidated compared with those in 
the present study. Finally, the retrieval scenario was different between the studies: 
while in Holland and Smulder’s study subjects were asked to free recall the what, 
where and when for each coin, subjects in the current study behaviourally identified 
the location of a pre-specified what/when combination. This may have meant that 
subjects were differently motivated to get certain aspects (particularly the “what” 
aspect) correct. As Holland and Smulders discuss, the fact that both of their coin-
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types (2p and 20p coins) had comparably little value may have meant that there was 
no significant motivation to identify the coin type correctly.  
 
According to subjects’ self-reports, they used an almost equal mix of episodic and 
semantic strategies in the free recall test. This is in contrast to UEQ where almost all 
subjects reported using an episodic strategy. These reports are difficult to compare to 
the self reports of subjects in the WWW test, in which it was difficult to code reports 
into episodic and semantic, but in which around a third of subjects reported “re-
experiencing” or “making a story of” the hiding event. In none of the memory tests 
was there a significant effect of reporting using an episodic strategy on performance. 
This result is similar to that demonstrated by Easton and colleagues (2012), who 
found that when subjects were asked to recall when they had previously seen a 
particular object-location combination, their answers were significantly more like to 
be “remembered” than “known”. However, whether subjects reported “remembering” 
or “knowing” the answer did not have any effect on their performance. The authors 
concluded that both episodic and semantic processes can be used to identify when a 
particular location-object pairing has been previously seen, but only episodic memory 
can be used to assess in which context it was seen. Interestingly, reports of “knowing” 
in the current study were relatively common in the FR and UEQ tests (14% and 19% 
respectively) but not in the WWW, in which “knowing” was not reported by any 
subject. This supports the findings of Holland and Smulders (2011) and Easton and 
colleagues (2012) that WWW tests are overwhelmingly reported as “remembered” 
rather than “known” (when given the option only between these two reports). 
However, this may also suggest that the type of memories tapped by WWW tests do 
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not lend themselves to being reported as “known” but do not necessarily involve 
episodic cognition.  
 
Contributions of both semantic and episodic elements? 
There was a significant linear relationship between UEQ and level of PB, suggesting 
that those subjects who were more successful on UEQ were the most biased in the PB 
test. Given that over 90% of subjects reported using an episodic strategy to solve the 
UEQ test, this raises the possibility that, contrary to the assumptions of the Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis, episodic ability (insofar as it is assess by the UEQ test) may be 
negatively related to the ability to disengage from current state. This would be logical 
if one assumed that episodic cognition, due to its constructive nature, is more 
vulnerable to bias from current feelings than non-episodic/semantic cognition (see 
introduction of this chapter). This argument is potentially supported by the fact that 
those who reported only semantic strategies in the free recall test had no relationship 
between FR performance and level of PB, while those reporting episodic strategies 
showed a relationship between performance on the two tests. The fact that this 
relationship was quadratic rather than linear may be indicative of contributions from 
both episodic and non-episodic processes to FR performance, even if subjects report 
episodic experience. A similar quadratic relationship between performance on WWW 
and PB suggests again that this test also involved contributions from both episodic 
and non-episodic components. 
 
Episodic constructions of both past and future are constrained and specified 
(“scaffolded”) by known facts about the world. For example, someone might know 
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that it rains a lot in Glasgow, and thus when they imagine being in Glasgow, it is 
likely that the representation will contain rain. Similarly, if someone knows that there 
were 28 words on the wordlist, they are more likely to attempt to recall all 28 words – 
potentially resulting in recall of more words than if they were unaware of the number 
of words on the list. In both the WWW and FR tests (but not the UEQ test) subjects 
had the opportunity to use encoding strategies to aid their memories. The use of 
deliberate encoding strategies may have increased the contribution of such semantic 
“scaffolding”. For example, subjects may have mentally categorised the words, 
leading them to know that there were two words relating to body parts and attempt to 
remember both.  
 
There was differential opportunity for subjects to use semantic strategies in the 
different tests. Those engaged in answering an unexpected question on a single 
unusual event (hiding virtual treasure on a computer-generated island) have very little 
semantic scaffold (that is, few facts) to support their memory. Specifically, there is 
both no opportunity to deliberately encode semantic scaffolds (such as rules about 
where certain items are located) nor is there much of a knowledge base to rely upon 
(there is not, for example, a “usual” number of birds in a virtual beach scene). This 
lack of opportunity for semantic scaffolding was reflected in subjects’ self reports: 
only four subjects reported using no episodic strategies in the UEQ test. This 
difference in opportunity for scaffolding, along with the evidence from the self-
reports, may suggest that UEQ may represent a “purer” form of episodic memory test, 
with fewer contributions from non-episodic factors.  
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Where a semantic scaffold is available, one might expect the accuracy of a scaffolded 
memory to be modulated both by the vividness of the episodic contribution and the 
accuracy or applicability of the facts within the semantic scaffold. Thus people who 
constructed poor episodic details around a very accurate semantic scaffold may 
perform better (i.e. remember more accurately) than those who construct vivid 
episodic details around an inaccurate semantic scaffold. Those that have both an 
accurate semantic scaffold and vivid episodic details might be expected to perform 
the best. Thus the accuracy of the semantic scaffold would modulate the relationship 
between accuracy on a ‘true’ test of episodic memory and accuracy on a memory test 
that involved both semantic and episodic components; low-accuracy semantic 
scaffolds predicting a negative relationship and high-accuracy semantic scaffolds 
predicting a positive relationship. To give an example; suppose four people attend two 
different training courses; persons 1 and 2 (with a poor episodic memory and a vivid 
episodic memory respectively) attend a course that accurately teaches facts about 
anatomy. Persons 3 and 4 (with a poor episodic memory and a vivid episodic memory 
respectively) attend a course that teaches misinformation about anatomy. After these 
courses, all four watch an operation and are then quizzed about what they saw. When 
asked, for example, which organ was being operated upon, both the people with a 
very poor episodic memory may have to simply guess at the answer because they do 
not remember seeing the organ at all. Scaled up to the whole test, this would give 
them a chance level of performance (sometimes they will get the answer correct, 
sometimes they won’t). Person 4 (with a very vivid episodic memory but completely 
inaccurate knowledge of anatomy) will get the answer wrong, because they 
confidently remember seeing the organ, they have labelled that organ incorrectly. 
Scaled up to the whole test, this would result in a below-chance performance. Finally, 
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person 2 (with both a vivid episodic memory and an accurate knowledge of anatomy) 
will consistently get the answers correct. At the level of the whole test these four 
people would demonstrate a quadratic relationship between performance on this 
“operation” memory test and performance on a theoretical “pure” episodic memory 
test (see figure 4.5). Among those that attended the misinformation course, there 
would be a negative relationship between episodic memory score and performance (in 
that the person with a vivid episodic memory would have performed worse) while in 
those that attended the genuine-information course would show a positive relationship 
between episodic memory score and performance (in that the person with a vivid 
episodic memory would have performed better).  
 
Figure  4.5. Example of the relationship between performance on a “pure” episodic 
memory test and test that relies on both episodic memory and semantic knowledge 
where persons 1 and 2 have accurate semantic knowledge and persons 3 and 4 have 
inaccurate semantic knowledge.  
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Such an explanation might neatly account for the findings of this experiment if it is 
assumed that UEQ and PB are relatively “pure” tests of episodic cognition while FR 
and WWW contain both episodic and semantic elements (such that the accuracy of 
the “scaffold” of the memory can modulate the relationship between episodic 
vividness and accuracy). Such an account could in theory be tested in future research 
with the inclusion of a semantic memory test to assess the accuracy/appropriateness of 
subjects’ use of semantic information. 
 
In conclusion, the findings presented in this chapter demonstrate a relationship 
between all three types of episodic memory test (WWW, UEQ and FR) as well as 
relationships between each and these and the PB test. Not all of these relationships 
were linear, and many were quadratic. Such quadratic relationships may be indicative 
of the contribution of multiple factors. Specifically, it was suggested that the quadratic 
relationships may have been the result of a modulation of episodic input by semantic 
scaffolding. Finally, it was briefly mentioned that the act of pre-feeding may have 
itself affected episodic memory performance. The impact of diet on hippocampal 
function and episodic cognition is explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
The Impact of Diet and Obesity on Episodic Cognition 
 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that poor diet and obesity may 
lead to disrupted hippocampal function. Thus an investigation into the 
impact of these factors on episodic cognition is warranted. Two 
experiments were conducted to examine this issue. In the first, a 
population sample varying in body mass index (BMI), self-reported 
levels of dietary fat and sugar, and self reported levels of binge-eating 
was presented with a Projection Bias (PB) test and an Unexpected Free 
Recall (UFR) test. It was found that a high BMI predicted poor 
performance on the UFR test while a high fat diet predicted reduced bias 
in the PB test. In Experiment 2, a sample of obese binge-eating subjects 
underwent a PB test several times during 2-months’ treatment with a µ-
opioid antagonist. It was found that drug treatment made no difference 
to performance, suggesting that subjects were choosing according to 
semantic representations rather than being biased by their current state, 
as would be expected from an episodic strategy. It is concluded that 
obesity and diet do modulate episodic cognition, but affect different 
putative tests of episodic cognition differently.  
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5.1. Introduction 
 
 
Chapter 4 used individual differences in performance on episodic memory tests in the 
adult human population to assess the relationship between different measures of 
episodic cognition. The present chapter explores the factors that may lead to such 
individual differences in performance. In particular, the overarching goal of this 
chapter is to explore the fourth prediction laid out in Chapter 1: that if different tests 
of episodic cognition assess the same underlying psychological process, performance 
on these tests should be impaired in the same way by the same factors.  
 
It has been extensively demonstrated that patients with damage to hippocampal 
structures exhibit deficits in episodic cognition (e.g. Scoville and Milner, 1957, 
Tulving, 1985b, Mayes et al., 1988, Golomb et al., 1993, Sheline et al., 1996, 1999, 
Isaacs et al., 2000, Gadian et al., 2000, Allen et al., 2002, Levine et al., 2002, Piolino 
et al., 2002, Spreng and Levine, 2006, Addis et al., 2007, Piolino et al., 2010, Girard 
et al., 2010). . However these studies have been conducted in patient groups. The aim 
of this chapter is to explore factors that may lead to individual differences in 
hippocampal function in the non-clinical population and assess the impact of these 
factors on episodic cognition. There is accumulating evidence for an association 
between poor diet, obesity and damage to hippocampal functioning. However, the 
relationship between these factors and episodic cognition is yet to be explored.  
 
This chapter contains two experiments. In the first, individuals who varied in body 
mass index (BMI), self-reported levels of dietary fat and sugar, and eating behaviour 
were tested on two forms of episodic cognition (namely unexpected Free Recall [FR] 
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memory and the Projection Bias [PB] test) in order to test the hypothesis that poor 
diet and obesity do result in poorer performance on such assessments. In the second 
experiment, a sample of obese, binge-eating individuals was tested on FR memory 
and was repeatedly tested on the PB menu choice test throughout treatment with a µ-
opioid antagonist. µ-opioid antagonism is thought to reduce the hedonic experience of 
eating high-fat, high sugar food, and is thus being explored as a potential 
pharmacological treatment for obesity. This experiment investigated whether the same 
performance on the PB test would be seen in obese individuals if the modulation of 
current state was achieved through the reduction of hedonic experience (i.e. how 
much they liked eating the food) rather than through satiation. Such an investigation 
would test the possibility that abnormal behaviour in the PB test in the overweight 
may be due to unusual responses to satiation, rather than a differential use of episodic 
cognition. 
 
Diet, Obesity and Hippocampal Functioning 
 
Obesity is fast becoming an international health crisis. As of 2009, it was estimated 
that a billion people are overweight, and around 300 million are obese worldwide 
(World Health Organisation, 2009). In recent years, there has been an increased focus 
on the psychological and neurological correlates of obesity. Of relevance to this 
thesis, there has been increasing evidence that obesity, and risk factors associated with 
obesity (e.g. a high-fat, high-sugar diet and binge eating) are associated with damage 
to the hippocampus. This raises the question of whether such individuals would also 
show impaired performance on tests of episodic cognition, given the established role 
of the hippocampus in this process (e.g. Squire et al., 1992). 
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There are a number of angles from which the association between diet, obesity and 
hippocampal functioning can be investigated. Firstly, the impact of poor diet and 
obesity can be studied independently. Secondly, directionality should be explored: is 
obesity a symptom of disruption to hippocampal functioning, or is unusual 
hippocampal function a symptom of obesity? Finally, indirect associations can be 
investigated: are there factors implicated in memory performance that are affected by 
obesity and/or poor diet? 
 
Hippocampal damage leads to obesity 
 
Unusual ingestive behaviour has been reported in humans and animals with structural 
damage to the hippocampus. Patients with extensive bilateral damage to the 
hippocampal area (including the amygdala) are willing to eat a second (and even 
third) meal when presented only a few minutes after the first (Rozin et al., 1998, 
Hebben et al., 1985). It is difficult to determine whether this could result from simply 
failing to remember having consumed food (these subjects are densely amnesic) or an 
insensitivity to internal states (patient HM, for example, also showed aberrant 
reactions to temperature and pain: Hebben et al., 1985). However, this evidence does 
support the idea that the structural integrity of the hippocampus is important for 
normal meal-limitation. Rats with selective neurotoxic lesions to the hippocampus 
show increased motivation to work for food relative to controls (e.g. Schmelzeis and 
Mittleman, 1996, Clifton et al., 1998) and are less able to use cues of hunger, thirst or 
satiety as discriminative stimuli (Kennedy and Shapiro, 2004, Davidson and Jarrard, 
1993, Hock and Bunsey, 1998). Furthermore, rats with lesions to the hippocampus 
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(but not the prefrontal cortex) gain more weight post-surgery and end up weighing 
more than control rats (Davidson and Swithers, 2004, Davidson et al., 2009). 
Davidson and colleagues argue that the incremental, modest weight gain of their rats 
(unlike the dramatic weight gain seen after hypothalamic lesions) is comparable to 
that seen in human obesity (e.g. Lewis et al., 2000).  
 
Obesity leads to hippocampal damage and memory/episodic cognition 
impairment 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that obesity may lead to hippocampal damage or 
unusual hippocampal function. The hippocampus is unusually activated after 
ingestion (or gastric stimulation designed to simulate ingestion) in obese or 
previously-obese individuals but not in healthy subjects (DelParigi et al., 2004, 
Gautier et al., 2001, Wang et al., 2006). Furthermore, obese subjects show atrophy in 
the frontal lobes and hippocampus compared to healthy controls (Raji et al., 2010, 
Gustafson et al., 2004b). Obesity and health problems that result from obesity (e.g. 
type 2 diabetes) are significant risk factors for cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s 
disease in later life (Elias et al., 2005, Wolf et al., 2007, Irie et al., 2008, Leibson et 
al., 1997, Gustafson et al., 2004a) This may be a result of increased cerebral atrophy, 
although whether this is the result of Obesity, or lead to the obesity is as yet unclear. 
 
There is also evidence that to suggest that memory may be impaired in obesity. Obese 
individuals have been shown to display deficits in both immediate and delayed FR 
and recognition (Elias et al., 2003, Gunstad et al., 2006, Gunstad et al., 2010), self-
report more problems with memory (Trakas et al., 2001) and are impaired relative to 
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healthy controls on both digit-span retention and the Trail Making test (which can be 
considered a form of spatial/multi-stage planning test [Kilander et al., 1997]). This 
memory impairment may be mirrored by alterations to future-oriented decision 
making in obese individuals. Nisbett & Kanouse (1969) showed that, in a real-world 
variant of the PB test (as described in detail in Chapter 4) overweight individuals 
showed a substantially different pattern of behaviour to healthy-weight individuals. 
While healthy-weight individuals tended to buy more food the longer it had been 
since they had eaten, overweight people tended to buy less food the longer it had been 
since they had eaten. 
 
Poor diet leads to hippocampal damage and poor memory 
 
Research on rats suggests that a high-fat high-sugar diet causes changes in 
hippocampal function (Kanoski et al., 2007, Molteni et al., 2002, van der Borght et 
al., 2011) and impaired learning and memory (Molteni et al., 2002, Jurdak and 
Kanarek, 2009, Jurdak et al., 2008). Preliminary studies in humans also raise the 
possibility that individuals who consume high-fat high-sugar diets show impairments 
in the episodic memory (Francis and Stevenson, 2011). 
 
Neurophysiological and neuroendocrine relationships between poor diet, obesity 
and hippocampal function and memory 
 
Feeding is controlled and regulated by the complex interaction of a number of 
hormones and peptides (see Box 3). Some of the main hormones implicated in control 
of feeding behaviour are insulin, leptin, ghrelin, neuropeptide Y (NPY), brain-derived 
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neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and cholecystokinin (CCK). These hormones are 
dysregulated in obesity and by high levels of dietary fat and sugar (see Box 3). 
However, while the role of these hormones and peptides in energy regulation and 
feeding is well established, there is growing evidence that each of them both acts in 
the hippocampus and affects memory performance. In the following section, these 
shall be discussed in detail. 
 
Cholecystokinin (CCK): CCK is a fast-acting, short-term satiety signal (see Box 3) 
that acts in the gut and brain. Plasma CCK and CCK secretion are increased in obese 
individuals. While to date there are no studies investigating the role of CCK on 
memory in humans, there is a possibility that the dysregulation of CCK in obesity (see 
Box 3) may be accompanied by a disruption of learning and memory. Much of the 
evidence for the role of CCK in obesity originates from research on the Otsuka Long-
Evans Tokushima Fatty (OLETF) rats, which are known to become obese. These rats 
have also been shown to exhibit impaired hippocampal-dependent spatial learning, as 
measured by performance on the Morris water maze (Matsushita et al., 2003, Moran 
et al., 1998, Li et al., 2002a, Nomoto et al., 1999). There is also evidence for impaired 
long-term potentiation (LTP) expression in the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus in 
these animals (Nomoto et al,. 1999). However, some have argued (e.g. Biessels and 
Gispen, 2005) that the deficits seen in OLETF rats may be more attributable to their 
hyperinsulinemia than their lack of CCK receptors per se.  
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Leptin and Insulin: Leptin and insulin are peripheral hormones – released by fat 
cells and the pancreas respectively – that help to regulate consumption (see Box 3). 
High levels of dietary fat and sugar, as well as obesity, are associated with 
insensitivity to both leptin and insulin (see Box 3). There are dense populations of 
leptin and insulin receptors in the hippocampus (Lathe, 2001), suggesting that 
dysregulation of these hormones may affect hippocampal function. Evidence from 
rodent models suggests that this is the case. 
 
Both administration of leptin and insulin have been shown to improve spatial memory 
and hippocampal LTP in rats (Farr et al., 2006, Zhao et al., 2004). Rodent models of 
diabetes are impaired on the Morris water maze of spatial memory, despite being 
relatively unimpaired on simple learned tests such as passive avoidance and, in the 
case of Zucker rats, in a frontal go-no go test; ; streptozotocin [STZ] induced diabetes: 
(Biessels et al., 1996, Popovic et al., 2001, Gispen and Biessels, 2000); BB/Wor rats: 
(Li et al., 2002b); Zucker Rats: (Li et al., 2002b, Winocur et al., 2005); diet-induced 
insulin resistance: (Stranahan et al., 2008)) These deficits are often accompanied by 
evidence of abnormal expression of LTP and decreased neuronal density in the 
hippocampus (STZ-induced diabetes: (Kamal et al., 2005, Gispen and Biessels, 
2000); BB/Wor rats: (e.g. Li et al., 2002b); Non-Obese Diabetic (NOD) mice: 
(Valastro et al., 2002); Zucker rats; (e.g. Gerges et al., 2003); diet-induced insulin 
resistance: (Stranahan et al., 2008, Stranahan and Mattson, 2008)). 
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In humans, there is evidence for memory loss and impaired executive function in 
patients with type II diabetes (e.g. Ryan and Geckle, 2000) especially in older adults10 
(Awad et al., 2004, Convit et al., 2003). Higher fasting insulin levels have been 
associated with lower hippocampal and orbital frontal volume in older subjects, and 
type 2 diabetes is associated with atrophy of the frontal lobes and hippocampus (Raji 
et al., 2010, Bruehl et al., 2011); and unusual hippocampal blood flow (Wu et al., 
2008). Higher fasting plasma insulin levels have also been associated with cognitive 
deficits in elderly subjects (Yaffe et al., 2004, Watson and Craft, 2003, Irie et al., 
2008, Leibson et al., 1997). High circulating leptin levels, meanwhile, are associated 
with poorer performance on the Trail Making test (Gunstad et al., 2008). 
 
Thus it appears that dysregulation of leptin and insulin, such as is seen in obesity and 
after high levels of dietary fat and sugar, is associated with deficits in hippocampal 
function and memory.  
 
Ghrelin: Ghrelin is a peptide found in the stomach and brain that acts to stimulate 
food intake. High levels of dietary fat act to reduce circulating ghrelin levels, and 
ghrelin concentrations are reduced in obesity (see Box. 3). 
Research in rodents has demonstrated that ghrelin binds to neurons of the 
hippocampal formation, where it promotes synapse formation and LPT. This neuronal 
action is accompanied by enhanced spatial learning and memory. Furthermore, 
disruption of the gene that encodes ghrelin resulted in fewer spine synapses and 
impaired memory. These effects were reversible by ghrelin administration (Diano et 
                                                 
10 Although given that hippocampal atrophy and impaired memory are symptoms of normal aging, it is 
difficult to tell if this effect is additive or interactional  
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al., 2006, Chen et al., 2011). In rodents, ghrelin has been shown to improve spatial 
memory and memory retention (Carlini et al., 2002, Davis et al., 2011) as well as 
reducing memory impairments seen in rodent models of diabetes and Alzheimer’s 
(e.g. Moon et al., 2011). 
This evidence may suggest that lowered concentrations of ghrelin – as found in 
obesity and after a high-fat diet – may result in poorer hippocampal function and 
memory. 
 
Neuropeptide Y (NPY): NPY is a neuropeptide that has roles in numerous areas of 
the brain.  In particular, NPY is known as a potent appetite stimulant (see Box 3). 
Obesity is associated with increased NPY release and mRNA and a high fat diet can 
stimulate NYP release (see Box 3). 
 
NPY receptors are distributed throughout the brain but are clustered in the 
hypothalamus and hippocampus (Dumont et al., 1992). In the rat hippocampus, large 
quantities of NPY-containing cells are found in the dentate gyrus, and the CA1 
CA2 and CA3 subfields (Chronwall et al., 1985, de Quidt and Emson, 1986b, 1986a, 
Köhler et al., 1986), a pattern that correlates closely with that seen in the human 
hippocampus (Chan-Palay et al., 1986a, 1986b). Intracerebroventricular (ICV) 
injections of NPY have been shown to enhance spatial memory (Morley and Flood, 
1990, Flood et al., 1987, 1989, 1989) and reverse amnesia. However passive 
immunization with NPY antibodies, injected into the hippocampus, induces amnesia 
(Flood et al., 1987), an effect that is mediated by the rostral hippocampus and 
amygdala (Flood et al., 1989). NPY has also been shown to inhibit glutamate release 
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onto pyramidal cells in rat hippocampus (Colmers and Bleakman, 1994, Greber et al., 
1994, Schwarzer and Sperk, 1998). 
 
There has been no investigation as to what effect chronically increased NPY levels 
have on hippocampal function, so it is unclear whether it would have a positive or 
negative influence on memory. However, the evidence suggests that NPY modulation 
(as is seen in obesity) would have a potentially significant effect.  
 
Brain-derived neurotrophic factor: BDNF is a protein that contributes to the 
survival, growth and maintenance of neurons (Alvarez-Borda et al., 2004, Allen and 
Dawbarn, 2006). BDNF concentrations have been shown to be reduced in obesity and 
by a high-fat, high-sugar diet (see Box 3). 
  
BDNF is important for activity-dependent synaptic plasticity, LTP (particularly in the 
hippocampus: (Lu and Gottschalk, 2000)) and learning and memory (Lebrun et al., 
2006, Rossi et al., 2006, Yamada and Nabeshima, 2003, Gartner and Staiger, 2002, 
Thoenen, 1995, Bramham and Messaoudi, 2005, Wibrand et al., 2006, Dalla et al., 
2007, Kitabatake et al., 2007). In particular, it is thought that BDNF is important 
during the encoding phase of memory retention (Goldberg et al., 2008, Hariri et al., 
2003).  
 
In humans, it has been suggested that genetic polymorphisms modulating BDNF may 
contribute significantly to heterogeneity of episodic cognitive ability (e.g. Koppel and 
Goldberg, 2009).  A common polymorphism of the human BDNF gene (val66met) 
which dramatically alters the intracellular trafficking and packaging of BDNF’s 
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precursor peptide (pro-BDNF) has been shown to affect hippocampal volume 
(Szeszko et al., 2005, Bueller et al., 2006). The polymorphism also affects 
hippocampal function, producing deficits in episodic memory (Dempster et al., 2005, 
Egan et al., 2003, Miyajima et al., 2008, Cathomas et al., 2010, Dennis et al., 2011) 
and reduced hippocampal engagement during both encoding and retrieval 
(recognition) of complex novel scenes (Hariri et al., 2003). Finally, genetic 
haploinsufficiency for BDNF, and mutations of the BDNF receptor TrkB have been 
associated with obesity as well as severe learning and memory impairments (Gray et 
al., 2006, Yeo et al., 2004). 
 
Thus BDNF is crucial for hippocampal LTP and also appears to modulate memory. 
This may suggest that the reduced concentrations of BDNF seen in obesity may have 
a substantial influence on hippocampal function and memory. 
 
Summary of connection between poor diet, obesity and hippocampal function/ 
memory and planning 
 
To date there is little direct evidence for a connection between poor diet, obesity and 
episodic cognition. Notable exceptions may include the works of Elias and colleagues 
(2003) and Gunstad and colleagues (2006, 2010) who demonstrated impairments in 
FR in obese subjects, and Francis and Stephenson (2011) study of poor FR in subjects 
who self-report high dietary fat and sugar. However, as has been demonstrated above, 
there is substantial evidence to suggest that there are associations between 
neurological and hormonal correlates of obesity and high-fat, high-sugar diet and 
those of hippocampal function and memory. This evidence suggests a clear 
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hypothesis: that high levels of dietary fat and sugar, leading to, or in combination 
with, obesity result in changes to hippocampal function. Based on this, there is a need 
for a dedicated investigation into the potential association between BMI, diet and 
episodic cognition. 
 
To this end, I conducted an online study in which participants reported their height 
and weight (from which BMI was calculated) and the regularity with which they 
consumed certain foods (including high-fat foods, high-sugar foods and healthy 
distracters). Subjects also participated in two episodic cognition tests: first a PB test 
similar to that described in Chapter 4, in which the fat content of the foods, the 
presently experienced state of hunger or satiety, and the delay until receipt of the food 
were manipulated within-subject. Second, the UEQ test and FR test were combined 
into an Unexpected Free Recall (UFR) test, in which the to-be-remembered items 
were central to a subject’s attention at the time of encoding, but subjects did not know 
that they needed to remember them. Subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall all the 
food items that had appeared on the menus. To ascertain food attitudes and eating 
style, subjects also completed the Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire 
(Fairburn and Beglin, 2008). In particular, binge-eating score was recorded. This 
score is indicative of regularity of binge-eating episodes over the past 28 days. There 
are no explicit predictions for the effects of this measure, however the subjects in the 
Experiment 2 were pre-selected for high binge-eating scores (for reasons external to 
this investigation) and thus it was important to assess the contribution of this measure 
to performance in the population sample. 
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Given that episodic cognition is easily biased by current feelings and desires (see 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 4), one might expect better performance on the PB test (i.e. a 
smaller effect of current state) in subjects who are less able to recruit episodic 
processes in approaching the test. Thus, I hypothesise that there will be a smaller level 
of PB (i.e. effect of current state on menu-choices for future) meals in subjects with 
higher BMIs (as was suggested by Nisbett and Kanous’s shopping test (1969)]) and/or 
higher levels of dietary fat and sugar (high “diet score”). In contrast, I predict that 
these subjects will perform worse on the UFR test. 
 
5.2. Experiment 1 
5.2.1. Methods 
Pilot study 
This study was piloted on a sample of 15 men (see Appendix 4). 
Subjects 
Participants were recruited via a range of social media websites, online forums and 
notice boards. 214 participants began the study, but there was a substantial dropout 
rate due to the requirement of successive website visits. A small number of subjects 
were also removed before analysis due to anomalous data or additional factors that 
influence BMI such as pregnancy or being ‘very muscular’ (as assessed by self-
report). The remaining sample was 59 (29% male), aged 18-69 years, (mean age 36 
years). 
 
Ethical permission was obtained from the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee. Participants were asked a number of consent questions at the start of the 
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first questionnaire, and a final consent question at the end of the fourth questionnaire 
after the intentions of the study were revealed. As some of the questions involved 
weight and disordered eating behaviours, a list of support contacts was given at the 
end of the questionnaire, in case participants felt worried by any of the issues.  
 
Procedure 
 
Subjects were directed to a central web page, where they found links to the 
questionnaires. The survey was split into four questionnaires, to be completed at four 
different times over the course of two days. The times were “before lunch”, “before 
dinner”, “after lunch” and “after dinner”. The aim of these timings was to make sure 
that subjects were fasted on some occasions (before meals) and fed on others (after 
meals). The order of these questionnaires was randomly counterbalanced between 
subjects. The subjects completed the questionnaires autonomously via an online 
survey website (www.freeonlinesurveys.com). 
 
Figure  5.1. Example Menu Choice 
 
In all four questionnaires, subjects were asked to confirm that they were completing 
the questionnaire at the appropriate time, either before or after their meal as 
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instructed, and to report on their hunger levels and how long (in hours) it had been 
since their last meal and since they had last eaten any food. They made three or four 
(depending on the questionnaire) forced choices between two similar foods that varied 
in fat-content and were to be eaten either immediately or in the future (see Figure 
 5.1). The fat content of the foods was not made explicit, but there were pictures and 
descriptions for each. After making their choices, subjects were asked if they disliked 
any of the foods mentioned. If so, the data from choices involving this food were 
excluded. A high-fat choice was scored 1 and a low-fat choice was scored 0.  
 
Thus there were four conditions; fasted for now, fasted for future, fed for now and fed 
for future (see Table  5-1).  Subjects were asked about each condition either twice or 
four times (controlling for future-state), with different foods each time 
(counterbalanced for order).  
 
Table  5-1. Four Within-Subjects Conditions of Projection Bias Test. 
 Now Future 
Fasted Choosing when fasted for 
immediate consumption 
Choosing when fasted for 
consumption later 
Fed Choosing when fed for 
immediate consumption 
Choosing when fed for 
consumption later 
 
 
At the end of the final questionnaire, subjects were asked for demographic details 
(including height, weight, age, gender) and for details about factors that may affect 
BMI (e.g. pregnancy or “muscliness”). To assess eating behaviour, subjects also 
completed sections from the Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire (Fairburn 
and Beglin, 2008) and reported whether they had previously been diagnosed with an 
eating disorder, and if so which one. 
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Finally, at the end of the study subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall as many of 
the foods that had appeared on all the menus as they were able. These responses were 
scored for accuracy. 
 
Analysis 
Coding: Where subjects indicated a dislike of a particular food, data for choices 
involving those foods was removed. The subject’s data was then calculated without 
this choice. This was an occurrence with just over 50% of subjects (31/59). To make 
sure that these omissions did not bias the data, the “now” and “later” choices were 
calculated by taking the average of the choices made when fasted and when fed and 
then taking an average of these. As such, if a given subject made more valid choices 
in either one of the “fasted” or “fed” conditions, this could not affect their “delay” 
scores. The “fasted” and “fed” score were calculated by averaging the choices made 
for now and later in a similar manner.  
 
Statistics: Where assumptions of normality were met, data were analysed using 
repeated measures ANOVA, one-way ANOVA, Pearson’s correlation and t-test. 
Where assumptions of normality were violated, nonparametric statistical tests (e.g. 
Freidman’s ANOVA, Mann-Whitney U test, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Kendell’s 
Tau) were used. Alpha was set at 0.05.  Where post hoc investigations were carried 
out, a Šidák alpha correction was used. 
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5.2.2. Results 
 
Pre-analysis results: BMI, binge-eating and diet data, memory and menu 
choices. 
 
Most subjects were of a healthy weight, but subjects were distributed throughout all 
four weight categories (underweight, healthy weight, overweight and obese). The 
mean BMI, diet and binge-eating scores for each weight group are shown in Table 
 5-2. Before the analyses regarding the effect of BMI, diet and binge-eating on 
episodic cognition measures can be investigated, these demographic measures must 
be analysed independently. 
 
Table  5-2. Means and standard deviations of BMI (body mass index), diet score 
(indicative of level of high fat high sugar food in diet) and binge-eating score 
(indicative of regularity of binge-eating episodes, Fairburn & Beglin, 2008) 
 Underweight Healthy 
Weight 
Overweight Obese Overall 
N 2 43 10 4 59 
BMI 17.15 (±0.99) 21.9(±1.69) 26.95(±1.55) 40.51(±11.32) 23.80 (±5.88) 
Diet 
score 
2 (±0.1) 2.5 (±0.69) 2.66 (±0.52) 1.98 (±0.15) 2.45 (±0.65) 
Binge-
eating 
1 (±1.41) 5.69(±8.19) 6.11(±11.37) 7.5 (±6.24) 5.7 (±8.4) 
 
 
Relationship between BMI, diet and Binge-eating scores: There was no correlation 
between BMI and either of the eating behaviour measures (BMI/Diet: Kendell’s Tau, 
N=58 R=-0.033, p=0.722; BMI/Binge-eating: Kendell’s Tau, N=58, R=0.047, 
p=0.635). There was, however, a significant, yet small, negative correlation between 
the eating behaviour measures (Binge-eating/Diet: Kendell’s Tau, N=58, R=-0.196, 
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p=0.05); those individuals who reported higher levels of binge-eating reported eating 
high-fat, high-sugar food less regularly. 
 
Efficacy of the “Fasted” and “Fed” conditions: In order to access the efficacy of 
the “Fasted” and “Fed” conditions, the subjects’ reported hungriness and time since 
last meal were compared between the conditions. It was found that subjects were 
significantly hungrier and had gone significantly longer since having last eaten in the 
“Fasted” condition than the “Fed” condition11 (see Table  5-3). 
 
Table  5-3. Efficacy of “Fasted” and “Fed” conditions. Cells contain t-tests 
comparing hungriness, hours since food and hours since last meal in the Fasted and 
Fed conditions. Where N is too small for t-tests to be calculated, the mean and 
standard deviation are given. 
 Hungriness Hours since food Hours since meal 
Overall t(57)=-18.86, p<0.001 t(60)=6.27, p<0.001 t(60)=7.77, p<0.001 
Men t(16)=-7.63, p<0.001 t(16)=4.35, p<0.001 t(16)=5.22, p<0.001  
Women t(40)=-19.63, p<0.001 t(40)=4.81, p<0.001 t(40)=5.92, p<0.001 
Underweight N=2, Fasted: m=3, 
sd=0.7, Fed: m=4.2, 
sd=1.7 
N=2, Fasted: m=4.5m 
sd=2.8 Fed: m=2.75, 
sd=2.47 
N=2, Fasted: 
m=10.25, sd=4.5; 
Fed: m=10.75, 
sd=13.789 
Healthy t(42)=4.55, p<0.001 t(42)=4.552, p<0.001 t(42)=6.995, p<0.001 
Overweight t(8)=-4.464, p=0.002 t(8)=3.054, p=0.016 t(8)=3.323, p=0.01 
Obese N=4, Fasted: m:2.25, 
sd=0.28, fed: m=4.5, 
sd=0.7 
N=4, fasted: m=4.2, 
sd=0.29, fed: m=1, 
sd=0.0 
N=4, fasted: m=6.75, 
sd=3.8; fed: m=1, 
sd=0.0 
 
Choice between high fat and low fat foods: There was a significant difference 
between weight groups in the percentage of occasions on which the high-fat food was 
chosen (F3,54=2.985, p=0.039; see Table  5-4). There was a significant positive 
correlation between levels of dietary fat and sugar (diet score) and choice of high fat 
                                                 
11 It should perhaps be noted that for the “underweight” group, the average time since their last meal in 
the “fed” condition was over 10 hours. This suggests that they either misunderstood the question and 
thought that it refered to the meal before that which they had just eaten, or that they had not, in fact, 
just eaten. 
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food in the menus (Pearson’s N=59, R=0.485, p<0.001), but no correlation between 
levels of binge eating and choice of high-fat food in the menus (Kendell’s Tau, N=59, 
R=0.052, p=0.604).  
Table  5-4. Mean (±sd) percentage of occasions in which high fat food was chosen 
 Mean percentage of occasions on which high-fat 
food was chosen (sd) 
Overall 48.3% (±0.22). 
Men 64.6% (±0.19) 
Women 41.5% (±0.20) 
Underweight 51% (±26) 
Healthy 44%  (±22) 
Overweight 66%  (±18) 
Obese 49%  (±14) 
 
In the Fasted condition, there was no correlation between levels of reported 
hungriness and decisions for now (Kendell’s Tau, N=58, R=-0.028, p=0.791) or the 
future (Kendell’s Tau(58)=-0.093, p=0.388), while in the Fed condition those that 
were hungrier chose the high fat food on fewer occasions both for now (Kendell’s 
Tau(58)=-0.366, p=0.001) and for the future (Kendell’s Tau(58)=-0.221, p=0.033). 
 
Sex Effects: There was a significant difference between men and women in BMI, diet 
score and proportion of occasions in which high fat food was chosen. Men on average 
had a higher BMI than women (Mann Whitney U, p<0.001) and reported eating high 
fat high sugar food more often (t[57]=2.095, p=0.041). Men also chose high fat high 
sugar food significantly more often than women on the test menus (t[56]=4.108, 
p<0.001). With a limited sample size, these strong and consistent sex differences risk 
confounding any main effects of the target factors (e.g. BMI, diet etc.) on episodic 
cognition with gender effects. For this reason, the main analysis was conducted 
separately on males and females.  
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Main analysis: Effects of BMI, diet and binge-eating on episodic measures 
 
Main outcome measure 1: Effects of BMI, diet and binge-eating on memory 
 
Men: In men, there was no relationship between any of the eating scores and memory 
performance (BMI F1,12=0.043, p=0.838; Diet F1,12=0.228, p=0.641; Binge-eating 
F1,12=0.049, p=0.829). 
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Figure  5.2. The effect of BMI on memory score in a) men and b) women 
 
Women: Women with higher BMIs performed worse on the memory test, but there 
was no effect of diet or binge-eating (BMI: F1,36=4.523, p=0.040; Diet: F1,36=0.322, 
p=0.574; Binge-eating: F1,36=0.426, p=0.518). However, this effect may have been 
driven by a single outlier (BMI=55). When the analysis was repeated without this 
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point, none of the effects was significant (BMI: F1,36=0.590, p=0.45; Diet: F1,36=0.24, 
p=0.63; Binge-eating: F1,36=0.39, p=0.53).  
 
Main Outcome Measure 2: Effects of BMI, diet and binge-eating on the influence 
of current state and delay on choices for high or low fat food. 
 
The main analysis of interest was whether choices made for later were modulated by 
current state, and whether this modulation differed according to BMI, diet or binge-
eating. However, this result is only relevant to the investigation of possible episodic 
cognition if the effect is specific to choices for the future (rather than for the present). 
Unfortunately, due to the small sample size (especially in men) the degrees of 
freedom are not sufficient to assess whether the two delays differ in the effect of 
dietary and weight factors on the modulation of choices by current state (a three-way 
interaction). Instead, two-way interactions are assessed in both delays. 
 
Men: In choices made for “later”, subjects chose more high-fat food when they were 
fasted than when they were fed (repeated-measures ANOVA: Current state: 
F1,13=7.358, p=0.018). There was an impact on self reported levels of dietary fat and 
sugar on the effect of current state on choices of high- and low-fat food (Current State 
x Diet: F1,13=5.872, p=0.031). The planned contrasts revealed a trend that those who 
reported rarely eating high-fat, high-sugar food chose more high-fat food when they 
were fasted than when they were fed (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.051), while 
those who reported high levels of dietary fat and sugar showed no effect of current 
state on choices (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.167; see Figure 5.3). There were no 
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other significant effects or interactions (Current State x BMI: F1,13= 2.930, p=0.111; 
Current State x Binge-eating: F1,13=0.803, p=0.387).   
 
 
Figure  5.3. Effect of Diet and BMI on the impact of current state on choices in men. a) 
Effect of Current State on choices of high fat food for now, divided according to 
dietary fat and sugar. b) Effect of Current State on choices of high fat food for later, 
divided according to dietary fat and sugar. c) Effect of Current State on choices of 
high fat food for now, divided according to BMI. d) Effect of Current State on choices 
of high fat food for later, divided according to BMI. 
 
In choices made for “now”, subjects did not make different choices when they were 
fasted than when they were fed (repeated-measures ANOVA: Current state: 
F1,13=1.665, p=0.219). Significantly, this was not modulated by dietary fat and sugar 
(Current State x Diet: F1,13=0.184, p=0.675). There was, however, an impact of BMI 
on the effect of current state choices of high- and low-fat food (Current State x BMI: 
F1,13=5.407, p=0.037). Planned contrasts revealed that subjects with a healthy BMI 
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chose higher-fat food when fasted than when fed (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.04), 
while people who were overweight showed no effect of current state on their 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.59; see figure 5.3). There was also a suggestion that 
number of self-reported binge-eating episodes had an impact on the effect of current 
state on choices of high and low fat food (Current State x Binge-Eating: F1,13= 4.341, 
p=0.058; Current State x Diet: F1,13=0.184, p=0.675).  
 
Women: In choices made for “later”, subjects did not make different choices when 
they were fasted than when they were fed (repeated-measures ANOVA: Current 
state: F1,37=0.003, p=0.960). There was no impact of any of the weight or dietary 
variables (Current State x Diet: F1,37=0.181, p=0.358; Current State x BMI: F1,37= 
0.243, p=0.625; Current State x Binge-eating: F1,37=0.865, p=0.358).   
 
In choices made for “now”, subjects did not make different choices when they were 
fasted than when they were fed (repeated-measures ANOVA: Current state: 
F1,37=0.028, p=0.869). There was no impact of any of the weight or dietary variables 
(Current State x Diet: F1,37=0.474, p=0.496; Current State x BMI: F1,37= 0.183, 
p=0.671; Current State x Binge-eating: F1,37=0.225, p=0.638).    
 
5.2.3. Discussion 
 
 
 
Men and women differed significantly in BMI and diet and so the impact of BMI, diet 
and binge-eating on episodic measures was investigated in the sexes separately. In 
women, but not in men, it was found that subjects with higher BMIs performed worse 
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on the UFR memory test than subjects with lower BMIs, but that this effect was 
driven by a single outlier. In men, but not in women, there were effects of diet and 
BMI on PB, with a suggestion that BMI may have a general (delay independent) 
effect on the impact of current state on choices, while diet had a more specific impact 
on choices for the future. When choosing for immediate consumption, healthy 
subjects chose more high- fat food when they were fasted than when they were fed, 
while overweight subjects showed no effect of current state on their choices of high- 
and low-fat foods. When choosing for delayed consumption, subjects who reported 
low levels of dietary fat and sugar chose more high-fat food for their future selves 
when they were fasted then when they were fed. In subjects who reported high levels 
of dietary fat and sugar, however, there was no difference in choices for the future 
selves between when they were fasted and when they were fed. It is important to note 
that in neither of these instances was the lack of effect of current state due to a ceiling 
effect. In other words, this result did not stem from overweight individuals and those 
with high levels of dietary fat and sugar simply choosing the high fat food on all 
occasions. 
 
These results do not replicate the findings that BMI is associated with poor FR 
performance (Elias et al., 2003, Gunstad et al., 2006, 2010). However, this difference 
may be the result of different sampling: the subjects in Elias and colleagues’ 
experiment were hypertensive and obese, while those in the present study were mostly 
healthy with only a few overweight and obese subjects.  Elias and colleagues also 
conducted their study on a sample of US citizens, while the present study was 
conducted with British subjects. 
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A relationship was also not found between UFR and levels of dietary fat and sugar. 
This is in contrast to the findings of Francis and Stephenson (2011). This difference 
may come from the manner in which FR was assessed.  In the present study it was the 
unexpected recall of items that were presented both in text and images at various 
times across the past 2 days, while in Francis and Stephenson’s study the verbal 
paired associates (VPA) and Logical Memory subtests of the Wechsler Memory Scale 
Revised (Wechsler and Stone, 1987) were used. These tests assess recall of aurally 
presented words and stories within a 30-minute time scale. Furthermore, the need to 
recall was expected, while in the present study it was unexpected. The difference in 
findings may also be due to the different ways in which diet was reported:  Francis 
and Stephenson asked subjects to report regularity of consumption of certain foods 
over the course of the past year in terms of discrete quantities (e.g. “less than once a 
month”/ “more than 5 times a week.”) while in the present study subjects merely 
reported a subjective estimate of the regularity of their consumption of certain foods 
(e.g. “rarely” / “often”).  
 
Overall, these data indicate that may indeed be a relationship between poor diet, 
obesity and episodic cognition. However the nature of this relationship remains 
difficult to define.  It is not easy to assess, for example, the extent to which men and 
women differ in the relationship between BMI, diet and episodic cognition. While 
different results were found between the sexes, it is very difficult to establish whether 
this is a genuine sex effect or whether the differences in BMI and diet scores between 
the sexes mean that the male and female populations in this sample represent different 
eating profiles. The degrees of freedom (and large female bias) did not allow a direct 
investigation of this. One possibility is that the impact of BMI and diet on sex 
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hormones (e.g. Kirschner et al., 1990) may modulate the complex interaction of 
hormones and neuropeptides that are involved both in eating behaviour and 
hippocampal function (e.g. Lukanova et al., 2004, McTiernan et al., 2006, Hankinson 
et al., 1995, Boyapati et al., 2004, Bezemer et al., 2005); see 5.1. Introduction)  
 
One reason that this relationship may be difficult to define is that these episodic tests 
have used food-related stimuli and motivational states. The performance of subjects 
on the episodic aspects of these tests may be modulated by the effects of diet and BMI 
on response to food stimuli and motivational state independent of episodic cognition. 
Furthermore, if the mechanism through which episodic cognition allows us to cater 
for future desires is by the establishment of mentally simulated hunger or satiation, 
then differences between overweight and healthy individuals in the way in which they 
respond to hunger-inducing and satiating situations may interact with episodic 
cognition. 
 
Satiation reduces the wanting but not the liking of food 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that overweight individuals have an unusual 
response to satiation. To explore this, it is first necessary to explore the nature of the 
cognitive response to satiation. 
 
The evidence that overweight people respond differently to satiation is mixed. 
Overweight people do not differ from normal weight people in their self- reported 
satiety during and after a meal (Teghtsoonian et al., 1981). Some studies (Pliner, 
1973, Schachter, 1968, Schachter et al., 1968, Tom and Rucker, 1975) find that while 
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healthy subjects reduce their eating after ingestion, obese subjects do not. Other 
studies, however, find no significant difference between obese and healthy subjects in 
the satiating effects of ingestion (Herman and Mack, 1975, Hibscher and Herman, 
1977, Hill and McCutcheon, 1975, Nisbett, 1968b, Nisbett, 1968a, Price and Grinker, 
1973, Rodin and Slochower, 1976, Ruderman and Wilson, 1979, Wooley, 1972). A 
review of this literature (Spitzer and Rodin, 1981) found no systematic differences 
between the studies that found significant or nonsignificant results in terms of hours 
of deprivation, time between pre-feeding and meal, dual-test performance, or level of 
deception.  
 
It has been shown that food-induced satiety (Epstein et al., 2003) and imagination-
induced satiety (Morewedge et al., 2010) reduce the reinforcement value (wanting) 
but not the hedonic value (liking) of food. Thus reinforcement value of food is 
transient and responsive to contextual information (e.g. whether or not you’ve just 
eaten), while hedonic value might be considered to be more of an absolute property of 
food. There are few studies investigating the willingness of overweight subjects to 
work for food after satiation. However, Nasser and colleagues (2008) found that after 
consumption of a liquid meal, there was a significant decrease in willingness to work 
for food in healthy-weight subjects, and that willingness to work was associated with 
ratings of hunger levels. In obese subjects with binge-eating disorder, however, there 
was no decrease in willingness to work, and there was no correlation between 
willingness to work and hunger ratings. Interestingly, when these subjects were 
compared to obese subjects without binge-eating-disorder, this difference still existed, 
suggesting that this maintained willingness to work following satiation may be a 
factor of binge-eating-disorder rather than obesity per se.  
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It is possible that overweight people (or people with high levels of binge-eating) 
represent food more in terms of its hedonic value than its reinforcement value and 
thus that their attitude towards it is less liable to change according to the context. 
While all subjects consume more food when it is palatable than when it is not, there is 
a substantially greater effect of palatability on amount eaten in overweight subjects 
compared to healthy-weight subjects  (Grinker, 1975, Hill and McCutcheon, 1975, 
McKenna, 1972, Nisbett, 1968b, Nisbett, 1968a, Price and Grinker, 1973) (Rodin et 
al., 1976, Rodin and Slochower, 1976) . However it should be noted that overweight 
people do not seem to like palatable food more than healthy-weight people (de Graaf 
et al., 2005, Mela et al., 1992), but do seem to want it more. For example, overweight 
individuals are more willing to work for food rewards (Johnson, 1974, Saelens and 
Epstein, 1996, Epstein et al., 2008, Temple et al., 2008) than are healthy subjects.  
 
One potentially interesting finding in Experiment 1 was that while subjects who 
reported rarely eating high fat high sugar food chose food for future consumption 
based on their current state of hunger, subjects who reported high levels of dietary fat 
and sugar did not respond to their current state when making decisions for the future. 
It may be that this finding is the result not of the reduced tendency to employ episodic 
cognition (i.e. a reduced tendency to be biased by current feelings but instead make 
decisions based on semantic facts), but instead be the product of a tendency to 
represent food rewards in terms of hedonic value (liking) rather than reinforcement 
value (wanting). 
 
196 
In simplistic terms, the reinforcement value (“wanting”) of food and other rewards is 
thought to be mediated by the dopamine system (e.g. Berridge, 2007) while the 
hedonic value (“liking”) of those rewards is thought to be mediated by the opioid 
system (e.g. Berridge, 2007, Pecina and Berridge, 2000, 2008, Barbano and Cador, 
2007). In particular, opioids are thought to modulate the perceived palatability of food 
(Olszewski and Levine, 2007, Drewnowski et al., 1995, Levine et al., 1995, Thornhill 
et al., 1982, Dum and Herz, 1984). Binge-eating behaviour is considered to be 
hedonically driven consumption (Davis et al., 2009, 2010) because binging behaviour 
tends to occur almost entirely on highly palatable foods (e.g. Abraham and Beumont, 
1982, Hetherington and Rolls, 1991). This type of feeding involves regulation by 
opioids (Levine and Billington, 2004); rodent models of binge-eating show similar 
patterns of excessive consumption of palatable food (Hagan et al., 2002a, 2002b, 
2003). This behaviour has been successfully suppressed by opioid receptor 
antagonists, particular µ-opioid receptor antagonists (Morley et al., 1980, Giraudo et 
al., 1993, Bodnar et al., 1995, Hagan et al., 1997, Levine and Billington, 1997, Glass 
et al., 2001, e.g. Barbano and Cador, 2006, Hadjimarkou et al., 2004, Pecina and 
Berridge, 2000). 
 
Recent pharmacological attempts to treat obesity have exploited the role of the opioid 
system in hedonic experience. There has been a general movement towards using 
opioid antagonism to reduce the tendency towards hedonic (rather than metabolic) 
intake in obese individuals (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1987, Nathan and Bullmore, 2009, see 
de Zwaan and Mitchell, 1992). This type of treatment can be harnessed to directly 
compare the two possible explanations for the effect of BMI on PB.  
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One can consider the long-term representation of a food’s palatability (rather than the 
immediately perceived palatability upon tasting it) as a semantic fact about that food. 
(“Generally chocolate is nice, but I didn’t like that piece of chocolate I just ate”). 
While treatment with a µ-opioid antagonist is likely to eventually reduce the long-
term represented palatability of certain foods, extinction of responding for high-value 
rewards is generally slow, context-specific and easily reversed (e.g. Bouton and Peck, 
1992). Thus once an individual has experienced a given food as highly palatable, it 
would take extensive (and multi-context) experience of that food being unpalatable 
for this revaluation to become part of the foods long-term mental representation. Thus 
short-term treatment with a µ-opioid antagonist should produce a transitory effect of 
unpalatableness that is insufficient to alter the long-term representation of the food, 
but is sufficient to reduce current liking of it (equivalent to feeling that you didn’t like 
this chocolate, but you do like chocolate generally). These different hedonic 
representations shall herein be referred to as experienced palatability and represented 
palatability respectively. 
 
In Experiment 2, a sample of obese individuals was treated with a µ-opioid antagonist 
for 28 days. During the study, subjects (unwittingly) repeatedly took part in a PB test. 
Subjects were required to choose which food they would like to receive for a meal 
later in the day. The foods in the menu varied in their fat content, and subjects were 
either fasted or fed at the time of making this decision. The two competing hypotheses 
(namely, that obese individuals represent food in terms of palatability rather than 
reinforcement value or that obese individuals represent food in terms of its semantic 
value rather than its current value) make different predictions as to the impact of µ-
opioid treatment on performance on the PB test. If obese people represent food more 
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in terms of its hedonic value than its reinforcement value, then this transient change in 
palatability should have a similar effect on decisions for the future as satiation has in 
healthy weight subjects: it would reduce the value of food immediately after food has 
been consumed (after experience of the food having low experienced palatability) 
relative to when food has not been consumed for a long period (when this experience 
will be less salient/remembered). However, if obese individuals are unaffected by 
their current feelings, but instead make decisions according to semantic fact (i.e. 
represented palatability) then whether those are related to liking or wanting is 
irrelevant. Thus if they have recently been exposed to low experienced palatability, 
this should not affect their decisions as these will be based on represented palatability.  
There should in this case be a time-dependent effect of µ-opioid antagonism on 
performance on the PB test. In the early stages of treatment, one should see no change 
in decision-making, for despite reduced experienced palatability of the foods, this has 
not yet been translated into the long-term semantic represented palatability of the 
foods. However, after long-term treatment, this transfer into represented palatability 
should occur and overall choices for palatable food should decrease. There should not, 
however, be any change in the difference between fasted and fed conditions, as the 
drug does not affect hippocampal function. Thus the reduced impact of hippocampal-
dependant episodic cognition on decisions making (and thus on the extent to which 
decisions for the future are affected by current state) should remain the same.  
 
However, while decisions for the future should remain stable despite drug treatment, 
immediate ad lib consumption and palatability ratings should be reduced reflecting 
reduced experienced palatability of the food items.  
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The following experiment assessed the effects of 4 weeks of treatment with the µ-
opioid receptor antagonist GSK1521498 on menu choices and consumption in binge-
eating obese subjects. Furthermore, the relationship between BMI and memory is re-
investigated in an entirely obese sample using a FR test. 
 
5.3. Experiment 2 
 
5.3.1. Methods 
Subjects  
Sixty-three volunteers (44% male) aged 18-60 years (mean age 41) with moderate to 
severe binge-eating symptoms (Binge Eating Scale scores ≥ 19; mean 26.4 ± 6.7) 
(Gormally et al., 1982; Gladis et al., 1998), and classified as obese (BMI ≥ 30 kg/m2; 
mean 37.3 ± 4.76 kg/m2) took part in this study after meeting criteria and providing 
consent. The study (identification number EudraCT 2009-016663-11, 
ClinicalTrials.gov identifier NCT01195792) was conducted at Addenbrookes hospital 
and approved by Berkshire Research Ethics Committee, United Kingdom.  
 
With the exception of binge-eating symptoms, subjects had no history of DSM-IV TR 
axis-I disorders (such as depression, anxiety or eating disorders). Subjects were 
excluded from the sample if they smoked, reported large average alcohol intake (>14 
units/week), screened positive for illicit drugs on urine screen, or had taken any 
centrally active medications in the past 2 weeks.  
 
 
 
200 
Procedure 
 
This study was conducted in collaboration with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) as part of a 
multi-centre study investigating the general effects of GSK1521498 on physiology 
and feeding in obese subjects. The study utilized a double-blind placebo controlled 
parallel group design.  After a 1-week single-blind placebo run-in, subjects received 4 
weeks of treatment with either placebo (n=21), 2mg/day GSK1521498 (n=21), or 
5mg/day GSK1521498 (n=21). Doses were chosen based on the findings of Nathan 
and colleagues (2011) of those that resulted in good drug-tolerance and high steady-
state µ-opioid receptor occupancy.  
 
Given that this study was multi-centre and had many endpoints, the procedures and 
methods reported hereafter refer only to the areas of the study relevant to this thesis 
and with which I was directly or indirectly involved. These were conducted alongside 
many other investigations involving physiological and neurological effects of 
GSK1521498 which are reported elsewhere and by others (e.g. Ziaudeen et al., in 
press). In addition, to maintain simplicity, only the results from the placebo and 5-mg 
drug groups were included in the following analyses. 
 
Food palatability 
 
The effect of GSK1521498 on the experienced palatability was examined using taste-
testing of a number of dairy products that varied in fat and sugar content. At three 
timepoints during the study (Days -1, 14, and 28), subjects were asked to taste and 
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rate the palatability of these dairy products on a 9-point scale ranging from “dislike 
extremely” to “like extremely”.  
 
Consumption Levels 
 
The effect of GSK1521498 on the ad lib consumption of food was examined with the 
use of natural meal consumption. Meals were provided to the patients in their beds by 
hospital staff. These meals were in the form of buffets in which subjects were 
presented with more food than they would be able to consume: this was assessed on 
days -1, 14, and 28 of the study. Subjects were given access to several portions of a 
wide variety of main course and pudding foods. Equicaloric portions of nine foods 
containing 20% fat, 40% fat or 60% fat were provided, six of which (two of each fat 
category) were savoury “main courses” and three of which (one of each fat category) 
were sweet “puddings”. This gave subjects ad libitum access to food and allowed 
them to eat according to their preference and until they wanted to stop. Subjects were 
not informed of the fat category of their food, nor that their eating behaviour was 
being recorded. Subjects were instructed to leave all food that was not consumed on 
the plate on which they had received it. Thus the total calories consumed were 
approximated by weighing the plates before and after consumption12. 
 
Projection Bias test 
 
The foods consumed in the buffet meals were also involved in the PB test. Subjects 
were divided into two groups: the “Fasted” group and the “Fed” group. Both groups 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately homogenous foods could not be used for the study, so the weighing can only act as an 
approximation of calories consumed. 
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received a menu containing choices for that day’s dinner; the Fasted group received 
these menus before eating a large quantity of snack foods (as part of an investigation 
not reported here; approximately 11am) and the Fed group received the menus after 
the snack-food consumption (approximately 2pm). Dinner was to be received at 6 pm. 
This procedure was repeated across 4 time-points (days -1, 1, 14 and 28). 
 
The menus contained verbal descriptions of six main courses (two of each fat 
category) and three desserts (one of each fat category) that would be actually received 
later in the day. They were informed that for supply reasons they could not be 
guaranteed their first choice and that as such they should rank the foods in order of 
preference (1-6 for mains and 1-3 for desserts) and indicate how many portions (1-3 
portions) they would wish to receive of each were they to be served it.  
 
Subjects were not informed of the fat categories of the different foods, and always 
received all foods on the menu such that their choice never affected what they had the 
opportunity to learn about in terms of experienced palatability.  
 
Free Recall Test 
 
Subjects were presented with a delayed FR test as part of the Cognitive Drug 
Research (CDR) battery at the beginning of the study. A series of 15 words was 
presented at a rate of one every 2 seconds. The words consisted of a mix of one, two 
and three syllable words, matched for frequency, concreteness and imagery. The 
subjects were asked to immediately recall as many of the words as possible during a 
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period of 60 seconds (“immediate recall”). They were then asked to recall the words 
again several minutes later, also during a 60 second interval (“delayed recall”).  
 
Analysis 
 
Where assumptions of normality were met, data were analysed using repeated 
measures ANOVA, one-way ANOVAs, Pearson’s correlation and t-test. Where 
assumptions of normality were violated, nonparametric statistical tests (e.g. 
Friedman’s ANOVA, Mann-Whitney U-test, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Kendell’s 
Tau) were used. Alpha was set at 0.05. Where post hoc investigations were carried 
out, a Šidák alpha correction was used.  
 
5.3.2. Results 
 
Demographics 
 
Men and women did not differ in BMI (men: 36.23 ±5.017; women: 37.97 ±4.47; 
t[61]=-1.454, p=0.151) or age (men: 40.16 ±7.43; women: 42.17 ±11.78; t[65]=-
0.818, p=0.417).  However, because the impact of BMI and diet on episodic cognition 
were analysed in the sexes separately in Experiment 1, the performance of men and 
women on the PB test are also assessed separately here, for the sake of continuity. 
 
Taste-Testing 
GSK1521498 successfully reduced the hedonic experience of high-fat food.  There 
was a significant difference in the change in hedonic experience of high-fat and high-
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sugar food between the drug group (5mg) and the placebo group at 28 days (fat: 
t[40]=2.279, p=0.028; sugar: t[40]=2.078, p=0.044). There was also a significant 
difference between the drug treatment groups in hedonic experience of sugar and a 
trend of fat at 14 days (fat: t[40]=1.801, p=0.079; sugar: t[40]=2.527, p=0.016). 
 
Consumption 
 
Consumption levels differed between foods that varied in fat content (One way 
ANOVA, F2,54=23.817, p<0.001). Subjects consumed less of the 20% food than either 
the 40% or 60% food (20%/ 40%: t[66]=-7.668, p<0.001; 20%/ 60%: t[66]=-5.081, 
p<0.001; 40%/60%: t[66]=1.473, p=0.145). 
 
Over the course of the study, the drug group reduced their consumption of high fat 
food compared with the placebo group. On day -1, the placebo and active drug groups 
consumed the same amount of food (t[35]=0.368, p=0.715). On days 14 and 28 
however, there was a significant difference between the amount consumed by those in 
the placebo group and those in the active drug group (day 14: t[37]=2.225, p=0.032), 
day 28 (t[39]=2.330, p=0.025).  
 
For the highest-fat food (60% fat) there was no difference between the drug and 
placebo groups on days -1 (t[35]=-0.073, p=0.942) or 14 (t[37]=0.230, p=0.819) but 
the placebo group consumed significantly more than the active drug group on day 28 
(t[40]=2.368, p=0.023). 
 
 
205 
Episodic Cognition Measures 
 
Free Recall 
 The subjects remembered an average of 6.25 (±1.96) words in the immediate recall 
test and 5.30 (±4.19) words in the delayed recall test. The figures for delayed recall 
cannot be considered to differ substantially from those found in the control groups of 
other studies using the same test (Wilkinson et al. 2002: M=5.2 [one sample t-test 
t(62)=0.187, p=0.8518]; Moss et al., 1998: M= 4.6 [one sample t-test t(62)=1.3241, 
p=0.1904]). However, the immediate recall score was different from that shown in 
these studies (Wilkinson et al. 2002: M= 6.9 [one sample t-test t(62)=-2.63, p=0.01]; 
Moss et al., 1998: M= 6.7 [one sample t-test t(62)=-1.8223, p=0.073]). 
 
There was no relationship between BMI and FR (immediate: N=61, R=-0.17, 
p=0.166; delayed: N= 61, R=-0.104, p=0.416). Men and women did not differ in 
either immediate (t[61]=0.854, p=0.396) or delayed recall (t[61]=1.034, p=0.305). 
 
Projection Bias  
Rankings 
Men: The drug had no impact on the effect of current state on average rankings of 
high-fat (60%) food. There was no difference between the drug groups in the effect of 
current state, and no change over time, or change over time in the effect of the drug 
(repeated-measures ANOVA: (Day: F3,9=0.333, p=0.802; Day x Drug: F3,9=0.980, 
p=0.444; Current state x Drug x Day: F3,9=2.777, p=0.103). However there was a 
trend towards change over time in the effect of current state on the rankings of high 
fat food (Day x Current state: F3,9=3.094, p=0.082). 
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Overall, there was no difference between the ranking of high-fat food of the Fasted 
and Fed groups (t[29]=-1.242, p=0.224). There was also no difference in the average 
ranking of high fat food between placebo and active drug group on day 1 (t[17]=-
0.589, p=0.564) or on day 28 (t[18]=0.57, p=0.576). 
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Figure  5.4. A Comparison of the ranked preference for high-fat food in subjects who 
were fasted or fed in the a) placebo or b) drug group. 
 
There was no change in choices over the course of the study in either drug treatment 
group (repeated-measure ANOVA: placebo: Day: F3,4=2.701, p=0.181; active drug: 
Day: F3,3=2.026, p=0.288). There was no interaction between day of testing and 
current state in the drug group (Day x Current State: F3,3=3.750, p=0.153) although 
there was a significant interaction between day and current state in the placebo group 
(Day x Current State: F3,4=13.765, p=0.014). Error! Reference source not found. 
indicates that in drug and placebo groups there was a change from subjects in the 
Fasted group ranking 60% fat food higher than those in the Fed group, to subjects in 
the Fed group ranking 60% fat food higher than the Fasted group. However, in the 
placebo group this was a smooth gradual progression, while in the drug group the 
relationship consisted of a sudden large reversal on day 1 (t[7]=-2.574, p=0.037) 
which then reduced on subsequent visits. 
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Women: The drug had no effect on the impact of current state on rankings of high-fat 
food for future consumption (repeated-measures ANOVA: Day: F3,10=1.008, p=0.429; 
Day x Drug: F3,10=1.482, p=0.278; Day x Current state: F3,10=0.212, p=0.886; 
Current state x Drug x Day: F3,10=1.439, p=0.289).   
 
Portions 
Men: The drug had no impact on the effect of current state on number of portions of 
high-fat food requested. There was no difference between the drug and placebo 
groups in the number of portions of high-fat food requested by those who were fasted 
and those who were fed (Day: F3,9=1.211, p=0.360; Day x Drug:  F3,9=2.278, 
p=0.138; Day x Current state: F3,9=1.645, p=0.247; Current state x Drug x Day 
interaction: F3,9=1.316, p=0.328). 
 
Women: The drug had no impact on the effect of current state on the number of 
portions of high fat food requested. There was no effect of any of the variables on the 
number of portions of high fat food requested (repeated-measures ANOVA: Day: 
F3,10=0.173, p=0.912; Day x Drug: F3,10=0.745, p=0.549; Day x Current state: 
F3,10=0.747, p=0.548; Current state x Drug x Day: F3,10=1.404, p=0.298). 
 
Relationship between Memory and impact of current state on choices for the 
future. 
 
The FR test conducted at the beginning of the study was compared with the rankings 
and portions requested of high fat food. It was found that those subjects who 
requested more portions of high fat food tended to perform worse on the FR tests. 
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There was a negative correlation between number of portions of 60% fat food 
requested and immediate recall (N=42, R=-0.307, p=0.048) and a trend for delayed 
recall (N=42, R=-0.282, p=0.070). There was no correlation between ranking of 60% 
fat food and immediate (N=42, R=-0.001, p=0.994) or delayed recall (N=42, R=-
0.003, p=0.986). Because the current state manipulation was between subjects (for 
reasons to do with GSK procedure) the relationship between memory performance 
and effect of current state on decisions for the future could not be investigated 
directly. However, it was found that in the fasted group, there was a trend towards a 
negative correlation between number of portions of 60% fat food requested for the 
future and delayed recall (N=18, R=-0.435, p=0.071) but not immediate recall (N=18, 
R=-0.302, p=0.224). Neither FR test correlated with portions requested in the Fed 
group (immediate: N=24, R=-0.325, p=0.121; delayed: N=24, R=-2, p=0.350). There 
was no correlation between recall and ranking of 60% fat food in either group (fasted 
delayed: N=18, R=-0.054, p=0.83; fasted immediate: N=18, R=0.05, p=0.842; fed 
delayed: N=24, R=129, p=0.548; fed immediate: N=24, R=-0.038, p=0.862). 
5.3.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that the µ-opioid antagonist was effective in 
reducing the hedonic experience of consuming high-fat and high-sugar food and was 
also effective in reducing levels of consumption of these types of food. However, it 
had little impact on the choices individuals made for the future. 
 
The hypotheses laid out earlier suggest that were obese individuals choosing 
according to hedonics (liking) rather than motivational state (wanting) then treatment 
with an opioid antagonist would introduce a difference between choices made when 
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fasted and those made when fed. Specifically, those choosing when fasted should 
prefer higher-fat foods than those choosing when fed. If, however, subjects were 
choosing according to their long-term represented palatability of the food (semantic) 
rather than being biased by their currently experienced palatability of the food 
(episodic) then there should be no difference in the effect of current state between the 
drug groups. However, there should be a reduction in overall choice of high fat food 
after an extended treatment period during which subjects had increased experience of 
the new hedonic values of various foods. These may then be translated into a changed 
long-term represented palatability. 
 
The results are somewhat mixed, and their ability to differentiate between these two 
hypotheses is limited. However, the overall suggestion is that there was no effect of 
the opioid-antagonist on the impact of satiation on choices for the future. Thus, it 
could be tentatively suggested that the results support the hypothesis that subjects 
were choosing according to semantic representations, rather than demonstrating 
projection bias (i.e. using episodic cognition). It is likely that 28 days was not a 
sufficiently long treatment period to give subjects enough exposure to different food 
types under the effects of the drug to change their long-term representation of high fat 
high sugar food. This is consistent with the finding that subjects did not lose any 
weight during the treatment period (Ziaudeen et al., in press). The amount of bias 
from current desires on future-oriented decision-making did not change with drug 
treatment. I suggest this is because the drug did not affect hippocampal function, but 
simply altered current feelings towards food. 
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An interesting finding was that subjects in this study differed significantly from other 
“normal” samples in immediate FR. This may suggest that, as found in Experiment 1 
(and demonstrated by others: (e.g. Elias et al., 2003, Elias et al., 2005, Gunstad et al., 
2010, Gunstad et al., 2006), there is a relationship between BMI and episodic memory 
impairment. There was also a correlation suggesting that the better subjects performed 
on the recall tests, the fewer portions they tended to request. This relationship is 
difficult to interpret because we cannot look directly at the impact of current state on 
portions requested.  
 
There are some limitations of this study that may have reduced its power to 
differentiate between the hypotheses. In particular, counterbalancing issues13 meant 
that the sample size for each of the groups was relatively small (placebo: fasted N=10; 
fed N=11; 5mg: fasted N=8; fed N=13), which reduced the power of the study.  
 
 
5.4. General Discussion 
 
In Experiment 1, a significant negative relationship was found between UFR Memory 
and BMI among women, but this was driven by a single outlier. No correlation was 
found in men. There was no relationships were found between UFR and levels of 
reported dietary fat and sugar or levels of reported binge eating (as calculated by the 
EDE-Q; (Fairburn and Beglin, 2008). In men, but not women, a significant 
relationship was found between the effect of current state on decisions for the future 
(projection bias) and levels of self-reported dietary fat and sugar. It was shown that 
                                                 
13 This was caused by my not being informed of the introduction by GSK of a 2mg drug group, 
resulting in the drug groupings to be 3-way rather than dichotomous.  
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men who consumed low levels of fat and sugar showed a current-state-consistent bias 
in their decisions for the future (more high-fat food when fasted) while men who 
reported high levels of dietary fat and sugar showed a current-state-inconsistent bias 
in their decisions for the future (more high-fat food when fed).  Thus the data do, very 
tentatively, support the idea that there is a relationship between obesity, diet and 
episodic cognition, but that this relationship is not a simple one.  
 
In Experiment 2, it was found that there was no projection bias (i.e. current state had 
no impact on choices for the future) in an obese sample, and that µ-opioid antagonism 
had little-to-no effect on PB. While in men, but not women, there was an interaction 
between day, drug-group and current state, Error! Reference source not found. 
appears to suggest that this derives from increased volatility/variability in decision 
making in the drug group, rather than a trend in a particular direction. These data 
cautiously support the hypothesis that the lack of projection bias in overweight 
individuals is due to reliance on the semantic representation of foods palatability, 
rather than current experience of it. 
 
In both Experiment 1 and 2, methodological issues may have contributed to the lack 
of clarity within the data. In Experiment 1, the reliance on an internet-based study 
using people’s actual meal consumption to induce satiety may have meant that people 
were neither fully hungry nor fully satiated at the time of completing the test. Indeed, 
the data from the underweight subjects suggest that when instructed to complete the 
survey immediately after a meal, they still reported having been more than 10 hours 
since their last meal. In addition, the choice of some relatively unpopular foods meant 
data were lost.  In Experiment 2, lack of control over testing led to problems with 
212 
counterbalancing. In both experiments, the distribution and sampling may have 
limited the efficacy of the investigation. In Experiment 1, the proportion of subjects 
that were overweight or obese was low such that much of the variation in BMI and 
diet were among the healthy population. This may have reduced the ability to detect 
the impact of unhealthy weight and diet on episodic cognition. Experiment 2 suffered 
from the opposite problem as it lacked a healthy control. This means that it was not 
possible to assess the impact of obesity itself on the variables, rather than the impact 
of the drug treatment on obese subjects. 
 
The findings contained in this chapter appear to refute the final prediction laid out in 
Chapter 1: that different tests of episodic cognition should be affected in the same 
way in the same patients. It seems that factors that cause deficits in free recall do not 
also cause deficits projection bias, and vice versa. Specifically, diet appears to affect 
performance on the PB test and BMI appears to impair performance on UFR 
(although the issue with the outlier means that there may be no relationship). Does 
this suggest that these tests are subserved by different neural/psychological processes? 
The independence of these effects may be a product of the testing method. In the diet 
questionnaire (Experiment 1) participants were asked “how often” they eat certain 
foods, but this does not assess the quantity consumed on each occasion. It may be that 
the results presented here in fact indicate that regular consumption of high-fat high, 
high-sugar food has a different impact on episodic cognition as compared to regular 
consumption of large quantities of high-fat, high-sugar food. However, it is also 
possible that obesity and high fat high sugar diet impact different regions of the 
hippocampus, and that these are differentially recruited by different episodic 
cognition tests: It has been found that FR performance is heavily dependent on the 
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entorhinal cortex, but relatively independent of the function of the dentate gyrus 
(Brickman et al., 2011), while the dentate gyrus (but not the entorhinal cortex) which 
has an important role in pattern separation (Bakker et al., 2008). Pattern separation 
and may be integral to separating representations of different, yet similar, experiences 
(such as motivational states originating in imagined events and those currently 
experienced). Recent evidence suggests that blood glucose levels are associated with 
damage to the dentate gyrus, but not other areas of the hippocampus (Brickman et al., 
2011, Wu et al., 2008), while high circulating insulin levels have been associated with 
damage to entorhinal cortex function (e.g. Wu et al., 2008). Thus it is possible that the 
entorhinal cortex function (and therefore FR) may be affected by obesity 
independently of diet, while high levels of dietary sugar (causing high blood-glucose 
levels) may, independently of BMI, selectively affect functioning of the dentate gyrus, 
causing problems with pattern separation (and therefore with the PB test). These ideas 
warrant further investigation.  
214 
Chapter 6  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
At present there exist several distinct literatures on episodic cognition. The 
comparative cognition literature has chiefly been concerned with answering the 
question of which animals can be said to possess episodic cognition. The 
developmental literature has chiefly focussed on answering the question of when 
children develop episodic cognition. The cognitive neuroscience literature has been 
chiefly concerned with where in the brain episodic cognition is routed. Finally, the 
medical literature is concerned with why some individuals suffer deficits. Around and 
through each and all of these literatures can be found those concerned with 
theoretical, philosophical and intuitive notions of what episodic cognition is.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to bring together not only disparate conceptions of episodic 
cognition (as represented by tests emphasising different features) but also literatures 
concerned with different experimental subjects. The results are reviewed in detail later 
in the chapter. Broadly speaking, they suggest considerable inconsistencies in the 
results obtained with different tests, suggesting that they may not be assessing the 
same underlying psychological process.  
 
Unlike many phenomena (notable examples being language and tool-use) there are 
not multiple official definitions of episodic cognition proposed by different theorists. 
There is (arguably) a single original theorist of episodic cognition – Endel Tulving. 
However, there is not a single original theory of episodic cognition, because Tulving’s 
concepts of it have evolved dramatically over time (e.g. Tulving et al., 1972, Tulving, 
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1983, Tulving, 2002). A central aspect of all manifestations of the theory concerns the 
phenomenology of episodic memory as a mental re-experience of a previous event. 
However the specifics of this defining phenomenology have evolved over time so as 
to allow for the continued inclusion of a second defining feature: that episodic 
cognition is late-developing and uniquely human (Tulving, 2005).  While few 
researchers and theorists question the validity of the first defining feature, the second 
has divided opinions, in part because the statement is not based on evidence, but on 
intuition.  
 
Everyone has their own experiences to draw upon when forming their beliefs, and will 
always interpret and apply theories in the light of these experiences. “we know what 
mental time travel is because we can introspectively observe ourselves doing it and 
because people spend so much time talking about their recollections and 
anticipations” (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, p.301). The difficulty with such a 
statement is that this personal “knowledge” of the phenomena informs, but also 
potentially clouds, our ability as humans to understand episodic cognition from any 
other perspective. Tulving’s later (1983, 2002) definitions incorporate this 
introspective element as defining the form of consciousness necessary for episodic 
cognition. This recourse to personal experience and intuition when interpreting theory 
and evidence is useful in that it helps to keep psychological science grounded in 
“common sense”. However, excess of this strategy leaves the field at risk of 
“surrendering to intuition” (Barr, 2007, p.315) rather than pursuing experimental 
investigation and, potentially, in the face of empirical evidence. What evidence is 
there that episodic cognition requires introspective self-awareness, other than that we 
as humans experience it in this context? 
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The different manifestations of Tulving’s theory of episodic cognition (e.g. , 1972, 
1983, 2002) as well as the different representations and interpretations that have been 
born out of them (e.g. Clayton and Dickinson, 1998, Zentall et al., 2001, Suddendorf 
and Corballis, 1997, Schacter et al., 1984, Levine, 2004) have led to the development 
of a wide range of tests that are considered to assess episodic cognition. Each of these 
tests emphasize different elements of episodic cognition (e.g. the spatiotemporal 
context of a unique past experience: (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998); automatic/non-
deliberate encoding: (Zentall et al., 2001); awareness of self-in-time: (Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 1997, Levine, 2004); representational theory of mind: (Perner, 1990, 
Perner, 1991, Perner, 2000); disengaging from current feelings: (Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 1997). Furthermore, there is contradiction as to whether certain “classic” 
memory tests, such as cued recall, can be said to assess episodic cognition (e.g. 
Tulving, 1985, Fletcher et al., 1995b). Indeed, some theorists propose contradictory 
accounts of these tests within a single publication (e.g. Wheeler et al., 1997; see 
Chapter 1). Add to this the tasks and theories that have developed relatively 
independently of theories of episodic cognition but nonetheless overlap on several key 
elements (e.g. Long-term Memory, Declarative Memory, Delayed Imitation; as well 
as various literatures within social and consumer psychology and economics), and the 
resulting picture is not easy to interpret. 
 
One might thus consider that there are two levels of fractionation in the episodic 
cognition literature. The first is theoretical - there exist many distinct yet overlapping 
concepts of episodic cognition. The second is empirical - there are many distinct, yet 
overlapping, fields of study depending on the experimental subject. This thesis 
represents an attempt to cohere elements of these two fractionations; to bring together 
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research using different techniques (born out of different theoretical conceptions) and 
different research subjects to ask the questions: What is Episodic Cognition, Where 
does it exist, When does it develop and Why does it fail? 
 
The thesis concentrated on four putative tests of episodic cognition: What-Where-
When, which assesses memory for spatiotemporal relations (Clayton and Dickinson, 
1998, Tulving et al., 1972); The Unexpected Question Test, which assesses memory 
for unattended events (Zentall et al., 2001, Zentall et al., 2008, Morris and Frey, 
1997); The Free Recall test of uncued memory for items on a list (Tulving, 1985b) 
and the Bischof-Köhler/Projection Bias test for the ability to disengage from current 
feelings in order to consider future needs (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).  
 
The overarching prediction was that, to the extent to which these different tests assess 
the same underlying ability, one would expect them to: 
 
1. Be phylogenetically consistent (i.e. if given species passes one test they should 
be more likely to pass another). 
2. Be related in development (i.e. performance should improve at the same rate 
and in the same pattern in children).  
3. Be related in maturity (i.e. adult humans who perform better at one should also 
perform better than the others).  
4. Be affected in the same way in the same patients (factors that cause deficits in 
one should cause deficits in the others). 
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These four predictions were addressed in the four empirical chapters. Chapter 2 
explored the evidence for episodic cognition in animals. There was a suggestion that 
those species that had been found to pass some tests of episodic cognition also 
perform well on the others. However, much of the research on animals is difficult to 
interpret due to the potentially major impact of extra-target factors (such as 
associative learning and executive demands) that may lead to “illegitimate” successes 
or failures. Two experiments were presented in a previously untested species - the 
Eurasian jay. This species is an intensive food-storing corvid which caches both 
perishable and non-perishable food throughout the year (e.g. Clayton et al., 1996). It 
was thus argued to be a good candidate for a species whose ecological pressures 
might have selected for the development of episodic cognition (e.g. Grodzinski and 
Clayton, 2010). Eurasian jays were shown to be capable of conceiving of a future 
motivational state different from that which they currently experienced (as assessed 
by the Bischof-Köhler test). The findings of the second experiment were equivocal, 
failing to provide convincing evidence that Eurasian jays are capable of remembering 
what they have cached, where and when (as assessed by the What-Where-When test). 
Considerable further investigation is required before the question of whether 
performance on different putative tests of episodic cognition is phylogenetically 
consistent. 
 
Chapter 3 explored the literature on memory and planning development in children, 
concluding that there was little to no evidence for the asynchronous development of 
multiple memory systems, and in particular little evidence to suggest that episodic 
cognition “emerges” at a given point in development. However, as with the animal 
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cognition literature, a proliferation of different assessment techniques (and 
interpretation/classification of these techniques) limits the interpretability of the 
literature as a whole. An experiment was presented in which the same sample of 3-6-
year-old children were tested on three putative tests of episodic memory (What-
Where-When, Unexpected Question and Free Recall); one putative test of both 
semantic and episodic memory (Cued Recall) and one putative test of episodic 
foresight (Bischof-Köhler). It was found that performance on all these tests increased 
gradually between the ages of 3- and 6-years. There was considerable inter-correlation 
between performance on all the memory tests, but much of this was lost when age was 
partialled out. There are two possible interpretations to this finding; one is that, 
beyond general cognitive development, there was little relationship between 
performance on these different tests in children. The other is that the developmental 
trajectory of these different tests was so similar that the interrelationship between 
them is heavily intertwined with increasing age. To investigate this possibility, the 
similarity of the developmental trajectories was assessed. The analysis revealed a non-
significant trend towards differences in the developmental trajectory of performance 
on the different tests, suggesting that the developmental trajectories may not have 
been sufficiently identical to mask age-independent correlations. Finally, there was 
little to no relationship between performance on the memory tests and performance on 
the Bischof-Köhler test, beyond the slight suggestion of a negative relationship with 
Unexpected Question performance.  
 
Given the lack of internal consistency in the developmental cognition literature 
regarding the development of episodic cognition, the results of this study provide 
some refutation of the second prediction of the thesis: that performance on different 
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tests of episodic cognition should be related in development. However, because this 
age range (3-6) is a period of great development generally, it may be that immaturity 
of non-mnemonic factors (such as language and executive functions) may 
differentially affect performance on different tests. Thus to interpret these results it 
was necessary to conduct the same experiment with human adults. 
 
There is extensive research on episodic cognition in human adults. However adult 
humans’ ability to verbally report their memories has led to development of very 
different paradigms for assessment in this field as compared with the two literatures 
previously discussed (comparative and developmental psychology). This extensive 
use of highly verbal techniques to assess episodic cognition (e.g. Addis and Schacter, 
2008, Addis et al., 2009, Hassabis and Maguire, 2007, Schacter et al., 2007) means 
that the more behavioural tasks have been less widely investigated. Chapter 4 
reviewed research using the target paradigms (What-Where-When, Unexpected 
Question, Free Recall and Bischof-Köhler/Projection Bias) in healthy human adults. 
Preliminary studies (e.g. Holland and Smulders, 2011, Easton et al., 2012) suggest 
that there may be relationships between performance on some of these different 
memory tests.  
 
An experiment was presented in which the three putative tests of episodic memory 
(What-Where-When, Unexpected Question and Free Recall) and one putative test of 
episodic foresight (Bischof-Köhler/Projection Bias) were presented to the same 
sample of healthy young adults. It was found that performance on all these tests was 
interconnected, but not always in a linear fashion. This finding suggested that multiple 
processes contribute to performance on these tasks, and that all these processes may 
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not always be shared by different tasks. Following from the finding of a possible 
negative relationship between Unexpected Question and Bischof-Köhler in the 
developmental data, it was found that memory performance (and particularly 
performance on the Unexpected Question test) was inversely related with performance 
on the Projection Bias test. Thus those subjects that had better memories for non-focal 
elements of the experiment were more biased by their current motivational state when 
making decisions for the future than those subjects with poorer memory performance. 
Thus while these results support the third prediction of the thesis (namely, that 
performance on the different tests should be related in maturity) the full picture is 
manifestly more complex, with evidence for contributions from other, non-shared, 
processes. 
 
The final empirical chapter (Chapter 5) explored the possibility that obesity and high 
levels of dietary fat and sugar may lead to damage to episodic cognition. There is 
mounting evidence for an association between excess body weight, poor diet and 
impaired hippocampal function. This evidence is both from human subjects and 
animal models, and is both behavioural (e.g. spatial memory tests) and neurological 
(e.g. measurements of hippocampal LTP). Given that patient groups with damage to 
the hippocampus show deficits in episodic cognition (e.g. Scoville and Milner, 1957, 
Addis et al., 2007, Isaacs et al., 2000, Golomb et al., 1993) it was predicted that 
episodic cognition deficits would also be evident in overweight individuals and those 
with high levels of dietary fat and sugar. Furthermore, it was predicted that to the 
extent to which different putative tests of episodic cognition test the same underlying 
psychological process, they should be similarly affected by body mass index (BMI) 
and diet. 
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These predictions were assessed in two experiments. In the first experiment 
individuals from the normal population who varied in BMI and dietary fat and sugar 
were tested on an Unexpected Free Recall test and a Projection Bias test. It was found 
that BMI and diet differentially effected performance on these tests. There was a 
suggestion that, (only in women and when an outlier is included), subjects with higher 
BMIs performed worse on the memory test. There was also a suggestion (only in 
men) that subjects with higher levels of dietary fat and sugar were less biased by their 
current motivational state in the projection bias test. In the second experiment, Free 
Recall and Projection Bias were assessed in a sample of obese binge-eating subjects. 
In the Projection Bias test, current state was manipulated by reduction of hedonic 
experience (µ-opioid antagonism) rather than satiety (as was used in the previous 
experiments and chapters). It was found that obese binge-eating subjects were 
significantly impaired on the Free Recall test, and did not show a projection bias (i.e. 
were unbiased by their current motivational state when choosing food for future 
consumption). Taken together, these findings cautiously suggest that performance on 
these different episodic cognition tests is differentially affected by harmful lifestyle 
factors (e.g. poor diet and obesity). This provides some refutation for the fourth 
prediction of the thesis: That performance on all the tests should be affected in the 
same way in the same patients.  
 
In summary, the evidence contained within this thesis suggests that, while there are 
relationships between different putative tests of episodic cognition, these are by no 
means robust or straightforward. Indeed, far from there being a one-to-one 
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relationship between performance on memory tests that have risen from different 
theoretical perspectives, there is often not even so much as a linear correlation.  
 
Do Different Tests of Episodic Cognition Test the Same Psychological Process? 
 
So what does this mean for the question as to what extent different tests of episodic 
cognition are assessing the same psychological process? I suggest that the answer lies 
in the question, or rather the assumption inherent within it. Episodic cognition is not a 
process, it’s a system. There is not a single neural basis of episodic cognition; there is 
an extensive neural network (see Figure  6.1).  The functioning of the network as a 
whole will thus be differently affected by injury, loss, underdevelopment or absence 
of different component parts. Similarly, tests born out of theories that differentially 
emphasize different parts of the system will likely measure individual differences in 
functioning of different brain regions. 
 
 
Figure  6.1 depicts a simplified (and by no means exhaustive) representation of the 
neural substrates thought to be involved in episodic cognition. Consideration of the 
functional, evolutionary and developmental differences between various components 
of this extensive network emphasizes the problems inherent in investigating what 
defines episodic cognition, where and when it evolved and when it develops.  
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Figure  6.1. A simplified representation of the brain regions shown to be involved in 
episodic cognition. The cross-sections show a lateral view of the cortex (top left), a 
medial view of the cortex (top right), a medial view of the striatum (bottom right) and 
a cross-section of the hippocampal formation (bottom left). The central picture 
combines these elements with an illustration of the connective white matter. Each 
“region” is identified by a different colour.  Each of these regions has been suggested 
to have a distinct function in episodic memory and/or episodic foresight (Suzuki et al., 
2002, 2003, Gaffan et al., 2000, 2004, Dolan et al., 2000, Murray and Mishkin, 1998, 
Squire and Zola, 1998, 1991, Zola-Morgan et al., 1983, Eichenbaum, 2000, 2007, 
Ennaceur et al., 1997, Sauvage et al., 2010, Fletcher et al., 1995a, Fletcher et al., 
1995b, Fletcher et al., 1995c, Fletcher et al., 1997, Fletcher et al., 1998a, Fletcher et 
al., 1998b, Rugg et al., 1999, Shallice et al., 1994, Simons et al., 2008a, Simons et al., 
2005, Simons et al., 2008b, Rugg et al., 2002, Henson et al., 1999, Graham and 
Hodges, 1997, Poldrack and Gabrieli, 1998, Smith and Jonides, 1999, Brickman et 
al., 2011, Bakker et al., 2008, Dobbins et al., 2002, Dobbins et al., 1998, Dobbins et 
al., 2003, Okuda et al., 2007, Cansino et al., 2002, Ranganath et al., 2003, Ranganath 
et al., 2000, Ranganath and Paller, 2000, Peters and Buchel, 2010, Squire et al., 
1992, Levine et al., 1998, Markowitsch, 1995, Nyberg et al., 2003, Nyberg et al., 
1996, Szpunar et al., 2007) 
 
 
Damage to various of the regions of the episodic network have been shown to result 
in episodic cognition deficits, suggesting that integrity of many different regions is 
crucial to “normal” episodic cognition in human adults (e.g. Incisa della Rocchetta, 
1986, Smith and Milner, 1984, Wheeler et al., 1995, Schacter et al., 1984, Klein et al., 
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2002, Tulving, 1985, Levine et al., 1998, Scoville and Milner, 1957). These different 
brain regions have changed differently over the course of evolution. Some central 
regions, such as the hippocampus, are evolutionarily ancient and can be considered to 
be shared by phylogenetically distant taxa such as birds and mammals (e.g. Szekely, 
1999, Ariëns Kappers et al., 1936, Benowitz and Karten, 1976, Campbell and Hodos, 
1970, Kuhlenbeck, 1938), while others are thought to have expanded dramatically in 
recent human evolution (e.g. the prefrontal cortex:Flinn et al., 2005, Deacon, 1997, 
Holloway, 1968, Holloway, 1996, Semendeferi and Damasio, 2000, Semendeferi et 
al., 2002, Rilling and Insel, 1999, Zilles et al., 1988, Preuss, 1999, Nimchinsky et al., 
1999). However, even for these “recently evolved” brain areas, there are functional 
homologues in other taxa such as birds (e.g. Gunturkun, 2005a, Gunturkun, 2005b, 
Jarvis et al., 2005) that have been shown to be expanded in those species that show 
many examples of intelligent behaviour (e.g. Lefebvre et al., 1997, but see Rattenborg 
and Martinez-Gonzalez, 2011). Finally, these different brain regions develop at 
different rates in human infancy, with some, such as much of the hippocampus, being 
considered fully formed in the early stages of prenatal development (Seress et al., 
2001, Angevine, 1975, Arnold and Trojanowski, 1996b, Arnold and Trojanowski, 
1996a) and some taking many months or years of postnatal development (e.g. Dentate 
Gyrus: Seress and Mrzljak, 1992, Seress and Ribak, 1988, Eckenhoff and Rakic, 
1988, Altman and Das, 1965; Prefrontal Cortex: Huttenlocher, 1979, Huttenlocher, 
1990, Carver and Bauer, 2001). 
 
In short, assessing which animals, and children of which particular age, “have” 
episodic cognition by focussing on a feature that may rely on a single region, or even 
a small cluster of regions, is much like defining the presence or absence of a skeleton 
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by focusing on a particular bone. Moreover, defining the presence of episodic 
cognition by the full-functioning presence of all regions may confine episodic 
cognition to a precious few individuals, even within our own species. As the evidence 
from Chapter 5 suggests, apparently simple aspects of an individual’s every-day life 
such as diet can have measurable impact on episodic function. It may be that all of us 
are in different ways and degrees “amnesic”, depending on our “poison of choice”. 
Thus the literature may thus be better focused on understanding the different elements 
of episodic cognition rather than concentrating on all-or-nothing definitions.  
 
Of course the concept of there being different “elements” of episodic cognition is not 
a new one. Indeed, “elements of episodic memory” was the title of Tulving’s (1983) 
book, and the fact of an episodic network is central to much of the neurocognitive 
literature. However, this seems to be under-appreciated in the fields of developmental 
and comparative psychology. Episodic cognition is often discussed as a single entity 
that is either present or absent (but see Clayton and colleagues (2003b) for an 
acknowledgement of its multifaceted features). This may in part have developed as a 
response to the challenge of whether or not episodic cognition is uniquely human. 
Even where such all-or-none approaches are criticised, this is often in favour of a 
linear simple-to-complex continuum (e.g. Barr, 2007). It is clear that this narrowness 
is not due to ignorance of the many complex contributions of different processes, but 
to definitions of episodic cognition that deliberately and self-consciously include only 
episodic cognition as it exists in healthy, young, human adults (e.g. Tulving, 1983, 
2002, Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007). However, even if one accepts this 
narrow (and, some might say, anthropocentric) definition, there is still little agreement 
as to what defines the healthy adult human experience of episodic cognition. 
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As it stands, there is a proliferation of behavioural tests that have arisen out of these 
different conceptions of episodic cognition. The evidence presented in this thesis 
suggests that each of these assess slightly different elements of episodic cognition. At 
present, this proliferation of semi-related tests could be considered to be a 
weakness/limitation of the field. However, if approached in the right way, it has the 
potential to be a great strength. 
 
Brickman and colleagues (2011) recently assessed whether different standardised tests 
of memory/hippocampal function (e.g. the picture recognition component of the 
Benton visual retention test, and the delayed free recall component of the Selective 
Reminding test) drew on activation of the same areas of the hippocampus. They found 
that there was a double dissociation, with the delayed recall test relying heavily on the 
entorhinal cortex, and the picture recognition test drawing upon the dentate gyrus. 
Such findings allow clinicians to assess functionality of different brain regions 
without the need for scanning. Thus instead of maintaining several parallel 
investigations of episodic cognition using different, and somewhat non-comparable, 
methodologies the episodic cognition literature may be in a position to combine the 
data and expertise from currently different fields into a singularly useful tool. The 
ability to have a range of tasks that differentially assess different aspects of episodic 
cognition could, on the one hand, be usefully included into a battery that might be 
used to assess the episodic system as a whole (rather than narrowly defined elements 
of it). On the other hand, these tasks may also allow behavioural identification of 
specific functioning deficits within the brain. Such a battery could begin to address the 
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findings that standard neuropsychological tests of memory tend not to be related to 
the experience of memory complaints in everyday life (e.g. Plancher et al., 2010)..  
 
Episodic Bias? 
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of the research contained within this thesis was 
the negative relationship between performance on the Bischof Köhler/Projection Bias 
tests and performance on tests of episodic memory (in particular the Unexpected 
Questions test). Specifically, it was found that those that performed better on the UEQ 
memory test tended to be more biased by their current state when choosing for the 
future. This finding is in contrast to the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis which suggests 
that episodic cognition is necessary for planning for motivational states different to 
those currently experienced (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997). In Chapter 4 a possible 
account for this finding was discussed. It is possible that because of its constructive 
and experiential nature, episodic cognition is particularly vulnerable to bias from 
current feelings. As such, those individuals with a greater tendency to use episodic 
cognition to plan for future needs and/or have more “vivid” episodic experiences of 
their potential future, are more likely to mistakenly incorporate their current feelings 
into their representation of their future state. But how does this account cohere with 
the picture of episodic cognition presented in Chapter 2? Here it was discussed that 
episodic cognition may allow an action’s temporally distant consequences to be “felt” 
in the present and thus act as a counter-motivation against current desires (Boyer, 
2008a). This account suggests that the evolutionary function of episodic cognition 
may have been in bringing future motivational states into the present and thus 
encouraging prospective behaviour.  
229 
 
These two accounts are not necessarily contradictory. It may be that, from an 
evolutionary perspective, the development of episodic cognition allowed future needs 
to gain some motivational salience in the present, but this motivational change is 
limited. The “pre-experience” of a future state (if you take Boyer’s account: 2008) or 
appropriate “re-experience” or a previous state (as might be suggested by Dickinson’s 
MAT model: (2011)) does not result in the organism replacing their current feelings 
with those of their future self, but merely altering their current state to a point that lies 
somewhere between their current state and their future state (see Lowenstein and 
colleagues (2003) for a mathematical model of a similar idea). This would lead to 
behaviour that was future-oriented to a degree, but still substantially biased by current 
state. In contrast, logical inference about one’s likely future state without recourse to 
“pre-experience” would not be so vulnerable to influence from current state (although 
may be influenced by current semantic beliefs). As such, it may be that the 
evolutionary development of episodic cognition allows an organism to act in the 
present in a way that secures some future benefit, but that in an organism possessing a 
range of prospective cognitive skills, episodic cognition may not be the most 
appropriate tool with which to predict and plan for future needs.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Taken together, the empirical results from chapters 2-5 showed that there is not a 
clear linear relationship between different putative tests of episodic cognition in jays, 
children, adults or patients. It was suggested that these tests may tap different 
components of the episodic system, and that they may be differentially influenced by 
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extra-target factors. Further research should concentrate on reducing the influence of 
extra-target factors by making the tasks entirely nonverbal and reducing the executive 
demands by making the scenarios simple and easy to understand and reducing the 
need for self-control. An episodic cognition ‘battery’ including these tasks could form 
a useful neuropsychological tool for assessing the episodic system as a whole and 
may be more effective at assessing deficits that are experienced in everyday life than 
current standardised tests. Development of such a battery would benefit greatly from 
fMRI investigation of the neural correlates of performance on each task, as well as 
investigation with patients with specific lesions. Finally, the results contained within 
this thesis pose a double refutation of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis (Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 1997). Not only was a nonhuman animal shown to be capable of planning 
for future needs (Chapter 2), but there was a negative relationship Bischof-
Köhler/Projection Bias task and episodic memory tests in human adults. This finding 
may suggest that episodic cognition is an inherently ineffective means by which to 
disengage from a current motivational state to provide for one’s future self. Perhaps 
episodic cognition allows an organism without the capacity for detailed 
semantic/logical consideration of likely future cause-effect scenarios (e.g. “large 
meals lead to satiety”) to reduce, if not eliminate, the impact of current desires on 
behaviour.  
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Appendix 1. 
Menu Creation 
 
Nine subjects rated 68 pictures of chocolate-based, lemon-based or neutral puddings 
on three scales: how chocolatey and how citrusy, each on a 6-point scale ranging from 
“highly” to “not at all”, and how thirst-inducing on a 6-point scale ranging from 
“would help quench my thirst” to “would help make me more thirsty” (see Figure 
7.1). Items were chosen to appear in the same menu only if they differed substantially 
from the other menu items according to their category (e.g. the chosen chocolatey 
items were rated as significantly more chocolatey than the neutral or citrusy items). 
The items were then coded into “highly thirst-inducing”/”not at all thirst-inducing”, 
“highly chocolatey”/”not at all chocolatey”, “highly citrusy”/”not at all citrusy” and 
allocated 1/0 points in these categories respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
Figure 7.1. Example ranking sheet 
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The foods were divided into six categories: High Chocolatey/High Refreshing, High 
Chocolatey/Low Refreshing, High Citrusy/High Refreshing, High Citrusy/Low 
Refreshing, Low Chocolatey and Citrusy/High Refreshing, and Low Chocolatey and 
Citrusy/Low Refreshing. Items were selected to be included in the menus if they 
scored very high or very low on the appropriate scale. After the menus were 
constructed they were analysed using repeated measure ANOVA to make sure that the 
items of the different categories differed significant from each other in terms of how 
citrusy, how chocolatey and how thirst-inducing/refreshing (see Table  6-1). 
 
Table  6-1. Within-menu differences between foods on the variables of “how 
chocolatey”, “how citrusy” and “how thirst-inducing”.  
 Chocolatey Citrusy Refreshing/thirst inducing 
Menu 1 F=154, 
p<0.001 
F=79.5, 
p<0.001 
F=14.27, p<0.001 
Menu 2 F=108.592, 
p<0.001 
F=68.934, 
p<0.001 
F=30.818, p<0.001 
Menu 3 F=187.145, 
p<0.001 
F=96.699, 
p<0.001 
F=20.16, p<0.001 
Menu 4 F=111.680, 
p<0.001 
F=82.754, 
p<0.001 
F=65.579, p<0.001 
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Appendix 2. 
Validation of Satiety Procedure 
Methods 
 
The pre-feeding procedure was piloted on thirteen subjects (six male, seven female). 
Participants were presented with eight menus, each containing six food items. Four of 
these menus were “distracter” menus containing savoury food and four were “test” 
menus which contained sweet food. In the test menus, the food was divided according 
to three categories: “ Chocolatey”, “Citrusy” and “Refreshing”. Two items were 
chocolate-based, two items were citrus-based and two were neutral. Within these, one 
of each was highly refreshing (e.g. sorbet/milkshake) and one of each was highly 
thirst-inducing (e.g. chocolate fudge brownie/lemon drizzle cake). Subjects ranked the 
foods from 1 to 6 based on how much they would like to receive that food right now 
(see Figure  4.2) 
 
After completing half the menus (four distracter and four test) subjects underwent the 
pre-feeding procedure, which was presented to them as a “taste test”. Subjects were 
split into two groups (Pre-fed-chocolate and Pre-fed-citrus) and presented with 27 
questions asking about specific features of six foods. The Pre-fed-chocolate group 
received and compared six chocolate-based foods and drinks (Frijj® Milkshake, 
Mars® Milkshake, Sainsbury’s Basics® Chocolate Mousse, Cadbury’s Button’s 
Chocolate Mousse®, Sainsbury’s Basics® Milk Chocolate and Cadbury’s Dairy 
Milk®), while the Pre-fed-citrus group received and compared six citrus-based foods 
and drinks (Satsuma, Clementine, and four squash drinks, the latter made up of 
differing proportions of Sainbury’s Basics® Orange Squash and Robinson’s® Lemon 
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Squash, matched for strength). To encourage maximum consumption the participants 
were asked to re-try the food and drink for every question. 
 
After the pre-feeding period, subjects completed the final four menus, which 
contained non-identical but comparable foods. Again, they were asked to rank the 
foods from 1 to 6 based on how much they would like to receive it right now.  
 
Subjects’ “before” and “after” scores were calculated by multiplying the category 
score of each food (e.g. whether it was highly thirst-inducing” etc.) by the rank, and 
then summing the resulting numbers for each set of menus (before/after). Thus, if 
highly thirst-inducing foods were ranked 1st, 3rd and 6th in the first “before” menu 
and 2nd, 4th and 5th in the second “before” menu, the subject would receive a “before” 
score of 21. A difference score between “before” and “after” menu choices were 
calculated by subtracting the after score from the before score. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 7.2 shows that the pre-feeding manipulation had an effect on subject’s choices 
for food for right now. Repeated-measures ANOVA with the food categorisation 
(chocolatey, citrusy, refreshing) as within-subjects and pre-feeding type as between-
subjects factor showed an interaction between the factors (F=4.994, p=0.016). Post 
hoc analyses indicated that there was a significant difference between the pre-feeding 
groups on refreshing/thirst-inducing foods (p=0.008), but not on citrusy/non-citrusy 
foods (p=0.662) or chocolatey/non-chocolatey foods (p=0.043) (Sidak correction, 
alpha=0.0169).  
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Figure  6.2. Effect of Pre-feeding manipulation on subject’s choices for right now. 
Bars show mean difference in choices between before and after pre-feeding. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The pre-feeding test significantly affected choices for food for right now, suggesting 
that it is effective in causing specific satiety. Due to the more robust effect of pre-
feeding on change in choices for refreshing items, only analysis into refreshing/thirst-
inducing foods will be continued into the main study.  
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Appendix 3  
Pre-feeding questions: 
Citrus group 
 
Which do you think is sweeter? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which do you think is sweeter? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which do you think is sweeter? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which do you think is healthier? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which do you think is healthier? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which do you think is more 
flavoursome? 
Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which is more “citrusy”? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which is more “citrusy”? Drink 1 Drink2 
Which is more “citrusy”? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which do you prefer? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which do you prefer? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which do you prefer? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which is more refreshing? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which is more refreshing? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more refreshing? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which is more drinkable? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more drinkable? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which is more “more-ish”? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which is more bitter? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which is more bitter? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more bitter? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which is more sour? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more sour? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which is more sour? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
Which seems more watery? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which seems more watery? Drink 3 Drink 4 
Which seems more watery? Fruit 1 Fruit 2 
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Chocolate Group 
 
Which do you think is healthier? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which do you think is healthier? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which do you think is healthier? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is sweeter? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which is sweeter? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is sweeter? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more “chocolatey”? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is more “chocolatey”? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more “chocolatey”? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which do you prefer? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which do you prefer? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which do you prefer? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is more cloying? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more cloying? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which is more cloying? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is more drinkable? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is more more-ish? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which is more more-ish? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is thicker? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is thicker? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which melts more in the mouth? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is richer? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which is richer? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is richer? Drink 1 Drink 2 
Which is creamier? Mousse 1 Mousse 2 
Which is creamier? Chocolate 1 Chocolate 2 
Which is creamier? Drink 1 Drink 2 
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Appendix 4  
Obesity Pilot Study 
 
Subjects 
 
The sample consisted of 15 men14 aged 23-66 years with a mean BMI of 25.54. 
Subjects were split into four groups: Healthy weight (N=7, BMI=21.95); overweight 
(N=5, BMI=26.88) and obese (N=2, BMI=36.55). 
 
Method 
 
Subjects were emailed 4 menus (Word documents) and an answer sheet. Each menu 
contained three or four (depending on the menu) binary choices between two foods, 
one of which was a “high-fat/unhealthy” food and one of which was a “low 
fat/healthy” food. Each choice indicated when the choices were being made for: 
immediate or delayed consumption. The subjects were instructed to make the choices 
on their answer sheet at certain times of day: before lunch, before dinner (when 
“fasted”), after lunch and after dinner (when “fed”). This was counterbalanced 
between subjects.  
 
Results 
 
There was a significant difference between choices made when deprived and those 
made when fed in the healthy weight group (t[7]=2.518, p=0.04) but not the 
                                                 
14 It was thought at the time of piloting that the drug study would be conducted only with men, thus 
only men were tested in the pilot study. 
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overweight group (t[4]=0.513, p=0.635) and there was a trend in the Obese group 
(t[1]=9, p=0.07). There was no significant difference between choices for immediate 
consumption and choices for delayed consumption in any weight group (healthy: 
t[7]=-1.239, p=0.255; overweight: t[4]=0, p=1; obese: t[1]=-1.308, p=0.416). 
 
Figure  6.3 indicates that, numerically, the expected pattern of results was revealed. 
Subjects were more likely to choose the high-fat food if they were making the choices 
while deprived (bottom figure) or for immediate consumption (top figure). This 
pattern was shown in the healthy-weight group and the obese group, but not in the 
overweight group. 
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Figure  6.3. The expected pattern of more choices of the high fat food option when 
food is to be received a) immediately b) and when in a deprived state (bottom) is 
shown in the obese and healthy-weight groups, but not in the overweight group. 
